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Kosovan independence
Jun 1st 2007
From the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire
Russia is preparing to say nyet
Increasingly it is clear that Russia is poised to block Western plans to push through the UN a plan to grant independence to Serbia's breakaway Kosovo province. This poses a big dilemma for the EU which unlike the US cannot just walk away from the issue and which, not least because of its own miscalculations, is facing the prospect of yet another Balkan crisis.
Kosovo is formally still a part of Serbia but has been run as a UN protectorate since 1999. The plan of the UN envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, for the province's final status, supported by the US and main EU states explicitly recommends putting Kosovo on the road to independence. Kosovo is to have all the main attributes of an independent state, even during a transitional period of continued international (EU) supervision that is meant also to guarantee minority rights. It would be allowed to seek admission to international organisations, have its own security and defence forces, central bank, government, constitution and other trappings of statehood.
Unsurprisingly, the Ahtisaari plan has been rejected by Serbia and accepted by the Kosovo Albanians. For the latter, the prospect of continued, transitional international tutelage is seen as a small price to pay for the attainment of independence, which in time would become complete.
Security Council focus
Security Council focus
The Ahtisaari Proposal forms the basis of a Western draft UN Security Council resolution overturning Resolution 1244 from 1999, which preserved formal Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. However, Russia's long-standing opposition to an imposed settlement has steadily hardened in recent months, with threats of a possible veto in the Security Council becoming ever more explicit in statements by Russian officials.
The strategy of the US and other supporters of Kosovo independence has been to first achieve maximum possible unity in support of the plan among Western nations and within the UN, and then to isolate Russia and to ratchet up the pressure on Moscow to back the plan, or at least not veto it. The strategy has largely succeeded in achieving broad EU acquiescence despite reservations among some member states (many of which have their own actual or potential secessionist movements). EU divisions still exist, but Kosovo has been taken off the agenda of recent EU meetings to give a show of unity and help increase the pressure on Russia. The necessary support of at least nine members of the Security Council has also been secured, after several waverers—uncomfortable with dismembering a UN member state—have been persuaded to support the plan. Of the 15 current members of the Security Council, in addition to Russia and China, only South Africa and Indonesia have yet to come on board.
Russian opposition
Russian opposition
Russia insists that a solution must be the result of a compromise between Serbia and Kosovo, and not be imposed on one side. It has been strongly critical of the Ahtisaari plan as being one-sided and it has complained about what it sees as blackmail at the heart of the process and urgency to resolve the issue (the threat of violence in Kosovo unless it gets independence). During his much-publicised speech in Munich in February President Vladimir Putin accused the West of trying to "play God" on Kosovo. A month late Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking to the State Duma, insisted that Russia was not afraid of wielding its veto, adding "that's a matter of principle".
The May 30th meeting of G8 foreign ministers underlined the depth of Russian-Western disagreement. Mr Lavrov insisted on direct Serbia-Kosovo talks before the UN considers independence, and questioned why long-running disputes such as Palestine were not being tackled first. Although in the meeting Mr Lavrov reportedly refused to give a direct answer to the question of whether Russia would veto, in the subsequent press conference he said he couldn’t conceive of the Security Council approving an independence resolution.
Vital interests
Vital interests
Russia's motives on Kosovo have been widely misunderstood. A frequent assumption has been that Moscow was only acting as a spoiler or using the issue as a bargaining chip to extract Western concessions on other matters. Another wrong assumption is that Russia would seek to use Kosovo independence as a precedent to secure the formal break-up of CIS states such as Georgia and Moldova (this is the exact opposite of what is in Russia's interest).
Russia is a conservative power that has an interest in a UN-based order (which has been heavily eroded in recent years), whose foundation stone is respect for national sovereignty. Kosovo is seen in Moscow as yet another example of the West's selective adherence to international legality. At stake for Russia are the principles of state sovereignty and the inviolability of borders. This is a much more important consideration than support for a fellow Slavic country and historic ally, Serbia. Discomfort for Russia also stems from the fact that a change in borders will have resulted from a war that NATO waged in 1999 in the face of Russian opposition and without UN authorisation.
Russia is troubled by the precedent that granting Kosovo independence would set for others with separatist aspirations in the CIS, Balkans and elsewhere. It would be the first instance since the collapse of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia in which a sub-republican unit became independent. Indeed leaders or spokesmen for some of the 50-odd separatist movements around the world are already drawing explicit comparisons, arguing that Kosovo will underpin their own independence aspirations.
Although not primary, other factors also help explain Russia's stance. It would not be that simple for the Russian government to abandon Serbia, even if Moscow had been more circumspect in voicing its opposition to the Ahtisaari plan. Among the Russian elite there is still a sense of humiliation that Russia was not able to protect a traditional ally from NATO in 1999.
The possibility of intra-Western and especially intra-EU discord if there is no new UN Resolution might be attractive to Russia, given its currently troubled relations with the West. Finally, Mr Putin might want a tangible foreign policy success to round of the final year of his presidency. Frustrating what Russia sees as yet another instance of the US seeking unilaterally to reorder world affairs might fit the bill.
What will Moscow do?
What will Moscow do?
The Western powers seemed intent on pushing a Resolution based on the Ahtisaari plan (under Chapter VII provisions) through the Security Council in May or June. The realisation that Russia was prepared to use its veto, and the discomfort in particular of many EU states with the possible absence of a UN imprimatur, has caused a recent stepping back by the US and others, and a readiness to extend the timetable, perhaps until September in order to try to overcome Russian objections. It is thought that the Putin-Bush meeting at Kennebunkport, Maine, on July 1st-2nd might be the final opportunity to hammer out an agreement.
It is, however, very difficult to see how a Russian-Western compromise can be cobbled together even over a more extended timeframe, given fundamental disagreement on the core issue—where sovereignty resides. Russia has circulated within the Security Council elements for an alternative Resolution, close to the Serbian position, that reaffirms Resolution 1244 (and thereby precludes Kosovo independence), takes note of some elements of the Ahtisaari Comprehensive Proposal for the governance of Kosovo and calls for further Serbian-Kosovo Albanian negotiations. This might also open the way for the EU to replace UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).
Kosovo is at present just one of many points of disagreement in the increasingly fractious relations between a resurgent Russia and the West. Although crude horse-trading over Kosovo is not on the agenda, this is the context in which the extremely difficult task of trying to achieve a Western-Russian compromise over Kosovo will take place in the coming weeks and probably months.
Possible amendments to the Ahtisaari plan that have been mooted (a Russian official to oversee minority rights and perhaps some delays in Kosovo's independence and/or UN membership) are likely to be dismissed as window dressing and will not secure Russian agreement. For Russia to accept anything that remotely resembles the Ahtisaari plan would represent an embarrassing climb-down and loss of face. It would also imply acquiescence to the opening of a dangerous "Pandora's box", from Russia's point of view, of disputed post-communist borders.
The EU's quandary
The EU's quandary
The situation poses an immense dilemma for the EU. The US can in the end sidestep the UN process, as it has before on other issues, recognise Kosovan independence unilaterally and even pull its troops out of the province. The EU, on the other hand, cannot just walk away. To follow the US in recognising Kosovo independence, in contravention of existing UN Resolutions, would split the EU and make it very difficult to assume intended responsibilities in the province. Ignoring the UN as during the 1999 NATO intervention, does not look like a palateable option for most EU states this time around. On the other hand, to back off and effectively shelve Kosovo independence for the time being risks causing a major backlash among Kosovo Albanians, whose expectations of independence are sky-high--not least because leading EU states, and especially the European Commission, ruled out other options early on in the process.
The dilemma is part of the EU’s own making and the result of miscalculation. Whereas similar intractable conflicts have defied resolution for decades, leading EU nations and the European Commission presumed that Kosovo could be resolved in a year, and that Serbian and Russian opposition could be surmounted. Some in the EU also seem to have got carried away with what they saw as an opportunity to reinvigorate a rudderless EU and impart a new sense of purpose to the EU’s fledgling common foreign policy.
Instead, the EU is stumbling headlong into yet another Balkan crisis. Despite the fact that the US and Russia have the decisive input, major EU countries have shared responsibility for the process and the EU will now be left bearing the brunt of the burden of managing the fallout.
