17422 replies to this topic

[Kinik]

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Halo!

Ne interesuje me sVrBovanje!

 

Otvori tred o britanskom kolonijalizmu & nesretnoj indiji - pa tamo necu ni piskarati.

 

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[Beonegro]

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Halo!

Ne interesuje me sVrBovanje!

 

Otvori tred o britanskom kolonijalizmu & nesretnoj indiji - pa tamo necu ni piskarati.

 

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U laži su kratke noge i to ni pozivanje na sVrbovanje neće promijeniti   

[Kinik]

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Samo ti lupetaj, besplatno je.

To obicno rade luzerski likovi koji bi da zatrpaju svaku temu svojim domisljatim glupostima i primitivnim relativizacijama.

Ako vec ne znas o cemu se govori - sta se kog djavola javljas i pokusavas da nameces svoje sVrBovske skalamerije?

Drzi se ti sporta - to ti je primereno.

 

Tank god, da sam veoma dalek od tvojih 'istina'.

Toliko bih se nasekirao, da bih mozda stavio neki odgovarajuci, prasetji, avatar.

   

 

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[Kinik]

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[Beonegro]

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Samo ti lupetaj, besplatno je.

To obicno rade luzerski likovi koji bi da zatrpaju svaku temu svojim domisljatim glupostima i primitivnim relativizacijama.

Ako vec ne znas o cemu se govori - sta se kog djavola javljas i pokusavas da nameces svoje sVrBovske skalamerije?

Drzi se ti sporta - to ti je primereno.

 

Tank god, da sam veoma dalek od tvojih 'istina'.

Toliko bih se nasekirao, da bih mozda stavio neki odgovarajuci, prasetji, avatar.

   

 

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Ej   Nisam ja tema, ovaj silazak na lični nivo je tek pokazatelj nemoći. Ajde sada zdravo, i bodi tu slaninu i dalje.

[Atreid]

Ovo je odlomak iz memoara jednog lika koji je imao priliku da kao novinar sretne i intervjuiše Kejnza u Lenjingradu 1926. koji je doputovao na proslavu 200 godišnjice Akademije nauka. Bio je oženjen ruskinjom, balerinom. Nakon intervjua urednik je poslao tekst Zinovjevu koji je pozeleo da se sretne sa Kejnzom. Ovo je taj razgovor. 

 

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>> ... Zinovjev: „Hteo bih da čujem vaše mišljenje o perspektivama našeg ekonomskog razvoja. Naše najvažnije grane industrije, spoljna trgovina i banke su nacionalizovane. Možemo da usmerimo ekonomski razvoj zemlje ne na osnovu zakona potražnje i ponude, na osnovu anarhije tržišta, već u skladu sa određenim planom, na naučnoj osnovi. Nećemo imati konkurenciju u proizvodnji, neće biti pada proizvodnje, već samo postojani i stalni rast“.

 

Kejnz je odgovorio da je sovjetska ekonomija nužno povezana sa svetskom privredom, tj. sa ekonomijom buržoaskih zemalja Zapada, da će to vršiti stalni pritisak na ekonomiju Rusije. 'Na ovaj ili onaj način, bićete vezani i zavisni od svetske ekonomije. No, postroje i drugi faktori, koji će delovati na vaš ekonomski razvoj. Možete praviti kakve god hoćete planove, ali kako da ih sprovedete kada vaše stanovništvo nema nikakve garancije za svoja prava i svoju imovinu? Ne mogu da govore slobodno, ne mogu da kritikuju. Nisu sigurni da li će imati sutra ono što imaju danas, hoće li im imovina biti konfiskovana. U takvim uslovina nemoguće je praviti dugoročne planove razvoja'.

 

Zinovjev nije želeo da nastavi razgovor o pravima pa je pitao: „Vi smatrate da ćemo zavisiti od svetske privrede. Ali kako i u čemu konkretno?

 

Kejnz: „Ne možete stvoriti privredu potpuno izolovanu od ostatka sveta. Treba vam tehnika – mašine, oprema, potreban je kapital. Možete dobiti neophodna sredstva za razvoj privrede, recimo, putem zajmova. Ali teško da će vam neko sada dati zajam. Drugi način su koncesije. No, kod zaključivanja ugovora o koncesijama kapitalisti će vam nametnuti svoje uslove, ako požele da rizikuju i ulože pare u vašu zemlju. Koncesije su vrlo rizične. Ne za vas, već za kapitaliste koji rizikuju svojim parama“.

 

Zinovjev: „Mi uvek izvršavamo ugovore o koncesijama“.

 

Kejns: „Verujem vam. No koncesije u vašoj zemlji imaju još jedan aspekt. Prema ugovorima o koncesijama moraćete da obezbedite ruskim radnicima isplative uslove rada. Ali u tom slučaju radnici na stranim koncesijama u Rusiji imaće veću platu i bolje uslove rada nego ruski radnici u ruskim oreduzećima. Pa šta će reći vaši radnici kada vide da ruski radnici u stranim preduzećima imaju bolje uslove, nego u sovjetskim? Ili nećete štiti interese vaših radnika od stranih kapitalista? Na kraju krajeva, Rusija je vezana sa svetskom privredom putem trgovine. Možete dobiti neophodna sredstva za ekonomski razvoj vaše zemlje samo uz uslov, da vam je izvoz veći od uvoza. Ako to ne postignete nećete imati dovoljno sredstava ni da pokrijete budžet. Rusija je u carsko vreme izvozila mnogo žita, izvozila je i industrijske sirovine. Da li će privreda sovjetske Rusije biti u stanju da savlada konkurenciju SAD i Argentine oko izvoza žita, ili drugih zemalja oko izvoza drvne građe, lana i slično? To će biti moguće samo ako vaše cene za žito i drvnu gradju budu niže od svetskih cena. Ako prihod od izvoza bude manji od vaših troškova uvoza, moraćete u Rusiji da štampate novac, vrednost nacionalne valute će pasti i gubiti na vrednosti“.

 

Zinovjev: „Vi crtate isuviše mračnu sliku. Mislim da ćemo biti u stanju da savladamo to i da ne doživimo krah“.

 

Kejnz: „Samo u slučaju ako u vašoj zemlji radnici budu plaćeni mnogo manje od radnika u drugim zemljama. Ili ako uvedete skoro besplatni, ili prinudni rad“.

 

Tu je razgovor bio završen. ... <<

 

Eh, dobri stari Keynes,..

 

Nego zar ovdje na forumu proteklih nekoliko godina Keynes ne vazi za staljinistu, komunistu i sta sve ne,..?

 

Otkud sad to da ti citiras jednog takvog? Zadnje vrijeme doslo?

[Kinik]

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Ne lupetaj, troleru.

 

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Edited by Kinik, 27 November 2016 - 22:06.

[Atreid]

Ne lupetaj, troleru.

 

Molim? Ovaj, a sto? Pa meni se ovdje vec godinama objasnjava da je Keynes staljinista i ludak i svasta nesto, i da to sto je on pricao da nema veze ni sa cim,.. i tako to. Sad odjednom Keynes je kao OK?

 

Mislim dogovorite se, je l' Keynes staljinista ili nije? Je l' relevantan ili nije? Kako ovako arbitrarno, u jednoj situaciji jeste, u drugoj nije? Mislim, ne znam,.. ali vrlo shizofreno.

[Kinik]

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http://euromaidanpre...sor-of-history/

 

tajno pismo NKVD zasto se Ukrajinci imaju unistiti

 

 

Holodomor je takodje doveo do promene etnicke slike Ukrajine, jer su mnoge oblasti sa umrlim / preseljenim stanovnistvom bile naseljene rusima.

 

 

Takodje, prema pisanju stranih dopisnika, i u nekim delovima rusije je bilo gladi, ali ne masovnog umiranja stanovnistva, sto je u Ukrajini bila ciljana praksa.

 

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[Atreid]

(...)

 

I sta sad? Da pricamo o Holodomoru? A, "staljinista" Keynes nista? Preko toga da predjemo,..?

[Kinik]

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'Drugarsku samokritiku i istrazivanja budnosti' ces moci da vezbas na vasim debilnim sastancima, a ja sam strogo ibegavao leftisticku bulumentu.

 

Kao prvo, moras da naucis da citas sa razumevanjem.

Kao drugo - ni onda me nece interesovati tvoje ideolosko, leftisticko svircanje q.

 

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[Atreid]

(...) a ja sam strogo ibegavao leftisticku bulumentu.

 

Vidim

[Kinik]

...

 

 

>> ... RFE/RL Interview: Robert Conquest On 'Genocide' And Famine

December 08, 2008

 

RFE/RL Ukrainian Service correspondent Irena Chalupa interviewed British historian Robert Conquest in December 2006. They talked about the "question of genocide," famine denial in the USSR, and who was worse: Stalin or Lenin? (Conquest died on August 3, 2015.)

 

RFE/RL: [In November 2006], after much debate, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill recognizing the 1932-33 famine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Those legislators who argued against the bill -- the Communists and the Party of Regions -- argued that labeling the famine "genocide" would fuel anti-Russian sentiment. What do you think of the way Ukraine has handled this part of its history?

 

Robert Conquest: I don't know much about the internal politics and what caused people to vote one way or the other and things like that. But in my book on the famine, "The Harvest of Sorrow," I go into the question of genocide and note that by the definition of genocide at the time it was put to the United Nations, it covered a much broader field than the Jewish one.

 

It included partial attempts on nationality. I don't think the word genocide as such is a very useful one. When I say if you want to use it you can, but it was invented for rather different purposes. I can see that the trouble is it implies that somebody, some other nation, or a large part of it were doing it, that the Nazis are more or less implicated, they are Germans. But I don't think this is true -- it wasn't a Russian exercise, the attack on the Ukrainian people. But it was a definite attack on them as they were discriminated against as far as death went. But it didn't mean if you were a Russian you were doing very well in Stalin's time either.

 

But I think it's a good thing that the famine should be recognized. It's an odd thing but I was asked by the Holocaust Foundation -- they asked me to speak on the famine, on the Ukrainian famine some years ago and it's still on the record. They asked the Armenians to do the same. At that time the Ukrainian ambassador in Washington came to the Holocaust Museum. So the Jews were not forcing it as the same thing at all. That's the other danger. Once you start using these terms, you have to be not only just as bad, but just the same as the Jewish genocide. And it's not the same. As long as that's recognized. And I think there are guilty people, but they aren't the Russian nation or anybody else. They're a particular group of particularly horrible people.

 

RFE/RL: When your book, "The Harvest of Sorrow," was published in 1987, RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service translated sections of it into Ukrainian and broadcast it to Ukraine as a multipart series. I suspect that many Ukrainians first learned about the famine from these broadcasts based on your book. Famine denial continues on some level today. Why do you think this is so?

 

Conquest: I think there are people everywhere who are committed to think things which aren't true. This doesn't only apply to this -- it applies to dozens of things. There are Stalin deniers in general. There are, of course, Holocaust deniers, about the Jewish Holocaust. There are people who'd like to forget, or else to think, "At least I wasn't guilty, and if I wasn't guilty, somebody else was." To ask why people take peculiar political or other views is a long story which I've gone into in other books.

 

RFE/RL: What kind of scholarship do you think we still need to do on this particular period in history? Can the full story of the Ukrainian famine ever be told?

 

Conquest: I think the famine now is pretty fully established. Nobody will deny it anymore. I mean, only a very few people would deny it. There is a tendency not to know some of the actual orders given from above, from Moscow, to blockade Ukraine, to keep the famine in the Ukraine and in the Kuban. There were other areas -- there's Kazakhstan, of course, up on the Volga. There were other similar acts used again other areas.

 

But the fact that Ukraine and the Kuban were blocked off, and quite clearly that was partly due to make sure that the death roll was localized, not the nationality, exactly, but to the inhabitants -- and, in practice, meaning the nationality too. But Stalin would not call himself [anti-Ukrainian]. Andrei Sakharov said that Stalin was anti-Ukrainian, and other people have said the same. But he was anti-Ukrainian because they gave him trouble. But he was also anti a lot of other people. Because even when he was anti-Jewish in his great purges in 1953, he said: "No, I'm not being anti Semitic. We're killing only 10 Jews and four or five non-Jews in the doctor's plot. So I'm not anti-Semitic."

 

RFE/RL: You probably know Stalin better than most. Is it difficult studying someone like him in such great detail?

 

Conquest: A friend of mine has just done a huge book called ["Young Stalin,"] up to 1917, a huge book -- Simon Sebag-Montefiore, a British writer -- and he's found new stuff. There's a whole chapter on Stalin in London. He was in London for a few weeks in 1908 but he's found all sorts of odd reports and it's a whole chapter. So one can learn more and more and more about him, go into him.

 

In Russia they're now publishing books where the Politburo starts examining the basis of Stalin in Gorbachev's time, and they're arguing -- why did he kill everybody? They say, what, because he was frightened of losing power? They have these arguments, but they can't quite make out because it's irrational, and it's irrational in a very peculiar way. He's definitely not a normal, straightforward human being. I don't want to use psychological language -- it's too easy. But he's a monster, more than anything else. After all, he wasn't only killing peasants. He was killing his closest supporters. And in a very nasty way, after torture and so on. He doesn't sound like a modern man, a terrestrial man, an Earth man. He sounds like a monster from some strange planet. I've written a science fiction novel amongst my various writings and also some of my poems are science fiction and I think Stalin would fit in very well as a nonhuman. Part human, perhaps, it was a curious mixture of a monster and a human being on some very strange planet.

 

RFE/RL: Do you find that these tyrants -- Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot -- have a bit of a banality to their being?

 

Conquest: Oh yes, you're absolutely right. There's something very third-rate and unnatural, but not stupid exactly, about them.

 

RFE/RL: Mediocre?

 

Conquest: Mediocre, yes. Stalin, of course, massacred his intelligentsia and, of course, the Ukrainian intelligentsia. They're not only Ukrainian -- they're intelligentsia, that's the other point. I remember looking at "The Harvest of Sorrow" -- all the pages about the purges of academe in all the portions of Ukrainian studies and every other sort of studies. I found that half the professors had been shot.

 

RFE/RL: The crimes of communism are certainly very vast. Ukraine, like every republic in the former Soviet Union, has many scars. Ukraine was maimed by communism as a culture, as an economy, as a nation. How do you get healthy again after something like that? How do you recover?

 

Conquest: Well, obviously, it takes more time than people thought. Now we've got Cambodia and North Korea, which, if anything, were worse than Stalin They were stupider than Stalin, I think. There's China, who knows what China's like. Once you fall for a system like that, you suddenly find yourself empowered to kill a lot of people for no reason at all. I mean in Cambodia they were just killing people for killing's sake: "Time to kill a few more people".

 

And look at North Korea. I met a Soviet diplomat who'd been in North Korea, and he said that they've done more fakery than was possible in Moscow. More falsification. There's a big shop on the main street in Pyongyang, and he went into it -- lots of people buying lots of things, wonderful salesmanship. But he suddenly realized nobody was actually getting anything. Extraordinary.

 

There's another thing that's common to all Stalinists. These are rich countries mostly, but even poor countries in Africa can build good hotels; the tsars built good hotels. But the hotels in the Soviet Union were awful! Why? They could afford to build hotels to impress foreigners, but somehow they couldn't work it. So they relied on finding very stupid foreigners, which they found.

 

When we talk about getting over Stalinism it's not only in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, and Russia. It's in the West as well. After all, in Ukraine and Russia people were not allowed to tell the truth. Full stop. In the West, they were allowed to and they got themselves fooled, believed nonsense. They are more to blame than those inside Stalinism in some ways.

 

RFE/RL: What do you think stopped people from excelling under communism? Is it the mediocrity of its leaders that you mentioned? After all, they certainly had some degree of knowledge, some degree of talent, and certainly they had money. And yet they produced shoddy goods, their economies were second- or third-rate, nothing worked.

 

Conquest: Well, it was an impossible system both economically and ecologically, of course. When you, for example, see your seas drying up, you must know something has gone wrong. They did finally after 20 or 30 years that something's wrong. What? Perhaps our system's wrong. They did start thinking that in 1985, 1990, that sort of time. They knew something was wrong, and they had to get rid of the old regime. Of course, they still had more to do than that.

 

RFE/RL: I read a piece by Andrew Brown in "The Guardian" about you a few years ago.

 

Conquest: He made quite a lot of mistakes.

 

RFE/RL: Did he? Well, he writes that when your book "The Great Terror" came out, everyone could agree that Stalin was wicked and evil -- but Lenin, he had to have been good. Brown says that you claimed they were both cut from the same cloth. Do you think that 40 years later that sentiment still exists, that Stalin perverted Lenin's ideology and he is ultimately a better man than Stalin was?

 

Conquest: Was Stalin worse than Lenin? Well, it's not very difficult to be better than Stalin. So if Lenin was a bit better than Stalin, perhaps he was a bit. But it doesn't make much difference. I still think Lenin is over-praised, if not over-praised, then given a bit of leeway here and there which he didn't deserve. I think Stalin could be put down as killing more people, if that's your criterion. And Stalin certainly produced a system under which duller and duller and stupider and stupider people came to the top. But that isn't based on Lenin's system. I mean, Lenin died when he was quite young. Had he lived to the age of Stalin or Mao.... [Soviet politician Vyacheslav] Molotov always said, if anything, Lenin would have been even tougher than Stalin. Molotov said that in his conversations with [Felix] Chuev, a famous collection. In fact, he rebukes Stalin for being too soft occasionally.

 

RFE/RL: Why do you think communism, despite the fact that it has been totally discredited, still remains attractive?

 

Conquest: Well, let's start with Marxism. It's one of those beliefs you get into and it's hard to get out. It's hard to define. I do find when they get rid of Marxism or anything like pro-communism, they say to themselves: "Well, what do we do now? What are we thinking? We can't think like the bourgeoisie; we can't think like the foreigners. We've got to think like... who?" ... <<

 

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[Kinik]

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http://www.worldaffa...-unmakes-itself

 

>> ... september /  october 2010

Deleting the Holodomor: Ukraine Unmakes Itself

Alexander J. Motyl

 

T he first thing Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich did after his February 25 inauguration was delete the link to the Holodomor on the president’s official Web site. Yanukovich’s predecessor, Viktor Yushchenko, had made the Holodomor—the famine of 1932–33 produced by Joseph Stalin and responsible for the deaths of millions of Ukrainian peasants—into a national issue, promoting what Czech novelist Milan Kundera famously called “the struggle of memory over forgetting” as part of his attempt to move the country toward democracy. That Yanukovich turned his back so dramatically on this movement to rehabilitate Ukraine’s tragic past indicated the extent to which the recent election was as much about identity as it was about politics.

 

This was no accident. Thanks to the 2004 Orange Revolution, Ukrainian national identity has become synonymous with democracy and the West. And thanks to Vladimir Putin’s construction of a newly assertive Russian state, Russian identity has unfortunately become associated, as in Soviet times, with authoritarianism and empire. Yanukovich’s Party of Regions has its electoral base in Ukraine’s southeastern rust belt, the Donbas; the region produced, and is still proud of, both Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev and Stalin’s favorite proletarian, the coal miner extraordinaire Aleksei Stakhanov. It names its streets after Stalinists, displays statues of the Soviet dictator, and retains its Soviet-era identity as a Russian-speaking enclave with an authoritarian political culture. When president-elect Yanukovich decided to turn back the clock on Yushchenko’s Ukraine and reestablish its role as a client of Moscow, it was natural that he should begin by shutting down discussion of what historian Robert Conquest called Stalin’s “terror famine.”

 

Yanukovich’s assault on Ukrainian identity, newly resurgent following the Orange Revolution, has focused on education, culture, language, and history. Various policy measures have already begun to squeeze the authentically Ukrainian out of public life, education, and media. University rectors have been co-opted into supporting the new, Russocentric regime, while the only two holdouts—from the pro-Western Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv and the Mohyla Academy in Kiev—have come under pressure from the authorities. But the central target of the regime’s rollback of Ukrainian identity is history. As Yanukovich well knows, all new nations develop identities based on their understanding of history. Foundation myths, heroes, villains, defeats, and victories are identified—and sometimes invented—so as to create “narratives” that have implications for contemporary political movements. Americans glorify the Founding Fathers, while the French lionize their first revolution. Germans moved from sanctifying Otto von Bismarck to admiring Konrad Adenauer after the catastrophe of the Third Reich. So, too, have Ukrainians in the last twenty years been developing a distinctly Ukrainian historical narrative as part of their slow-motion embrace of democracy and the West.

 

A ny attempt to construct a distinctly Ukrainian identity must inevitably address the recent past. Ukraine today remains largely a product of the terror, violence, war, and genocide of Russian czars, Soviet Communists, and German Nazis. A 2008 study by the Moscow-based Institute of Demography calculated that Ukraine suffered close to 15 million “excess deaths” from 1914 to 1948: 1.3 million during World War I; 2.3 million during the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War of the early 1920s; 4 million during the Holodomor; 300,000 during the Great Terror and annexation of western Ukraine; 6.5 million during World War II; and 400,000 during the postwar famine and Stalin’s campaign against Ukrainian nationalism. ... <<

 

Alexander J. Motyl is professor of political science at Rutgers University–Newark.

 

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[Schrodinger]

da bi ti sa starom Grčkom upao kao običan padobranac.

 

Jbg padobranac, nisam te ja gurao da skačeš

Dakle, Corn Laws imaju podjednako veze sa Holodomorom koliko ima i atinski imperijalizam sa grckom danasnjicom. To je nesporna cinjenica, a sve ostalo je rusofilska propaganda i potreba za opravdanjem onoga sto se nikada ne moze opravdati. To je identicno kao kad relativizatori Holokausta zapene sa pricom o zlim jevrejskim bankarima, Rotshildima i Rockfellerima. 

 

Posebno je ogavno kad potice iz ovdasnjeg okruzenja koje je odavno ispunjeno sasvim bolesnom udbaskom anti-britanskom propagandom i ispiranjem mozga.