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Kraj Dolara!?

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Poll: Koja je buduca svetska valuta? (535 member(s) have cast votes)

Koja je buduca svetska valuta?

  1. Dolar (95 votes [21.02%])

    Percentage of vote: 21.02%

  2. Evro (196 votes [43.36%])

    Percentage of vote: 43.36%

  3. Juan (67 votes [14.82%])

    Percentage of vote: 14.82%

  4. Nesto cetvrto (94 votes [20.80%])

    Percentage of vote: 20.80%


#3811 siogadjura

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Posted 28 January 2013 - 21:27

A evo ga i drugi kandidat za next bubble ;) :





Health Care: The Next Bubble?
  Text Size    
  Published: Monday, 9 Apr 2012 | 9:29 AM ET

Student loans. Social-media start-ups. Apple.

All of these have been described as America’s next great bubble, readying to pop.


New research from Citigroup adds another specter to the list: the U.S. health-care industry. A pair of economists at the bank, Steven Wieting and Shawn Snyder, note that “functioning market price competition barely exists” in the health industry, whose per-capita spending is now nearly twice that, on average, of other developed nations.”

As the duo point out, consumers directly finance only about 12 percent of total health-care expenditures in the U.S., the rest of which is covered by private insurance and government transfer programs like Medicare (and this share is expected to fall below 10 percent in the next decade, absent major reform).

This helps explain how health-care spending has grown 2.5 times faster than incomes over the past three decades. “The health-care system in the U.S. reminds us somewhat ominously of the bubble in housing finance, [also] a ‘public/private’ partnership,” cautions Citi.

Of course, when taxpayer subsidies produced more housing than incomes could support, demand ultimately eroded and prices collapsed. Health care is different. If more of the cost of care is shifted onto patients directly, demand for some pricier services might collapse (and prices with it).

More likely, though, the market would come to resemble the market for other types of consumer goods: wealthier patients able and willing to purchase fancier products and procedures. Trouble is, an elderly patient who has a heart attack either gets life-saving (and costly) procedures, or dies. Demand is much less discretionary, and choices often bleed into questions of fairness and ethics that market signals alone can’t govern.

Still, concern about the need for nearly unlimited taxpayer resources to fund programs like Medicare has economists increasingly concerned. Indeed, Citi notes that “the housing boom and bust had a strong cyclical element to it, while the rise in health-care consumption…[has] no immediate end in sight.”

Even more troubling to Wieting and Snyder is that the spending on health-care today is inefficient and even wasteful, because the industry hasn’t been subject to market discipline, broadly resulting in costlier, less effective care. As they observe, “If today’s health-care expenses are unworthy of financing with today’s resources, why should future taxpayers pay the price for past spending and carry that burden along with their own?”

The Urban Institute, a Washington-based nonpartisan think tank, estimates that retirees are set to consume nearly twice the health-care benefits they have paid for with their lifetime tax contributions, as Citi notes; “In our view, the U.S. doesn’t have another decade to wait before making adjustments affecting future benefit recipients.”

#3812 JimmyM

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Posted 28 January 2013 - 23:24

Pff, zaboravio si sa kim razgovaraš ^_^
Nema veze sa će Jimmy da te podseti :wub:

    Daklem, da bi shvatili zasto dolar propasti mora, trebamo poceti od pocetka, tj kako je sve pocelo :


Noup, noup. ^_^
Opet si se ispalio. :heart:
Prvo balonče nije balonče nekretnina, već commodities balon, kada je dolarče otpegovano od zlata i drmalo je 70s, pa je Japanče iskoristilo burst i počelo da raste u, onako Opa China style fazonu B-)
Dok nije kolapsirao naravno :heart:
Vidiš kako ne znaš. -_-
Neobavešten si, hebiga. :wub:
Moraš više da se trudiš, ovako ti ne ide. :angry:

    Taman im se ispuhao ovaj bubble, kad eto ga novi


E, imam news, jako divan, taman još pošto ti slušaš, kako ono kažeš glavne baje, e, on kaže da to nije balonče :heart:

Naravno, paradigmatično, ništa bez paradigme :heart:

Bernanke Says Student Loans Won’t Cause Crisis
By Jeff Kearns & Janet Lorin - Aug 7, 2012 10:55 PM GMT+0200

  Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said record U.S. student loan debt doesn’t put the financial system at risk the way mortgages did because most educational borrowing is backed by the government.
“I don’t think it’s a financial stability issue to the same extent that, say, mortgage debt was in the last crisis because most of it is held not by financial institutions but by the federal government,” Bernanke said today at a town hall meeting with teachers at the Fed in Washington.
    Outstanding educational debt, which includes loans taken out by students and their parents, is estimated at $1 trillion, according to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. About 15 percent is private student loans, issued by lenders including banks. The rest is backed by the government.

Trebao sam da postanem hirurg definitvno, pa ja ušivam. ^_^


A evo ga i drugi kandidat za next bubble


Zamalo, ali naravno - with no success ^_^

No 'bubble' for healthcare IT, analysts say

    NASHVILLE, TN | May 16, 2012

    Leading financial analysts scoffed at the notion of a healthcare IT “bubble” that could slow the pace of mergers and acquisitions this year. Speaking on a panel called “Financing The Deal” at the Nashville Health Care Council, they predicted that 2012 M&A activity would be brisk, though not superheated.
    In the health IT sector, there’s currently a glut of buyers and not enough companies to acquire. There are many non-healthcare players like Lockheed-Martin wanting to buy healthcare IT companies – and many suitors for a limited number of clinical decision support companies. “There are still a lot of great opportunities for technology-enabled healthcare companies with a demonstrable ROI,” said David Jahns, managing partner at Galen Partners.
    The analysts agreed that deal-making this year won’t be dampened by uncertainty surrounding the future of healthcare reform. If anything, there’s greater pressure to make deals this year in advance of possible post-election efforts at tax reform.
    “There’s still a stable financing environment despite the upcoming election and the events in Europe,” said Jon Santemma, global co-head of healthcare investment banking at Jefferies & Company. “Valuations are down in some sectors like nursing homes and home health, which makes them good deal-making opportunities this year. And we anticipate a lot of deals this year involving private-pay companies.”
    There’s still about $350 billion in private equity “overhang”, which sets the stage for some rapid-fire M&A this year. “I look for a lot of activity in the mid-market private equity arena, with a lot of possible deals in the $200 million to $800 million range,” added Santemma.
    According to Irving Levin & Associates, hospital M&A reached a 10-year high last year, when 86 deals were completed. “I look for hospital transactions to increase,” said Ravi Sachdev, managing director at J.P. Morgan. “The attitude we’re now seeing is, ‘If I can’t be No. 1 or No., 2 in my service area, I want out’.”
    Panelists were reluctant to make long-range forecasts. “Five years ago, who would have predicted that you’d have payers acquiring HIEs?” said Jahns. “But that’s exactly what’s happening now.” The panel members agreed that one long-term trend is rock-solid: a lot of money will continue to flow through America’s healthcare system – enough money to allay dealmakers’ concerns about declining state and federal reimbursements.
    As for overseas deals, look for increased activity in telemedicine in 2012. China and India have been quick to harness the potential of telemedicine. And as one panelist quipped, “It’s easier for U.S. telemedicine companies to operate in China than across state lines.”

Teška srca ti ovo saopštavam :heart:


Health IT Bubble Is No Bubble At All
    Eric Lundquist | December 12, 2012 12:48 PM
    I was at the Boston event and I concur that the packed room full of entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and established vendors were in agreement that something big -- driven by tech -- is happening in healthcare. I was also there at the Internet bubble and the healthcare fervor has some big differences from that era of Pets.com, Webvan and Kozmo. Those Internet bubblers were solving problems that didn't exist. The healthcare upstarts are trying to solve gnarly business/technology problems in a multi-trillion dollar industry.
    CTO of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is at the forefront, trying to change an industry that at times seems cast in concrete. "Can technology-driven innovation be infused within the legendary bureaucracies of government?" I asked Sivak in an interview following his Xconomy keynote presentation. "The funny thing is, I don't think government is that much different from other large industries," Sivak said.
    Sivak, who came to the 90,000-employee HHS six months ago, was the founder of knowledge management company InQuira, which was acquired by Oracle in 2011. "Some of the greatest people I've worked with are in government ... [T]hey are people doing these projects for the right reasons, they are smart, they work hard and they are dedicated. But the way the system is structured can be risk adverse, with no tolerance for any sort of failure. What we are trying to do is to allow people to successfully experiment, even if those experiments don't happen to show the hypothesis to be true."
    In his keynote, Sivak said "data is changing the healthcare industry right now. Healthcare is an opaque market and you need transparency around cost and quality." He could have the biggest, big data project currently taking place in government. The healthcare industry is awash in data contained in silos, subject to various privacy rules, guarded by companies that want to keep the data to themselves, in an environment where paper and manila folders still rule.

    Figuring out how to mesh that data, maintain privacy and make it available in a customer-friendly format is a tech and business problem formidable enough to stump the best and the brightest. You need to take the complex data and present it in a consumer-friendly user interface. That information will most likely be viewed on a mobile device and, while difficult, there are some initiatives that are pointing the way. Sivak points to the Blue Button initiative as an example of a simple way for Veterans Administration patients to access complex data streams.
    Solving the healthcare big data dilemma has enormous rewards. Healthcare in the United States is a multi-trillion dollar industry (2007 figures were $2.26 trillion), and it is expected to continue to grow as the population ages. National health reform, changes in Medicare, and changes in the provider, insurer, and patient relationships are all creating a search for efficiency. This requires new methods of care, as well as the application of business analysis to an industry that traditionally operated under extensive medical and legal oversight, but little impetus for a customer-first attitude.
    That shifting relationship and the resulting business opportunities filled the room at the Xconomy Forum. Here are four technology trends that will change healthcare over the next five years.
    1. Cloud: "Payers are stuck with 25-year-old infrastructures. They are asking: Is there another way?" said Rob Gillette, CEO of HealthEdge. The prospect of a cloud-based architecture to mesh those information silos and provide patients, providers and payers with a consistent view into the healthcare system is one of the big health investment drivers. Rock Health, a venture capital organization, tracks health-related startups and lists seven in the health cloud category.
    2. Robots: The idea of a robot scooting around a hospital ward checking on patients might sound farfetched -- until you speak with Yulan Wang, CEO of InTouch Health, based in Santa Barbara, Calif. I interviewed Wang from Boston via the RP-VITA robot, which is a co-project with iRobot. The robot allows full-image, full-audio and (for the doctor or nurse) remote monitoring. The biggest issue holding back the wider use of robotics for telemedicine is not technology but figuring out the provider and payee reimbursement systems.
    3. Consumers: Consumer gadgets are expanding from music, video and social sharing to include health monitoring and health improvement. The most interesting one mentioned was Scandu, which is pioneering in allowing patients to do tests using a smartphone app that were once restricted to the doctor's office. Where this will lead is anyone's guess, but patients will increasingly know more details about their personal health than any one office visit can provide.
    4. Big Data: No tech conference is complete these days without some mention of big data. But just as Sivak's keynote address stated, big data in health may be our biggest data analysis problem with the greatest benefit. Unlike other industries where data on an individual or process may be sparse, the healthcare industry suffers from an overload of data contained in silos, often incompatible and very often still in analog, rather than digital, form. The cloud may help align some of that data, but it will be the data analysis systems still to be built that may finally turn data overload into just the right data being available at just the right time.
    Venture capital funding of healthcare technology companies is 70% ahead of Q3 2011, year over year, with the Boston and San Francisco Bay regions accounting for about half of the funding.
    VCs looking for "real" investments, as opposed to yet another social networking app, are betting on those shifts in the multi-trillion dollar healthcare economy to create superstar companies. I'm betting they are right and this bubble is no bubble at all, but the stuff from which great new companies will emerge.

Mislim ono, i jedna ciganka je bila kanditat za mega svetski show Zvezde Granda, imala žena kaže san da se obogati i kupi Ferari, ali hebiga, doživela debakl na audiciji :heart:
Vidiš kako Jimmy brzo podučava, sve slikovito! ^_^
A sad će da te nauči ujka kako balonče izgleda!


Chanos: Beware of China's 'epic' property bubble
By Catherine Tymkiw @CNNMoneyInvest May 2, 2012: 10:46 AM ET

Bearish investor Jim Chanos says China is in the midst of an epic property bubble that could face an ugly end.

    LOS ANGELES (CNNMoney) -- Notoriously bearish on China, Kynikos Associates president Jim Chanos is continuing to caution investors to brace for China's real estate bubble to burst.
        The hedge fund manager also sounded the warning bell about the outlook for Chinese inflation.
        "We're bearish on China's property sector and the credit sector," Chanos told CNNMoney at the Milken Institute Global Conference in Los Angeles. "This is a country that's in the middle of an epic property bubble and construction bubble that will end at some point and it won't be pleasant when it ends."
        Home sales began slowing last year, he said. But the problem is construction continues to outpace demand, and that can skew China's gross domestic product figures.
        "In China's GDP calculations, they don't look at final sales, they look at production," said Chanos. "So a condo being built but not sold contributes to GDP."
        China has been the fastest growing emerging market, in terms of GDP. But Chanos said investors haven't been able to cash in.

        "The growth drivers in China have been the wealth that has been accruing to the insiders, to the state-owned enterprise, not to the Western investors," he said.
        To that end, China's Shanghai Composite (SHCOMP) stock market has declined 16% over the past year versus the S&P 500's (SPX) nearly 3% gain.
        Beyond the GDP, uncertainty about China's inflationary pressure is causing Chanos some unease as well.
        He said if inflation is really 6% or 7% in China -- as opposed to just 4% -- that would subtract from China's overall economic growth rate.
        "That's why so many people worry about China hitting stall speed at 4% or 5% growth, which in the West we would love. If you factor in the real inflation, 4% or 5% might not be any growth at all," Chanos explained.
        So what should investors do?
        "Be careful investing in China based on GDP," Chanos said. "And you see it also in warnings from companies like Caterpillar (CAT, Fortune 500) that actually sell construction products. Business is down and disappointing."
        Soft landing or hard landing? "I don't know," said Chanos. "All I know is that this continuing model of using construction to drive economic growth is sowing the seeds of its own destruction."
        "We're pretty optimistic on the U.S.," said Chanos. "I think it's the best house in a bad neighborhood."
        In addition to touting America's intellectual property rights and patent protection, Chanos said the United States is on the right side of the credit equation.
        "If you think of the pig in the python, the U.S. is the pig at the end of the snake, Europe is the pig in the middle of the snake and Asia is about to be eaten by the snake," Chanos said. "We are through most of our credit issues."


 Mislim, sve pod uslovom da ne puknu i prave cifrice istovremeno, onda će da bude vesela fiesta ^_^


Fake goods, fake growth? Will the Chinese feast end?
        Published: Friday, Mar 23, 2012, 10:30 IST
        By Satyajit Das

        A significant part of China’s growth has been an illusion.

        Since 2008, China’s headline growth of 8-10% has been driven by new lending averaging around 30-40% of GDP.

        Given that (up to) 20-25% of these loans may prove to be non-performing, amounting to losses of 6-10% of GDP. If these losses are deducted, Chinese growth is much lower.

        The China economic debate is focused on the alternatives of a soft or hard landing. Both scenarios assume a slowdown in growth and transition to a troubled maturity.

        The case for the soft landing assumes that the investment and property bubbles are less serious than thought. Beijing has sufficient financial capacity to boost growth by loosening monetary policy and bank lending, while adjusting specific policies, such as lifting restrictions on housing sales to prop up prices. China is able to boost domestic consumption, replacing investment as the key driver of its economy. Excess capacity is gradually absorbed as the world economy recovers.

        Growth comes down gradually, without causing social and political disruptions.

        The case for the hard landing assumes the rapid and destructive unwinding of asset price bubbles and problems within the Chinese banking system. A poor external environment and losses on foreign investment exacerbates the problem. Growth collapses triggering massive social unrest and political tensions.

        More benign scenarios rely on the self interest of the Party and Chinese leaders, who will risk anything to maintain growth at around 7% or 8% to preserve social stability and control.

        But the end of a cycle of debt and investment driven growth is typically disruptive. Japan’s experience, which China has drawn on in shaping its economic model, is salutary. Japan grew by 10% in the 1960s, 5% in the 1970s, 4% in the 1980s, and has remained stagnant since, adjusting to the deflation of its debt fuelled bubble.

        China analysts like Michael Pettis believe growth will decelerate sharply as the identified problems emerge falling below 5% by the middle to end of the decade. While growth of this level is high by the standards of developed nations, it is below that required in China to meet the needs of its population and their aspirations. A lower growth rate is also problematic for external investors and trading partners, assuming higher rates of growth.

        Chinoise Exceptionalism...

        Interestingly, both scenarios assume China continues as part of the international trading system and the global economy. A deteriorating external environment, losses on international investments, foreign pressure on China’s currency and trade policy may drive a more radical outcome. Like its competitor the US, China might be tempted to embrace an isolationist policy as a way of solving its problems.

        China would de facto write off its foreign exchange reserves, but refuse to purchase new US, European and Japanese government bonds to avoid the risk of future losses. It would further limit access to its own market to foreign investors. China would then redirect its attention to the domestic economy and seek to rebalance its economy.

        External economic engagement would be sharply curtailed and would be limited to acquiring needed commodities, technology and skills in the open market on commercial terms. In effect, it would retreat behind a wall as a quasi autarky. Brazil’s import substitution industrial strategy is a possible model.

        A variation would be a Chinese zone of economy influence within Asia and the emerging market block. This would entail trading and capital flows within member nations, with transactions denominated in non-G3 currencies. China’s increasing interest in denominating more of its trade in Renminbi and establishment of currency swap lines with interested nations is consistent with this strategy.

        China’s large population and huge internal market provide a significant incentive to co-operation. As part of a deal to establish mutual swap lines between the central banks of China and Japan, Japanese investors will gain access to the domestic Chinese bond market.

        Isolationism is not a given. But criticism of China’s policies, losses on its foreign investment, domestic needs and perceived weakness of developed economies and their limited tangible future benefit may drive China to re-assess it policy of international re-engagement.

        The Chinese feast will end?

        The global economy increasingly looks to China to drive the world’s growth. These febrile expectations are ill founded. China’s GDP is only around 20% of the combined GDP of the US, Europe and Japan, which make up around 60% of global output. The view that China, because of its large population, can compensate for a decrease in consumption in the developed countries is fanciful. China’s consumption is only a little more than France, a little less than Germany and around 1/8th of the US.

        In the aftermath of the crisis, industrial and direct investors have looked at China for earnings growth and returns. High growth rates, fables of urbanization, rising domestic consumption and the need for investment in upgrading infrastructure have attracted investments. Fairy tales about how a billion Chinese would urbanise and consumerise, driving 10 % growth forever and replacing America as the global consumer of last resort captivated audiences at business conferences. In reality, a major source of interest in China and other emerging markets was that it wasn’t America, Europe or Japan.

        Investors generally chose to ignore the truth underlying the fairy tales, ignoring how the growth was going to be achieved. China’s debt driven and investment fuelled growth is now vulnerable. There is a significant amount of unproductive investment and mis-allocated capital. Some of this will manifest itself in the form of bad loans.

        For businesses seeking to capitalise on the domestic economy, there have also been disappointments.

        China’s median household income is around $6,000, less than 20% of that in the US where it is $45,000. There is a growing number of consumers, around 100-150 million, which is expected to double in the next 5 years. But a large portion of China consists of “survivors” (a term coined by research firm Dragonomics) whose income levels only allow purchase of basic food and other necessities, making them less interesting for foreign firms.

        China’s growing consumption has been a function of increasing income. But as China slows and the identified problems emerge, growth in consumption is likely to slow, limiting opportunities and returns.

        Chinese industrial policy and regulations has also favoured local incumbents. China lack of protection for intellectual property is well known with the practice of shanzhai or clever fakes widespread. The US Trade Representative’s annual report of December 2011 found that 8 of 30 of the world’s most notorious counterfeit markets were in China, including the infamous Silk Street market in Beijing. Around 20-30% of branded mobile phones in Chain are fakes. Estimates suggest that up to 80% of software sold in China is pirated.

        Financial investors have also discovered the “muddy waters” of Chinese corporate governance, fraud, lack of transparency and state intervention in business. The Chinese stock markets fell around 23% in 2011, remaining around 60% below its 2007 high.

        China’s problems are likely to affect the global economy is a variety of ways. As the Chinese economic slows, it will affect global growth.

        There will be significant effects on commodity prices and volumes, affecting resource producers and commodity-exporting nations, like Canada, Australia, Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Chinese demand for iron ore constitutes around 2/3 of the global market. China accounts for 15% and 23% of Brazil and Australia’s exports.

        It will also affect demand for industrial goods, especially advanced machinery. China consumes over $500 billion of these products, mainly imported from Europe, US and Japan.

        Chinese demand for dollars, euros and yen will diminish. This will force borrowers, primarily governments, to find alternatives buyers for their bonds. This may drive down the value of these currencies and increase the interest cost. A hard landing will be especially traumatic for the global economy, which has not dealt with its core problems - excessive debt levels, weak non debt fuelled demand and global imbalances. The crisis and its affects have been masked in developed economies by artificial demand from government spending, which is proving increasingly difficult to sustain. In China, it was masked by debt fuelled investment. Now, that feast too is coming to an end.


Nego pitam se koliko bubblea krije sve Kina? :blink:


China Economy: 2012 and beyond (Part 2) – Real Estate Bubble

7 March, 2012, 16:34. Posted by Zarathustra
Needless to say that there is a huge bubble in Chinese real estate, just as Japan had twenty odd years ago. While it is almost ludicrous to say that there is no bubble, because of the poor quality of data (or sometimes, no data), it is difficult to tell exactly how big the bubble is.
One of the approaches we can potentially know what’s going would be some casual observation, just as I have already done for one of the extreme cases of Hainan. And indeed, I generally feel that the problems of having large number of unoccupied buildings exist almost in every city in China, to a varying extent, and the problems are not limited to supposedly second-tier or third-tier cities or small towns, but also first-tier cities. One obvious weakness of casual observation, of course, is that it is very hard, if not impossible, to generalise your findings in a very limited number of places you can ever visit to the whole of China, which is a very big country.
If we look at the data instead, I would be just as frustrated as everyone else because of the lack of reliable data. There are, of course, some pieces of data which are consistently with the general impression that real estate investment increased significantly after the 2008 financial crisis as the Chinese government put in massive stimulus to counter the effect of the global recession. For instance, we did see new constructions increase across the board towards the end of 2009 and 2010 after contracting in the first half of 2009.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics
But this is almost where consistency ends with official data. From various sources of official data with various calculations, we could establish, albeit in a convoluted way, that potential housing supply (i.e. existing housing stock plus those already under construction and those land that has been sold to developers but constructions have not yet been started) at the national level is far too much for the entire population to cope with. The existence of oversupply is a question of how much.
In deriving the future potential housing stock, the starting point is the housing stock that has already existed. In this part, I have largely got to the same starting point as Jinsong Du of Credit Suisse has. First, I took the reported Per capita urban residential GFA (which are different numbers from using the total housing stock divided by reported urban population), multiplied that by the non-agricultural population (hukou basis) to arrive at the existing housing stock for 2010 at 14,514 million square meter. On that basis, the annual net increase of urban housing on average was 816 million square meter per year from 2005 to 2010. For simplicity sake, the 2011 existing housing stock is estimated by adding the 2010 housing stock and the annual completion of residential floor area. This is not a completely accurate of doing so, as we would normally have to account for, among other things, the floor areas being demolished, etc, which should point to a lower net increase in GFA. However, as we can notice from the figure that the annual completion (per National Bureau of Statistics) is always almost invariably lower than the net increase, thus for the purpose of this exercise, the reported 717 million square meter completion is used.
With respect to future supply, one can base the following analysis on the 2011 third quarter report from the Ministry of Land and Resources, which stated that the land area for residential uses which was under construction amounted to 355 thousand hectares, and land area for residential uses of which construction has not started amount to 165 thousand hectares (note that there were latest figure which says that land area under construction by the end of 2011 amounted to 479.9 thousand hectares, but as that did not separate the portion for residential use, here I use a smaller and less updated figures of 355 thousand hectares). That means the potential residential GFA supply currently in the pipeline will come from the total of 520 thousand hectares of lands.
Note that these figures are in terms of land area, not actually floor area. Thus to get the actual potential housing stock, we must multiply the land area by an appropriate plot ratio. It would be difficult to say for certain which plot ratio to use. Some, like this report, suggests that 1.5x is the right ratio, while Jinsong Du used 2.2x. Here, I estimate the potential housing stock on various plot ratios assumptions, from the low of 1.5x to a probably unrealistically high ratio of 3.0x.
The resulting total housing if all the lands are developed under different plot ratios assumptions will be as following.
Now when it comes to demand side of the equation, instead of trying to classify various types of annual demand (e.g. first-time buyers, upgrade buyers, investment, etc), which is a flow concept (similarly, I focus on estimating the total housing stock in the future rather than annual new supply), I focus on the population growth and the rate of urbanisation as the main factors, which should give me the indication of total floor area required in the future.
The reason I focus on the stock concept of total housing stock and total floor area required as implied by total population in the future and rate of urbanisation is that, unlikely many other products such as food, which will most certainly disappear forever after the consumer consumes the products, is that real estate stays there after being bought, used, and subsequently abandoned by the owner (to be sold to others). Or to put it more clearly, upgrade buyers will most probably sell their existing homes, which should be subsequently on the market, and people who buy real estate as an investment will (eventually) have to sell it to someone else ultimately to realise on profits (if any), or let it out at the very least. That makes the analysis that focuses on, for example, annual investment demand vs. annual completion totally useless, because even though investment demand can absorb all completion in a given year, these real estate will eventually be on the secondary market at some point in the future, and that will (if using the flow concept) add to the “supply” in the future years.
For the forecast of total population, I use the forecasts made by the UN population division. In terms of future rate of urbanisation, the various scenarios are constructed as follow:
Additional assumptions regarding per capita GFA have to be made. As mentioned before, the per capita GFA officially reported by the government does not match the figures derived by dividing the total housing stock by total urban population, with the total housing stock being reported by the government till 2006. As a result, the reported per capita GFA appeared to have been overstated.
In estimating the total housing stock required, I use the derived per capita GFA as a starting point (which is invariably smaller than the reported figure, as state above), and assumed that it will simply go up to 30 meter per person by the end of 2020. With all these estimates (population, urbanisation rate, per capita GFA), rough estimates of total GFA needed can be found. And the result indicates that by the end of 2020, under various assumptions, the total GFA required around 24 billion square meters to around 27 billion square meters.
Based on the analysis, one can conclude that if developers completed all the constructions on all the lands which are currently under construction and those which construction has not yet started, the resulting floor area could easily accommodate all the residential needs for the urban population at least through 2017, in which one would take the most bullish assumptions for both plot ratio (at 1.5x) and urbanisation rate (65% by the end of 2020). Using a moderate assumptions of plot ratio at 2.2x and urbanisation rate at 58.5% by the end of 2020, all the potential supply in the pipeline will be able to meet the residential requirement beyond 2020.
Note that the population forecast from UN population division suggests that China’s population will peak on 2025 and decline thereafter. If that is indeed the case, and if the current potential residential supply in the pipeline can indeed meet the requirement through to 2020s, China will only need to complete all the constructions on these 520 thousand hectares of lands and stop doing any constructions whatsoever, and China will be able to meet the residential requirement pretty much forever.
Of course, one has to recognise that this is not meant to be a precise estimate. Indeed, the range of results we see show that it would be brilliant if we could only get it roughly right. However, we can establish from here that it is not at all an exaggeration to assert that the housing supply in the pipeline can meet the demand through 2020, even though constructions stop after all the current ones in the pipeline are completed. Certainly, it is not likely that construction will stop altogether, nor are we sure that all those currently in the pipeline will certainly be completed. for example, we could well imagine that some developers will run out of money, thus not able to complete the work. Also, we would find it difficult to quantify the exact amount of residential floor area that will be demolished over the next decade, as it will make the current estimate of future housing stock an overstatement.
Another source of in precision comes from the starting point of the whole exercise, namely the existing housing stock one of the big uncertainties here, in my view, is that no one is exactly sure about the occupancy of the existing housing stock. We have already seen that large number of flats are empty as people bought for investment, not for their own use. But these housing stock will have to be sold to real users ultimately, or at least be let out, in order for investors to realise any return. it could take extra years just to fill up these vacant homes, which further intensify the problem of oversupply.
Finally, another source of uncertainty comes from the rate of urbanisation. Although it has been progressing at a very rapid rate over the past decades, urbanisation in china still lags behind major developed countries, thus one might say that urbanisation will increase requirement for housing. However, as Jinsong Du pointed out, at least some of the urbanisation was happening simply by re-designate some areas from rural to urban, and people who have already been living there owned houses. as a result, that does not increase demand, but it adds to housing stock. Secondly, i doubt if china urbanisation will really catch up with other developed economies. Research has pointed out that agricultural land as a proportion of the total land surface of china is well below international average. Urbanisation not only reduces agricultural land as lands are developed, those lands not being developed are affected by urbanisation through pollution and others. Thus rapid urbanisation poses threats to food security of china. To ensure food security, China does not need more city dwellers, but probably more farmers. Although this will certainly be a contentious proposition to be made, urbanisation might have come closer to the limit than the consensus thinks. As such, we could not count on urbanisation to help absorbing oversupplied flats in cities.
Real estate investment now probably account for 10-13% of China’s GDP. With over-investment in fixed assets (not only in real estate, for that matter) in various parts of economy, it will be inevitable that investment will slow down. Just imagine for a moment that if the above mentioned residential supply in pipeline will all be completed by 2015, and those supply can meet the demand literally forever, there will be almost no point of building anything beyond 2015. It would certainly be preposterous to say that constructions will stop on the land surface of China, but construction will inevitably slow down in the years to come. If growth in the contribution of real estate to GDP went to negative, China’s GDP growth could easily tip into what most would regard as “hard-landing”.

E sad kad reviziramo sve bubblse, vdimo dve stvari:
1. Amerika uvek izađe kao broj #1 :heart:
2. Emerging country uvek doživi collapse :wub:
I uvek na isti način. B-)
Poetika, čista poetika! ^_^

Edited by JimmyM, 28 January 2013 - 23:37.

#3813 siogadjura

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 01:29

Sad ide nastavak sage, ko je u stvari Bernanke :





Yes, Virginia, It Is Bernanke's Fault

As the Senate debates Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke's reappointment, it is striking how the media view blaming Mr. Bernanke for the Great Recession as being out of bounds. Of course Bernanke bears much of the blame for this economic collapse.

He was either in, or next to, the driver's seat for the last seven years. Bernanke was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board since the summer of 2002. He served a six-month stint as head of President Bush's Council of Economic Advisors beginning in the summer of 2005 and then went back to chair the Fed in January of 2006.

This crisis is not a weather disaster like Hurricane Katrina; it is a manmade disaster that was brought about by seriously misguided economic policy. And, after Alan Greenspan, Bernanke was better positioned than any other person in the country to prevent this disaster.

The basic argument is very simple. The country had an enormous housing bubble. This bubble drove the economy ever since the last recession in 2001. It propelled the economy directly through a building boom that sent housing construction to record levels. Indirectly, it led to a consumption boom as people spent money based on the $8 trillion in housing equity that was temporarily created by the bubble.

When the bubble collapsed it was inevitable that it would lead to the sort of disaster that we are now seeing. We lost close to $500 billion in annual demand due to the collapse of housing construction. The building boom created an enormous glut of housing. There will be little need for new construction for several years in the future.

The disappearance of trillions of dollars of bubble generated housing equity led to a plunge in consumption. Annual consumption has fallen by close to $500 billion. If we add in a loss in demand of close to $200 billion associated with the bursting of a bubble in commercial real estate, the collapse of the bubbles led to a fall in annual demand of close to $1.2 trillion. The Fed has nothing in its bag of tricks that allows it quickly replace $1.2 trillion in demand, which is why the country is now mired in double-digit unemployment.

In spite of the heroic efforts at obfuscation by many economists, there is not really much to dispute in the above story. Add in the fact that the bubble was both recognizable and preventable and you have a very solid indictment of Bernanke.

The bubble was easy to recognize, Bernanke just failed to do so. Nationwide house prices had already experienced an unprecedented 30 percent increase by the summer of 2002. Since there was nothing in the fundamentals of the housing market to justify this run-up and no remotely corresponding increase in rents, Bernanke should have already been aware of the housing bubble by the time he joined the Fed in 2002.

The Fed has a large arsenal with which to attack a housing bubble, but the first weapon is simply talk. If Greenspan and Bernanke had used their platform at the Fed to educate Congress, the financial industry, and the public at large about the existence of the housing bubble and the risks it posed, this likely would have been sufficient to rein it.

This is not about mumbling "irrational exuberance." It's a question of using the Fed's full research capacities to document the existence of a housing bubble (they actually did the opposite) and then disseminating this research as widely as possible. If this proved inadequate, the Fed also had substantial regulatory powers to curb the deceptive subprime loans that helped inflate the bubble in its later stages.

If talk and regulation and failed, then the Fed could have used interest rate hikes. A policy of raising interest rates with the explicit target of bursting the bubble, for example a commitment to raise rates until house prices fall, would almost certainly accomplish its goal in fairly short order.

Bernanke and his sidekick, Greenspan, chose to take none of these measures. Instead they insisted everything was fine the whole time. Things were not fine and the country is paying the price. And yes, it is very much Bernanke's fault.

#3814 siogadjura

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 01:35

A tek Greenspan, nobelovac :rotflmao:





Yes, It Was Greenspan’s Fault printButton.png
Dean Baker
The Hankyoreh (South Korea), April 21, 2010

See article on original website

Alan Greenspan is trying to absolve himself of blame for the economic crisis. He again argued that the housing bubble in the United States was caused by factors that were beyond the Fed’s control. Furthermore, he claimed that Congress would have attacked him if he had done anything to slow the growth in homeownership that helped fuel the bubble. Neither of these arguments deserves to be taken seriously.

Greenspan attributes the bubble to the worldwide decline in long-term interest rates. He noted that there were serious run-ups in house prices in much of the world, not just the United States. Greenspan argued that if he had increased the short-term interest rate under the Fed’s control, it would have had little impact on the increase in house prices in the United States, therefore the bubble was beyond the control of the Fed.

Greenspan’s argument suffers from several serious flaws. First, the fact that there were housing bubbles in many countries doesn’t mean that Greenspan could not stop the bubble in the United States. Each central banker is responsible for ensuring orderly markets in the economy under their control. The fact that many central bankers may have made the same mistake does not mean that none of them made a mistake.

Low interest rates create an environment that is conducive to the growth of bubbles. However, low interest rates by themselves do not necessarily lead to bubbles. The United States and much of the rest of the world enjoyed a long period of low real and nominal interest rates in the two decades immediately after World War II. There were no notable housing bubbles in this period.

Greenspan certainly should have been cognizant of the risk of a housing bubble in the low interest rate environment in the first half of the last decade. If he did recognize the bubble at the time (a point on which he is still not clear), then the Fed had many tools with which to combat it. The first tool would have been to simply call public attention to the bubble.

This does not mean mumbling “irrational exuberance” as he famously did when the stock bubble was first taking off. Greenspan could have used the Fed’s enormous staff of economists to carefully document the evidence for a housing bubble and the likely impact on the economy and specific sectors from its collapse. The facts were very straightforward and easy to recognize even as early as 2002. There had been a sharp and unprecedented run-up in house prices that had no explanation in the fundamentals of the housing market. Furthermore, there was no remotely corresponding increase in rents, indicating that the run up in house prices was not driven by the fundamentals of the market. 

If Greenspan had used his congressional testimonies and other public appearances to highlight these facts, it almost certainly would have affected people’s willingness to buy homes and investors’ willingness to issue mortgages. Investors may not agree with the Fed chair, but they will not ignore him. And, there were no serious counter-arguments to the bubble explanation for the pattern in house prices.

Of course, instead of making these arguments, Greenspan did the opposite. He insisted that there was no bubble – that everything was fine in the housing market. He even encouraged people to take out adjustable rate mortgages at a time when the interest rate on fixed rate mortgages was near a 50-year low.

The huge growth in adjustable rate mortgages also contradicts Greenspan’s claim that the Fed was powerless because it only directly controls short-term interest rates. Adjustable rate mortgages follow the short-term rates that are under the Fed’s control. Of course the Fed also had ample authority to directly crack down on many of these loans, which were being issued by the millions without meeting traditional underwriting standards. Instead, Greenspan looked the other way.

This brings up the second point, that the Fed was constrained by pressure in Congress to support the increase in homeownership. The Fed has been deliberately structured to be independent of political control. Its governors serve 14-year terms during which they cannot be removed except in the case of serious misconduct.

If Greenspan had attempted to prick the bubble, and in the process slowed the growth of homeownership, it almost certainly would have angered members of Congress. However, Greenspan’s job was to maintain economic stability, not to please members of Congress. If he believed that the housing bubble presented a serious threat to the economy, then it was his responsibility to take steps to rein it in, even if it upset members of Congress. Perhaps Congress then would have tried to undermine the Fed’s authority, but this risk is no excuse for the Fed not to have done its job.

In short, Greenspan’s excuses are lame. The Fed had ample authority to counter the bubble before it grew to such dangerous levels. No one can say with certainty that they would have been successful, but we can say with certainty that Greenspan never tried. This was an inexcusable failure and the reason that Alan Greenspan will go down in history as one of the worst central bankers of all time.


Ima jos toga, u stvari moze roman u nastavcima da se napise :lol+:





Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation But on Thursday, almost three years after stepping down as chairman of the Federal Reserve, a humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive power of wanton mortgage lending.

“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief,” he told the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

Now 82, Mr. Greenspan came in for one of the harshest grillings of his life, as Democratic lawmakers asked him time and again whether he had been wrong, why he had been wrong and whether he was sorry.

Critics, including many economists, now blame the former Fed chairman for the financial crisis that is tipping the economy into a potentially deep recession. Mr. Greenspan’s critics say that he encouraged the bubble in housing prices by keeping interest rates too low for too long and that he failed to rein in the explosive growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending.

“You had the authority to prevent irresponsible lending practices that led to the subprime mortgage crisis. You were advised to do so by many others,” said Representative Henry A. Waxman of California, chairman of the committee. “Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wish you had not made?”

Mr. Greenspan conceded: “Yes, I’ve found a flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I’ve been very distressed by that fact.”

On a day that brought more bad news about rising home foreclosures and slumping employment, Mr. Greenspan refused to accept blame for the crisis but acknowledged that his belief in deregulation had been shaken.

He noted that the immense and largely unregulated business of spreading financial risk widely, through the use of exotic financial instruments called derivatives, had gotten out of control and had added to the havoc of today’s crisis. As far back as 1994, Mr. Greenspan staunchly and successfully opposed tougher regulation on derivatives.

But on Thursday, he agreed that the multitrillion-dollar market for credit default swaps, instruments originally created to insure bond investors against the risk of default, needed to be restrained.

“This modern risk-management paradigm held sway for decades,” he said. “The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of last year.”

Mr. Waxman noted that the Fed chairman had been one of the nation’s leading voices for deregulation, displaying past statements in which Mr. Greenspan had argued that government regulators were no better than markets at imposing discipline.

“Were you wrong?” Mr. Waxman asked.

“Partially,” the former Fed chairman reluctantly answered, before trying to parse his concession as thinly as possible.

Mr. Greenspan, celebrated as the “Maestro” in a book about him by Bob Woodward, presided over the Fed for 18 years before he stepped down in January 2006. He steered the economy through one of the longest booms in history, while also presiding over a period of declining inflation.

But as the Fed slashed interest rates to nearly record lows from 2001 until mid-2004, housing prices climbed far faster than inflation or household income year after year. By 2004, a growing number of economists were warning that a speculative bubble in home prices and home construction was under way, which posed the risk of a housing bust.

Mr. Greenspan brushed aside worries about a potential bubble, arguing that housing prices had never endured a nationwide decline and that a bust was highly unlikely.

Mr. Greenspan, along with most other banking regulators in Washington, also resisted calls for tighter regulation of subprime mortgages and other high-risk exotic mortgages that allowed people to borrow far more than they could afford.

The Federal Reserve had broad authority to prohibit deceptive lending practices under a 1994 law called the Home Owner Equity Protection Act . But it took little action during the long housing boom, and fewer than 1 percent of all mortgages were subjected to restrictions under that law.

This year, the Fed greatly tightened its restrictions. But by that time, the subprime market as well as the market for other kinds of exotic mortgages had already been wiped out.

Mr. Greenspan said that he had publicly warned about the “underpricing of risk” in 2005 but that he had never expected the crisis that began to sweep the entire financial system in 2007.

“This crisis,” he told lawmakers, “has turned out to be much broader than anything I could have imagined. It has morphed from one gripped by liquidity restraints to one in which fears of insolvency are now paramount.”

Many Republican lawmakers on the oversight committee tried to blame the mortgage meltdown on the unchecked growth of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant government-sponsored mortgage-finance companies that were placed in a government conservatorship last month. Republicans have argued that Democratic lawmakers blocked measures to reform the companies.

But Mr. Greenspan, who was first appointed by President Ronald Reagan, placed far more blame on the Wall Street companies that bundled subprime mortgages into pools and sold them as mortgage-backed securities. Global demand for the securities was so high, he said, that Wall Street companies pressured lenders to lower their standards and produce more “paper.”

“The evidence strongly suggests that without the excess demand from securitizers, subprime mortgage originations (undeniably the original source of the crisis) would have been far smaller and defaults accordingly far lower,” he said.

Despite his chagrin over the mortgage mess, the former Fed chairman proposed only one specific regulation: that companies selling mortgage-backed securities be required to hold a significant number themselves.

“Whatever regulatory changes are made, they will pale in comparison to the change already evident in today’s markets,” he said. “Those markets for an indefinite future will be far more restrained than would any currently contemplated new regulatory regime.”

#3815 zg76

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 17:06

#3816 siogadjura

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 21:47

Da vidimo kako stvari stoje u autoindustriji:







Cars produced in the world - sources and methods

The data on global car production displayed on the Worldometers' counter is based on the latest statistics on worldwide car production issued by the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA).

A formula based on the current data available, historical trends, and projections is used to estimate total cars produced in the current year.

Because the auto industry is an important sector of the global economy, numerous analysis of sales data and future outlook are issued by financial and economic institutes worldwide.

National trade organizations are surveyed on their annual data by OICA. Each summer, a survey on the last six months provides a first estimation of the year’s production figures .

Definition of "car" and "production"

By "car" we are referring to passenger cars, which are defined as motor vehicles with at least four wheels, used for the transport of passengers, and comprising no more than eight seats in addition to the driver's seat. Cars (or automobiles) make up approximately 74% of the total motor vehicle annual production in the world.
The remaining 26%, not included in this statistics, is made up by light commercial vehicles and heavy trucks (motor vehicles with et least four wheels, used for the carriage of goods), buses, coaches and minibuses (comprising more than eight seats in addition to the driver's seat)

By "production" we are following the convention used by national trade organizations and referring to completely built vehicle (CBU) as opposed to assembly of completely knocked down (CKD) or semi-knocked down (SKD) sets when vehicle parts originate in another country.

How many cars are produced in the world every year?

In 2012, for the first time in history, over 60 million cars passenger cars will be produced in a single year (or 165,000 new cars produced every day).

After a 9% decline in 2009 (due to the 2008 global financial crisis), global car production immediately jumped back the following year with a 22% increase in 2010, to then consolidate at the current 3% yearly growth rate.

Going back in history, in 2006 there were less than 50 million passenger cars produced in the world, with an increase of 6.45% over the previous year. The increase for 2007 was more modest, and 2008 showed a decline. Analysts from various institutes had in fact pegged the year 2007 as the year which would end the 5-year cycle (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) of record global auto sales worldwide.

year cars produced
in the world
2011 59,929,016 2010 58,264,852 2009 47,772,598 2008 52,726,117 2007 53,201,346 2006 49,918,578 2005 46,862,978 2004 44,554,268 2003 41,968,666 2002 41,358,394 2001 39,825,888 2000 41,215,653 1999 39,759,847


Which country produces most cars?

1 out of 4 cars produced in the world comes from China.
China was the world’s third-largest car market in 2006, as car sales in China soared by nearly 40% to 4.1 million units. Soon thereafter, China took the lead and became the world’s first-largest car market, as low vehicle penetration, rising incomes, greater credit availability and falling car prices lift sales past those of Japan. Furthermore, vehicle penetration in China still stands at only about 40 vehicles per 1,000 people, compared with approximately 700 vehicles per 1,000 people in the mature markets of the G7.

More than half of the cars are produced in Asia and Oceania, whereas Europe produces almost a third.

Below, a summary of global car production by country in 2011:

Cars produced
% of total
world production
  South Korea
  Czech Republic
  South Africa
Last Updated: December 1, 2012
Which are the manufacturers and how many cars they produce?

The statistics on world car production include the following auto-makers: Anhui, Avtovaz , Beijing, BMW, Brilliance, Byd, Chana, Changhe, Chery, China National, Chrysler, Daewoo, Daihatsu, DaimlerChrysler, Dongfeng, Faw, Fiat, Ford, Fuji, Fujian, Gaz, Geely, General Motors, Great Wall, Guangzhou, Harbin, Hino, Honda, Hyundai, Ij-Avto, Isuzu, Kamaz, Kia, Mahindra&Mahindra, MAN, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Multicar, Nanjing, Navistar, Nissan, Nissan Diesel, Paccar, Porsche, Proton, PSA, Renault, Saic, Scania, Suzuki, Tata, Toyota, Uaz, Vaz, Volkswagen, and Volvo.

For detailed statistics on production by manufacturer, make, country and type visit the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers


How many cars are there in the world currently?

It is estimated that over 1 billion passenger cars travel the streets and roads of the world today.
The 1 billion-unit mark was reached in 2010 for the first time ever.

In the United States alone, 250,272,812 "highway" registered vehicles were counted in 2010, of which 190,202,782 passenger cars. (Bureau of Transportation Statistics U.S. Department of Transportation)


Na drugoj strani prodaja:





Forecast: Worldwide Car Sales Will Grow 4% This Year

Posted: February 29, 2012 at 2:03 pm


Global sales of cars and light trucks will grow 4% to 78.3 million units this year and nearly 7% to 83.6 million units in 2013, predicts IHS Automotive.

IHS-1-12-sales.pngThe industry research firm says U.S. sales this year will rise almost 6% to 13.5 million and climb 9% to 14.7 million in 2013. IHS expects sales in western Europe to fall 6% in 2012 but rise almost 5% next year. The growth rate in China, which slowed to only 3% last year, will accelerate to 9% to 19.5 million this year and 11% to 21.4 million in 2013, according to the researchers.

Car sales in Japan will soar 26% to 5.2 million as the country rebounds from natural disasters last year. But IHS predicts sales there will fall 10% in 2013.

IHS expects global light vehicle sales to grow at a compounded annual rate of 4% through 2019, reaching annual volume of 105.3 million units by then. The company predicts that key markets in South America, south Asia and China will outperform that average.


Zanimljivo, Kina je prva u obe kategorije, mada ovo nikog ne iznenadjuje ;)

Edited by siogadjura, 29 January 2013 - 21:48.

#3817 headhunter

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 22:43

Kako je ovo ruzno i masivno zatrpavanje glupim copy&paste radnjama. Dzimi  i SioMiGaDjura sa Alexom odaju utisak potpuno razlupane skupine sarlatana. Ovo je dno foruma.

Edited by headhunter, 29 January 2013 - 22:54.

#3818 JimmyM

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 23:23

Sad ide nastavak sage, ko je u stvari Bernanke :


Pf, ovo čak nije ni daleko - toliko razoružam protivnika, da on prosto mora da pređe u teme Scandalčeta. ^_^

Izgube se u ekonomiji, pa ono. :heart:

Nego to se sve objedini na finjaka B-)


Soros favors US monetary policy, warns of "currency war" -CNBC

  Published: Thursday, 24 Jan 2013 | 5:11 PM

George Soros: European Banking System Revived
Billionaire investor George Soros, provides perspective on Europe's banking crisis, U.S. debt and when he expects to see a spike in interest rates, with CNBC's Maria Bartiromo. The euro is transforming the European Union into something very different, he says.

NEW YORK, Jan 24 (Reuters) - Billionaire investor George Soros said on Thursday that he favors U.S. monetary easing policy, but warned of a "currency war" because of differences in how countries manage national deficits.

"I think the policy, basically, pioneered by Bernanke is actually the right policy," Soros told CNBC in an interview from Davos, Switzerland.

Soros was referring to the monetary easing policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve and its chairman, Ben Bernanke, of buying $85 billion in Treasury and agency mortgage securities per month.

Soros warned, however, that Germany's belief in tackling deficits through austerity clashes with other nations' preference for monetary easing, and could spur a "currency war."

"I think the biggest danger is actually, potentially, a currency war," Soros said.

"The rest of the world follows a different recipe from the Germans. Germans believe in austerity, and the rest of the world believes in quantitative easing," Soros added.



 E, eno je Jovanka na Zvezdama Grandama, vozi bicikli. :blink:


A tek Greenspan, nobelovac



A koga je SiogaDjurica citirao kao kredibilan izvor: :wub:


Kažem, neuspešno ti ide, ustvari pokopavaš sam sebe. B-)
Znaš već fazonče - nisam za Obamu, bullish sam na USA, pa valjda kapiraš koliko si promašio usled mog uragana i pobegao u oblast novi broj Scandala. ^_^


Zanimljivo, Kina je prva u obe kategorije, mada ovo nikog ne iznenadjuje ;)


Nemačka je već godinama SCI market broj #1, pf, opet nisi bio ni blizu, ništa novo, ne zadovoljavamo se mrvicama :heart:

Samo complete :wub:


A sad da vidimo kompletan market, gde će Kini trebati aprox. 100 godina da stigne USA kao najveći market sveta :heart:





Pf,  šteta samo što tih 100 godina neće doživeti ^_^


Ali dobro ni četvrto mesto nije loše :wub:



mada ovo nikog ne iznenadjuje


Paradigmatično ^_^

Nego da Jimmy nastavi sa brutalom, onako konkretnim stvarima, kidaju kao i uvek, naravno paradigmatično :heart:


China's bubble will burst - and take Asia with it, says Jim Chanos

By James McKeigue Feb 17, 2011
James McKeigue
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"China is heading for a fall", says Jim Chanos - and it "will take Asia and resource economies like Australia and Brazil with it".

Chanos, the short seller who predicted the collapse of both Enron and the US housing market, believes the Chinese property boom is a bubble that will eventually burst. Speaking to CNBC, he says: "The property crash in China will be worse than it was in America or the UK."

He notes that "real estate values compared to GDP are like Japan in 1989 or Ireland in 2007", and that "construction accounts for 70% of Chinese GDP". Debt is "spiralling upwards" and there is "$4 of credit for every dollar of GDP growth".

Many investors seem unworried because they assume that "the Chinese government can do what it wants. This is a "misconception" - when the crash comes the government will not be able to stop it.

Chanos, the founder and president of Kynikos Associates hedge fund, first made the call to short China last year and admits that it is difficult "to get the timing exact... The catalysts are obvious afterwards but not so easy to spot at the time." He first began shorting the US housing market in 2005 and notes that the "turning point" came when "the cranes stopped multiplying and construction slowed".

So he is prepared to wait on China. In any case, "so far it has been a good trade. China might not have collapsed but equities were down 20% in 2010".

Chanos, who has used satellite images from Google Earth to highlight Chinese "ghost cities", has been criticised by some fund managers for never visiting China. But he thinks "being on the ground is overrated. In fact, people in China get bamboozled the other way. They see lots of activity and think things are booming... But if that isn't economic activity, you're going to have a problem, no matter how good it looks. People should spend more time studying the numbers."



Naravno naša dobra stara poznata kuhinja i dalje sabija


Is China faking economic stats?

HONG KONG – As the Chinese economy continues to sputter, prominent corporate executives in China and Western economists say there is evidence that local and provincial officials are falsifying economic statistics to disguise the true depth of the troubles.
KEITH BRADSHER; The New York Times
Published: June 23, 2012 at 12:05 a.m. PDT

HONG KONG – As the Chinese economy continues to sputter, prominent corporate executives in China and Western economists say there is evidence that local and provincial officials are falsifying economic statistics to disguise the true depth of the troubles.

Record-setting mountains of excess coal have accumulated at the country’s biggest storage areas because power plants are burning less coal in the face of tumbling electricity demand. But local and provincial government officials have forced plant managers not to report to Beijing the full extent of the slowdown, power sector executives said.

Electricity production and consumption are considered a telltale sign of a variety of economic activity. They’re viewed by foreign investors and even some Chinese officials as the gold standard for measuring what is really happening in the country’s economy, because the gathering and reporting of data in China isn’t considered as reliable as it is in many countries.

Indeed, officials in some cities and provinces are also overstating economic output, corporate revenue, corporate profits and tax receipts, the corporate executives and economists said. The officials do so by urging businesses to keep separate sets of books, showing improving business results and tax payments that do not exist.

The executives and economists roughly estimated that the effect of the inaccurate statistics was to falsely inflate a variety of indicators by 1 or 2 percentage points. That may be enough to make very bad economic news look merely bad.

The executives and economists requested anonymity for fear of jeopardizing their relationship with the Chinese authorities, on whom they depend for data and business deals. The National Bureau of Statistics, the government agency in Beijing that compiles most of the country’s economic statistics, denied that data is overstated.

Some still express confidence in the official statistics. Mark Mobius, executive chairman of Templeton Emerging Markets Group, cited the reported electricity figures when he expressed skepticism that the Chinese economy had real difficulties. “I don’t think the economic activity is that bad – just look at the electricity production,” he said.

But an economist with ties to the agency said officials had begun making inquiries about the authenticity of some data after detecting signs that electricity numbers may have been overstated.

Questions about the quality and accuracy of Chinese economic data are longstanding, but the concerns now being raised are unusual. This year is the first time since 1989 that a sharp economic slowdown has coincided with the once-a-decade changeover in the country’s top leadership.

Officials at all levels of government, from provincial party secretaries down to county administrators, are under enormous pressure to report good economic results to Beijing as they wait for promotions, demotions and transfers to cascade down from Beijing.

A top corporate executive in China with access to electricity grid data from two provinces in east-central China that are centers of heavy industry, Shandong and Jiangsu, said electricity consumption in both provinces had dropped more than 10 percent in May from a year earlier.

Rohan Kendall, the senior analyst for Asian coal at Wood Mackenzie, the global energy consulting firm, said that coal stockpiled at Qinhuangdao port had reached 9.5 million tons this month, as coal arrives on trains faster than it is needed by power plants in southern China.



Au, pa strašno, ja mislim da će posle ovoga Kina biti poslednja komunistička zemlja - u istoriji. ^_^

Ono što se tamo bude dogodilo, a biće nešto jako bezobrazno, ima da izdresira svakog komunistu da čim pomisli na fotelju - odmah se seti Armagedona u Kini. ^_^

A sad da pređemo na malo detaljisanja i zašto nam Kinica štampa bezumno lovicu-momicu  :heart:




China Economy: Debts

7 March, 2012, 16:35



Real estate bubble seems to be invariably tied to debt. It is almost as if you could not have any real estate bubble without debt. In China’s case, however households debts are probably relatively small as (especially after the Chinese government tried to curb home prices) it is difficult for households to borrow to buy properties. Thus this has been one of the major bulls’ arguments on why the real estate market of China is not a bubble. However, for a number of times, I have been pointing out that real estate developers in China are quite highly indebted, thus I have correctly predicted that it would be struggling real estate developers who would start offering flats at lower prices, setting up for the burst of the bubble. Besides that, government’s finance may not be as good as it seems.

More than anyone would know

The truth about the debt problem in China is that no one really knows the truth, and just because households’ balance sheets appear healthy does not mean that there is no debt problem, and that by no means suggests that real estate bubble can’t burst, or that there is no real estate bubble at all.


Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government has pledged to put in RMB4 trillion to stimulate the economy. The size of the Chinese economy at the time was roughly RMB40 trillion, so the stimulus was more than 10% of the economy. The Chinese government has basically encouraged banks to lend as much as possible (just like old time), and allowed local government to borrow as much as they wish through the local government financial vehicles (LGFVs), which is the centre of the first big debt problem in China.


To stimulate the economy, these local governments got their funding from state-owned banks through LGFVs and started investing, mainly in infrastructure and others. At the time when the developed world was still trying to get banks to lend, banks in China have already lent billions and trillions of RMB. It sounded like something pretty enviable, but the potential threats of such lending spree only surfaces recently.


Professor Victor Shih was among the first to raise the question on the practice of LGFVs borrowing. He first estimated that by the end of 2009 there was RMB11.4 trillion of LGFVs debt, with additional 12.8 trillion credit lines. That figure was shockingly large at the time, but it only raised the eyebrows of very few people, and even the government had very little clue on the matter. It wasn’t until earlier this year when 3 government agencies audited the debt and come up with 3 completely different estimates. As it turns out, the estimate by Prof. Victor Shih was pretty near it.


The highest end of the estimate is from the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), of which they later denied such an interpretation of the number. In the 2010 China Regional Financial Operation Report, they suggested that overall banks’ lending in different regions to LGFVs did not exceed 30% by the end of 2010. Based on the total loans outstanding of Chinese banks by the end of 2010, the upper limit of LGFVs borrowing would have reached RMB14.4 trillion. But to be fair, it could mean that there were no banks in the entire country which lend more than 30% to LGFVs, which meant banks in some regions can be lower than that. The second estimate was by the CBRC, which came up with the number RMB 9.1 trillion. Finally, the National Audit Office’s estimate was RMB4.97 trillion, which I believed was an understatement. However, the National Audit Office figures also told us that there are other kinds of debts outstanding which are not LGFVs debts, and non-LGFVs debts amounted to RMB5.746 trillion.

No one really knows how much loans there are in reality, and even government agencies couldn’t settle. The definitions of those loans in different reports also make things less comparable. Thus, if one would like to be optimistic, the LGFVs debts along with other local government debts would amount to RMB12-13 trillion range. If one would like to be more conservative (i.e. more pessimistic), the higher end would be closer to RMB20 trillion. At the higher end, the local government debt-to-total-GDP ratio would be about 50% of 2010′s GDP.


So what these LGFVs are supposed to do in order to repay its debt? Local governments sell land to property developers. As the real estate market boomed, property developers were more than willing to bid up the price of prime spots, thus these governments are able to raise money to repay its debt.


On top of looking at government debts, which should actually be closer to 100%, we could also gauge the leverage in the system regardless of what type of debts they are – whether they are to the governmental entities or not. Below is a quick comparison between China and the US in terms of bank credits, bank assets, and money supply. As you can see, all of those measures in China exceeded similar measures in the US. Of course it is not completely comparable as China does not have a significant bond market yet, while many of large US corporations raise debts financing from the bond market. It nevertheless gives an idea that China has a lot of debts within the economy. Certainly there are more debts than people who think Chinese like to save can ever imagine.



Monetary tightening and that shadow banking system boom

While households in China have relatively strong balance sheets (at least it appears so on the surface anyway), that is not the case for many real estate developers, as some of the fund raising in the debt market early this year and last year has shown. The effect of massive fiscal stimulus and ultra-loose monetary policy was high inflation. Not surprisingly, this self-inflicting “credit crunch”, while necessary as far as inflation and real estate bubble is concerned, creates some problems for local governments, real estate developers, and small businesses.


Real estate developers, as pointed, are quite leveraged. With tightening in-place, developers have been finding it difficult to obtain financing. Some bigger names have been able to raise money from the Hong Kong debt market at very high coupon rates, and these bonds have been sold-off. Smaller names, however, would not have that luxury of getting any funding.

As real estate market cools, local governments are also raising less money from land sales as developers are becoming less keen to bid up prices. So as these LGFVs debts come due in the years to come, it will not be surprising to see some defaults of LGFVs as the returns on their investments are low. In fact, some have already attempted to default, previous mentioned here and here. To avoid downright defaults, the government has basically resort to the old tactics that Japan has been trying out after the burst of Japan’s own real estate bubble: it asked banks to roll-over loans.


The side-effect of credit tightening last year, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, was the growth of the shadow banking system, which has been outside of the formal banking system, thus not much regulated and not well understood.


The components of the shadow banking system includes trust loans, which are how many real estate developers get financing as banks are less willing to lend to the real estate sector. It also includes the underground/informal lending, which offers loans to businesses, primarily small and medium businesses. The reason why these businesses are unable to get funding is that banks have preferred to lend to state-owned companies as credit is tightened. As a result, these small businesses are forced to get loans from these underground channels, which often charge 20% or more in interest. Some of these businesses are also involved in real estate market speculations in hope to make a quick buck to repay the debt. Unfortunately, things are turning against them.


Another interesting bit is on the sources of fund. Some of the funding of these shadow banking are from depositors, who have been apparently quite unhappy about the low rate of return on bank deposits. Banks themselves have been packaging high-yield retail products, which were probably lent to real estate developers. Some funding of the underground lending might be from banks, so some people who can still obtain loans from banks have managed to re-lend the money at even higher interest rates. Some state-owned enterprises have also been involved in the shadow banking system lending.


There is little concrete statistics of how large the shadow banking system has become. Société Générale, for instance, estimated that the entire shadow banking system was RMB14-15 trillion large, of which 3.95 trillion is in entrusted loans, 1.49 trillion is in trust loans, 5.26 trillion is in bank acceptance bill, and 3-4 trillion is in underground lending. Thus on top the 20 trillion mystery of LGFVs debt, we have another 14-15 trillion mystery of the shadow banking system.


It might be tempted to think that the Chinese government has very little debt as the official number (~26%) would have led you to believe. Adding the local government debts (especially if you choose to pick the pessimistic case, which is 50% of GDP), Ministry of Railways (5%), policy banks (12%), asset management companies (4%), etc, the debt-to-GDP ratio would be close to 90%. Given the size of the state-owned sector in the economy, and assuming that the debts owed by state-owned enterprises are ultimately the obligation of the government, one can argue even argue that the public sector debt-to-GDP ratio on a consolidated basis could reach more than 200%.


The table below lists out some of the estimates of debts which are ultimately obligations of the government. Note that some of the figures below, while latest available, are not all for 2011 year-end, thus there is likely a slight understatement.




  Debt deflation? Or just massive roll-over and over and over?

In a capitalist economy, a private entity would try to get more cash to reduce debt during economic uncertainties. A private entity (let us assume it is an individual for the moment) would probably sell assets to raise cash if it is desperate to reduce debt. If everyone is doing the same, collective selling of assets will drive asset prices lower, making more entities facing financial troubles, and more entities will have to sell assets to stay liquid.


The banking system creates money by extending credit. When one entity decided to repay its debt, money is extinguished by the action of repayment of debt. In normal time, it is alright for the economy as it is quite likely that someone else would borrow money to make up the fall in credit as debts are being repaid, so the overall money supply would be maintained. However, in a situation where debt has become unsustainable for the economy as a whole, most people would be selling assets and repaying debt (or going bankrupt). These actions would reduce money supply, and hence general price level. Because debt level became unsustainable, borrowing would be weak. The only possible way to counter the contraction would need central bank to create money, such that the purchasing power of money could be maintained, not increasing.


Of course, a central bank under a fiat currency regime (as the People’s Bank of China is, and particularly as it is not that independent) can create as much money as it wishes if it does not care about the long-term consequence. That may give optimists an illusion that the PBOC can manipulate the economy or the real estate market, the illusion that the Chinese government can stop the fall of real estate prices at 20-30% and let them stabilise, the likelihood of reality operating in that manner is next to impossible. When one asset bubble went bust, that asset wouldn’t come back strong easily. American house prices, for example, have not bounced back even with two rounds of quantitative easing. So did the burst of dot-com bubble, real estate bubbles in Asia in 1997, gold bubble in early 1980s, just to name few. They ended, and did not come back, sometimes for decades.


The coming burst of real estate bubble in China will not be stopped simply by printing money. It will just be the same. The central bank, however, does have the ability to print a lot of money such that purchasing power of each yuan can be maintained by countering the debt deflation spiral brought by the burst of bubble.











Chief Investment Officer, Investment Management Associates

China Bubble Today vs. Japan Bubble in the '80s
Posted: 04/30/2012 3:10 pm


I am back from San Francisco, where I had the great pleasure of attending and speaking at FAME Symposium, diligently put together by students at San Francisco University. One of the other speakers was a famous international investor, Charles De Vaulx. During a break Charles and I were discussing the Chinese bubble today vs. the Japanese bubble of the late '80s. This conversation got me thinking. In Japan the bubble was the most prominent in commercial real estate and to a lesser degree in residential real estate. The house-price-to-income ratio (just take the average house price and divide by average income) in Tokyo at the height of the bubble was nine, while in China in 2010, in the big cities this number was much greater (Beijing 15, Shanghai 13), and in fact the ratio for the whole of China was over eight. The commercial real estate bubble might have been greater in Japan; it is hard to tell. I remember reading that at the peak of the Japanese bubble the Imperial Palace was worth more than a state of California. But from different reports I've seen, China has plenty of empty skyscrapers.

But China also has a couple more bubbles, in industrial overcapacity and overinvestment in infrastructure. Japan did not have an infrastructure bubble, for several reasons: first, it was a more developed country than China. Second, the government played a much smaller role in the economy -- Japan did not have a command-control economy, and it did not try to build for social/political stability reasons. Japan had your garden variety real estate bubble: easy credit, inadequate banking laws, etc.

Also, and this point is hard to quantify, but the quality of Japanese construction is better than in China. There are many reasons for that: less corruption, no five-year plans (i.e., output-per-capita targets), and the Japanese put a higher value on human life. I remember reading an interview, just a few years ago (before the high-speed-train crash in China) with a Japanese high-speed-train executive. At the time the Chinese were showcasing their high-speed-train system and rubbing in Japanese faces the fact that their trains traveled at higher speeds. The Japanese executive said something along these lines: "Our systems are very similar, since the Chinese stole our high-speed railroad designs. We could run our trains at faster speeds, but we just don't think it's safe." Japan has a population of 130 million people, which is shrinking. China has over a billion people and its population is growing.

The quality of Chinese construction is horrible; you read stories of glass and masonry falling off of buildings, and the latest story was of a girl swallowed by capsized pavement. So they'll have to do a lot more rebuilding in the future, and thus their return on capital, which was already very low, will actually be even lower.

Japanese economy, despite government debt to GDP doubling, has been stuck in a rut for over two decades. Just saying...




Au :blink:




  If You Thought the 2008 Recession Was Bad, Wait Till China's Bubble Pops by David Frum Sep 13, 2012 11:00 AM EDT



In one of the most thought-provoking pieces I've read in a long time about China, a long-time British resident of that country, married to a Chinese woman, explains his decision to leave. Below is a long extract from a longer article. Trust me, you'll want to read the whole thing.


Social status, so important in Chinese culture and more so thanks to those 60 years of communism, is defined by the display of wealth. Cars, apartments, personal jewellery, clothing, pets: all must be new and shiny, and carry a famous foreign brand name. In the small rural village where we live I am not asked about my health or that of my family, I am asked how much money our small business is making, how much our car cost, our dog.

The trouble with money of course, and showing off how much you have, is that you upset the people who have very little. Hence the Party’s campaign to promote a “harmonious society,” its vast spending on urban and rural beautification projects, and reliance on the sale of “land rights” more than personal taxes.

Once you’ve purchased the necessary baubles, you’ll want to invest the rest somewhere safe, preferably with a decent return—all the more important because one day you will have to pay your own medical bills and pension, besides overseas school and college fees. But there is nowhere to put it except into property or under the mattress. The stock markets are rigged, the banks operate in a way that is non-commercial, and the yuan is still strictly non-convertible. While the privileged, powerful and well-connected transfer their wealth overseas via legally questionable channels, the remainder can only buy yet more apartments or thicker mattresses. The result is the biggest property bubble in history, which when it pops will sound like a thousand firework accidents.

In brief, Chinese property prices have rocketed; owning a home has become unaffordable for the young urban workers; and vast residential developments continue to be built across the country whose units are primarily sold as investments, not homes. If you own a property you are more than likely to own at least three. Many of our friends do. If you don’t own a property, you are stuck.

When the bubble pops, or in the remote chance that it deflates gradually, the wealth the Party gave the people will deflate too. The promise will have been broken. And there’ll still be the medical bills, pensions and school fees. The people will want their money back, or a say in their future, which amounts to a political voice. If they are denied, they will cease to be harmonious.

Meanwhile, what of the ethnic minorities and the factory workers, the people on whom it is more convenient for the government to dispense overwhelming force rather than largesse? If an outburst of ethnic or labour discontent coincides with the collapse of the property market, and you throw in a scandal like the melamine tainted milk of 2008, or a fatal train crash that shows up massive, high level corruption, as in Wenzhou in 2011, and suddenly the harmonious society is likely to become a chorus of discontent.


How will the Party deal with that? How will it lead?


Unfortunately it has forgotten. The government is so scared of the people it prefers not to lead them.

In rural China, village level decisions that require higher authorisation are passed up the chain of command, sometimes all the way to Beijing, and returned with the note attached: “You decide.” The Party only steps to the fore where its power or personal wealth is under direct threat. The country is ruled from behind closed doors, a building without an address or a telephone number. The people in that building do not allow the leaders they appoint to actually lead. Witness Grandpa Wen, the nickname for the current, soon to be outgoing, prime minister. He is either a puppet and a clever bluff, or a man who genuinely wants to do the right thing. His proposals for reform (aired in a 2010 interview on CNN, censored within China) are good, but he will never be able to enact them, and he knows it.






Av, av, av ^_^

Edited by JimmyM, 29 January 2013 - 23:40.

#3819 siogadjura

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 23:37

Sta reci, koju poruku poslati...

Pozdravljam sve obozavaoce i predlazem sledeci link za dopunu znanja ;) :




Opet nema iznenadjenja :lol+: , Kina je no 1, ali ono sto iznenadjuje je da je 8 puta bolja od USA :ajme: ..


Eh da je ziv Henri Ford sta bi rekao za ovo :huh:

Edited by siogadjura, 29 January 2013 - 23:39.

#3820 JimmyM

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Posted 29 January 2013 - 23:53

Pff, ništa to nije, da vidiš kako se to radi ^_^
GDP nominal - http://en.wikipedia....y_GDP_(nominal)

GDP household final consumption expenditure per capita - http://en.wikipedia....ture_per_capita

GDP per capita - http://en.wikipedia....PPP)_per_capita

GDP (PPP) per hour worked - http://en.wikipedia....per_hour_worked


GDP per person employed - http://en.wikipedia....person_employed

U svim kategorijama ostavlja Kinicu u prašini, ono što iznenađuje da je Kina u nekim (npr. per capital*) gora i od nas, a u nijednoj jedinoj broj jedan, negde ispada iz topa 20 :wub:



Opet nema iznenadjenja




*pf, običan refleks :heart:

Edited by JimmyM, 30 January 2013 - 07:35.

#3821 siogadjura

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Posted 30 January 2013 - 01:14

Ko jos koristi linkove sa wikipedie osim pubertetlija da na brzaka urade domaci :)


Inace, kaze se per capita, capital je nesto drugo B-)


Nego, evo malo ozbiljnih linkova:





Cox and Archer: Why $16 Trillion Only Hints at the True U.S. Debt Hiding the government's liabilities from the public makes it seem that we can tax our way out of mounting deficits. We can't. A decade and a half ago, both of us served on President Clinton's Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform, the forerunner to President Obama's recent National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform. In 1994 we predicted that, unless something was done to control runaway entitlement spending, Medicare and Social Security would eventually go bankrupt or confront severe benefit cuts.

Eighteen years later, nothing has been done. Why? The usual reason is that entitlement reform is the third rail of American politics. That explanation presupposes voter demand for entitlements at any cost, even if it means bankrupting the nation.

A better explanation is that the full extent of the problem has remained hidden from policy makers and the public because of less than transparent government financial statements. How else could responsible officials claim that Medicare and Social Security have the resources they need to fulfill their commitments for years to come?

As Washington wrestles with the roughly $600 billion "fiscal cliff" and the 2013 budget, the far greater fiscal challenge of the U.S. government's unfunded pension and health-care liabilities remains offstage. The truly important figures would appear on the federal balance sheet—if the government prepared an accurate one.

But it hasn't. For years, the government has gotten by without having to produce the kind of financial statements that are required of most significant for-profit and nonprofit enterprises. The U.S. Treasury "balance sheet" does list liabilities such as Treasury debt issued to the public, federal employee pensions, and post-retirement health benefits. But it does not include the unfunded liabilities of Medicare, Social Security and other outsized and very real obligations.

As a result, fiscal policy discussions generally focus on current-year budget deficits, the accumulated national debt, and the relationships between these two items and gross domestic product. We most often hear about the alarming $15.96 trillion national debt (more than 100% of GDP), and the 2012 budget deficit of $1.1 trillion (6.97% of GDP). As dangerous as those numbers are, they do not begin to tell the story of the federal government's true liabilities.

David Klein

The actual liabilities of the federal government—including Social Security, Medicare, and federal employees' future retirement benefits—already exceed $86.8 trillion, or 550% of GDP. For the year ending Dec. 31, 2011, the annual accrued expense of Medicare and Social Security was $7 trillion. Nothing like that figure is used in calculating the deficit. In reality, the reported budget deficit is less than one-fifth of the more accurate figure.

Why haven't Americans heard about the titanic $86.8 trillion liability from these programs? One reason: The actual figures do not appear in black and white on any balance sheet. But it is possible to discover them. Included in the annual Medicare Trustees' report are separate actuarial estimates of the unfunded liability for Medicare Part A (the hospital portion), Part B (medical insurance) and Part D (prescription drug coverage).

As of the most recent Trustees' report in April, the net present value of the unfunded liability of Medicare was $42.8 trillion. The comparable balance sheet liability for Social Security is $20.5 trillion.

Were American policy makers to have the benefit of transparent financial statements prepared the way public companies must report their pension liabilities, they would see clearly the magnitude of the future borrowing that these liabilities imply. Borrowing on this scale could eclipse the capacity of global capital markets—and bankrupt not only the programs themselves but the entire federal government.

These real-world impacts will be felt when currently unfunded liabilities need to be paid. In theory, the Medicare and Social Security trust funds have at least some money to pay a portion of the bills that are coming due. In actuality, the cupboard is bare: 100% of the payroll taxes for these programs were spent in the same year they were collected.

In exchange for the payroll taxes that aren't paid out in benefits to current retirees in any given year, the trust funds got nonmarketable Treasury debt. Now, as the baby boomers' promised benefits swamp the payroll-tax collections from today's workers, the government has to swap the trust funds' nonmarketable securities for marketable Treasury debt. The Treasury will then have to sell not only this debt, but far more, in order to pay the benefits as they come due.

When combined with funding the general cash deficits, these multitrillion-dollar Treasury operations will dominate the capital markets in the years ahead, particularly given China's de-emphasis of new investment in U.S. Treasurys in favor of increasing foreign direct investment, and Japan's and Europe's own sovereign-debt challenges.

When the accrued expenses of the government's entitlement programs are counted, it becomes clear that to collect enough tax revenue just to avoid going deeper into debt would require over $8 trillion in tax collections annually. That is the total of the average annual accrued liabilities of just the two largest entitlement programs, plus the annual cash deficit.

Nothing like that $8 trillion amount is available for the IRS to target. According to the most recent tax data, all individuals filing tax returns in America and earning more than $66,193 per year have a total adjusted gross income of $5.1 trillion. In 2006, when corporate taxable income peaked before the recession, all corporations in the U.S. had total income for tax purposes of $1.6 trillion. That comes to $6.7 trillion available to tax from these individuals and corporations under existing tax laws.

In short, if the government confiscated the entire adjusted gross income of these American taxpayers, plus all of the corporate taxable income in the year before the recession, it wouldn't be nearly enough to fund the over $8 trillion per year in the growth of U.S. liabilities. Some public officials and pundits claim we can dig our way out through tax increases on upper-income earners, or even all taxpayers. In reality, that would amount to bailing out the Pacific Ocean with a teaspoon. Only by addressing these unsustainable spending commitments can the nation's debt and deficit problems be solved.

Neither the public nor policy makers will be able to fully understand and deal with these issues unless the government publishes financial statements that present the government's largest financial liabilities in accordance with well-established norms in the private sector. When the new Congress convenes in January, making the numbers clear—and establishing policies that finally address them before it is too late—should be a top order of business.

Mr. Cox, a former chairman of the House Republican Policy Committee and the Securities and Exchange Commission, is president of Bingham Consulting LLC. Mr. Archer, a former chairman of the House Ways & Means Committee, is a senior policy adviser at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.

#3822 JimmyM

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Posted 30 January 2013 - 07:28

Ko jos koristi linkove sa wikipedie osim pubertetlija da na brzaka urade domaci :)


Ne vredi, to ne menja ništa moju superiornu poentu i tornando F5 ^_^



Hebiga, opet nisi uspeo, Kina i dalje ostala u prašini, sada smo to samo onako kulturiška izdetaljisali da je u svim GDP aspektima iza, negde i svetlosnim godinama :wub:
Sa mnom ti treba kapacitet, batice, inače ćeš doživljavate same debakle. B-)
Inače, kao što vidiš, opet nisi bio ni blizu.

Nego, ono, pubertlije ne koriste wordpress blogiće i NWO tekstiće, to koriste bebice, to je ono malo što izađe posle 9 meseci i pokazuje šipak ^_^
E, ili oni dinosaurusi kojima je žao što im Kina nije ispunila snove. :heart:
Ali dobro, takav je život, pomirićete se sa tim, mislim, vremenom. -_-


malo ozbiljnih linkova


Ovaj, Jimmy vidi link, ali ne vidi ovo ozbijlno :huh:

Nema veze, Jimmy je fleksibilac, sad će on da ti saopšti news - tekst ti nije uspeo, doživeo je - guess what - debakl - again. ^_^
Ko i njegov autor (mislim autor ovde) :heart:


10/19/2012 @ 3:44AM |68,916 views
No, The United States Will Not Go Into A Debt Crisis, Not Now, Not Ever

If there’s one article of faith in Washington (and elsewhere), it’s the idea that the United States might get into a debt crisis if it doesn’t get its fiscal house in order.

This is not true.

The reason why it’s not true is because we live in a fiat currency system, where the United States government can create an infinite number of dollars at no cost to meet its obligations. A Treasury bill is a promise that the government will give you US dollars–something that the United States government can produce infinitely and at no cost.

That’s the reason why interest rates on United States debt have only gone down even as the debt has ballooned. That’s the reason why Great Britain has very low rates on its debt despite having very high debt-to-GDP. That’s the reason why Japan has an astounding debt-to-GDP ratio and still enjoys some of the lowest rates ever. Investors have bet for so long that there would be a run on Japanese debt and have ended up so ruined that in financial circles that trade is called “the Widowmaker”. (Here’s a more detailed analysis by my former colleague Joe Weisenthal at Business Insider.)

Well, what about Argentina? Argentina had to default on its debt because it had pegged its currency to the US dollar. It wasn’t sovereign with regard to its currency since it had to maintain its currency’s peg. It wasn’t Argentina’s debt that caused it to default, it was its currency peg.

What about Greece? Same thing. Greece hasn’t used its own currency for ten years. Of course it’s going bankrupt.

Does it seem that strange that governments can’t run out of money?

You don’t have to take my word for it. How about Alan Greenspan? He said (PDF): ”[A] government cannot become insolvent with respect to obligations in its own currency. A fiat money system, like the ones we have today, can produce such claims without limit.”




Ali ti se nadaj, doduše, nikako da ubodeš, ne ide ti, ali će Jimmy da te nauči, samo opušteno, nisi jedini koji nije naučio iz prve. :wub:

A dok se ti nadaš, mi ćemo malo one ozbiljne stvari, znaš već kako to ide kod mene :s_w:


9/10/2012 @ 12:07AM |19,225 views
It Is Impossible For The US To Default

With so many economic, political, and social problems facing us today, there is little point in focusing attention on something that is not one. The false fear of which I speak is the chance of US debt default. There is no need to speculate on what that likelihood is, I can give you the exact number:

There is 0% chance that the US will be forced to default on the debt.

We could choose to do so, just as a person trapped in a warehouse full of food could choose to starve, but we could never be forced to. This is not a theory or conjecture, it is cold, hard fact. The reason the US could never be forced to default is that every single bit of the debt is owed in the currency that we and only we can issue: dollars. Unlike Greece, we don’t have to try to earn foreign exchange via exports or beg for better terms. There is simply no level of debt we could not repay with a keystroke.

Don’t take my word for it. Here are just a few folks from across the political spectrum and in different walks of life saying the same thing:

    “The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So there is zero probability of default.” Alan Greenspan

    “In the case of United States, default is absolutely impossible. All U.S. government debt is denominated in U.S. dollar assets.” Peter Zeihan, Vice President of Analysis for STRATFOR

    “In the case of governments boasting monetary sovereignty and debt denominated in its own currency, like the United States (but also Japan and the UK), it is technically impossible to fall into debt default.” Erwan Mahe, European asset allocation and options strategies adviser

    “There is never a risk of default for a sovereign nation that issues its own free-floating currency and where its debts are denominated in that currency.” Mike Norman, Chief Economist for John Thomas Financial

    “There is no inherent limit on federal expenses and therefore on federal spending…When the U.S. government decides to spend fiat money, it adds to its banking reserve system and when it taxes or borrows (issues Treasury securities) it drains reserves from its banking system. These reserve operations are done solely to maintain the target Federal Funds rate.” Monty Agarwal , managing partner and chief investment officer of MA Managed Futures Fund

    “As the sole manufacturer of dollars, whose debt is denominated in dollars, the U.S. government can never become insolvent, i.e., unable to pay its bills. In this sense, the government is not dependent on credit markets to remain operational.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

    “A sovereign government can always make payments as they come due by crediting bank accounts — something recognized by Chairman Ben Bernanke when he said the Fed spends by marking up the size of the reserve accounts of banks.” L. Randall Wray, Professor of Economics at the University of Missouri-Kansas City and a Senior Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute

Mind you, that doesn’t mean there might not be other economic or political consequences. Inflation and currency depreciation, for example, are possibilities. Also from Dr. Wray:

    “Government needs to be concerned about pressures on inflation and the exchange rate should its spending become excessive. And it should avoid “crowding out” private initiative by moving too many resources to our public sector. However, with high unemployment and idle plant and equipment, no one can reasonably argue that these dangers are imminent.”


Indeed, we have seen neither hide nor hair of inflation or high interest rates during the current run up of the debt. It is critical to bear in mind, too, that these deficits are not a result of the government trying to buy something it cannot otherwise afford (as would be the case for you or me). Rather, they are setting out to generate sufficient demand for goods and services to employ all those willing to work (that said, not every kind of government spending does this effectively, but that’s a different question). As there is no limit to how much debt we can successfully carry, we should be aggressively pursuing the latter goal rather than talking about being “fiscally responsible.” There is nothing responsible about leaving over 12 million Americans out of work.

We have plenty of problems in the world. No point in making one up.



I tako prođe još jedan talas generacije koja se ponadala svrgavanju Amerike -_-

Ova je najbrže prošla, ali dobro, proživeo sam 2 generacije i naravno čekam treću :wub:

Kapiram da će Indija (i Afrika, al tamo za 80 godina) trajati malko duže. ^_^

Nego da nastavimo mi B-)



Nobody Understands Debt
Published: January 1, 2012 712 Comments
Fred R. Conrad/The New York Times

United States Economy


This misplaced focus said a lot about our political culture, in particular about how disconnected Congress is from the suffering of ordinary Americans. But it also revealed something else: when people in D.C. talk about deficits and debt, by and large they have no idea what they’re talking about — and the people who talk the most understand the least.

Perhaps most obviously, the economic “experts” on whom much of Congress relies have been repeatedly, utterly wrong about the short-run effects of budget deficits. People who get their economic analysis from the likes of the Heritage Foundation have been waiting ever since President Obama took office for budget deficits to send interest rates soaring. Any day now!

And while they’ve been waiting, those rates have dropped to historical lows. You might think that this would make politicians question their choice of experts — that is, you might think that if you didn’t know anything about our postmodern, fact-free politics.

But Washington isn’t just confused about the short run; it’s also confused about the long run. For while debt can be a problem, the way our politicians and pundits think about debt is all wrong, and exaggerates the problem’s size.

Deficit-worriers portray a future in which we’re impoverished by the need to pay back money we’ve been borrowing. They see America as being like a family that took out too large a mortgage, and will have a hard time making the monthly payments.

This is, however, a really bad analogy in at least two ways.

First, families have to pay back their debt. Governments don’t — all they need to do is ensure that debt grows more slowly than their tax base. The debt from World War II was never repaid; it just became increasingly irrelevant as the U.S. economy grew, and with it the income subject to taxation.

Second — and this is the point almost nobody seems to get — an over-borrowed family owes money to someone else; U.S. debt is, to a large extent, money we owe to ourselves.

This was clearly true of the debt incurred to win World War II. Taxpayers were on the hook for a debt that was significantly bigger, as a percentage of G.D.P., than debt today; but that debt was also owned by taxpayers, such as all the people who bought savings bonds. So the debt didn’t make postwar America poorer. In particular, the debt didn’t prevent the postwar generation from experiencing the biggest rise in incomes and living standards in our nation’s history.






Nego još malo divnih tekstova ^_^



8/12/2012 @ 4:14PM |75,371 views
China Is Running Out Of Money
Comment Now

One hundred China Yuan Renminbi bank notes wit...


Last week’s release of disappointing economic and trade data for July has, predictably, renewed calls for additional stimulus.  In May, Beijing ramped up its support for the economy, and observers had expected activity to pick up by last month.

At first glance, that proposition seems preposterous.  After all, the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, held $3.24 trillion of foreign currency reserves at the end of the first half of this year.  Yet foreign currency, no matter how plentiful, has limited usefulness in a local currency crisis.  In any event, the PBOC’s foreign currency holdings are almost evenly matched with renminbi-denominated liabilities that were incurred to acquire all those dollars, pounds, euros, and yen.  As a result, the central bank cannot use the reserves without driving itself deep—actually, deeper—into insolvency.

The recent slight decline in the value of the renminbi versus the dollar has decreased the amount of the PBOC’s liabilities in relations to its assets and has therefore marginally strengthened its balance sheet, but the central bank still does not have the flexibility to use its reserves as it pleases.  Therefore, a massive foreign currency injection into the economy, even if it would work, is not in the cards.

Nonetheless, the central bank could, as it did beginning in 2003, inject a limited amount of reserves into the country’s state banks to permit them to lend more money.  The last stimulus program, announced at the end of 2008, created growth primarily because the state banks, at Beijing’s direction, embarked on an extraordinary lending spree.  In 2009, for instance, new local currency lending reached a record 9.59 trillion yuan, just about double that of 2008.  The loan-a-thon continued in 2010 and 2011 as the economy got hooked on easy credit.

The lending spree has ended, however.  The state banks cannot fund all the hundreds of new projects—500 according to one count—that Beijing and local governments have announced in recent months.  Why?  Many of the loans central technocrats forced bankers to make since 2008 will never be repaid.

The China Banking Regulatory Commission claimed the banks’ nonperforming loan ratio at the end of the first quarter was 0.9%, but even the regulator expresses doubts about its own figure.  And the rapid buildup of bad loans since the end of 2008 will have consequences.

Banks, despite what the CBRC says, are burdened by questionable loans and will have to scrounge for funding before they can make long-term commitments for stimulus projects.  Tsinghua University’s Patrick Chovanec reports that this year banks have managed to make new loans but most of them have been short-term.  Moreover, he notes these financial institutions will have problems soon as they will need their remaining liquidity to refinance wealth management and property trust products coming due.  In short, they will scramble just to find the cash for existing commitments.  Funds for new projects—the ones that represent growth—will be scarce.  In July, not surprisingly, new renminbi lending fell, dropping below all estimates to 540.1 billion yuan from 919.8 billion in June.

In any event, economists believe infrastructure—stimulus—spending will only make up for declining demand from private businesses.  As the Wall Street Journal’s Tom Orlik reports, such spending is not expected to stimulate growth.

Despite everything, some cities are getting funding for new projects, but that’s only because the CBRC has essentially ordered the banks to shovel funds to the uncreditworthy local government financing vehicles.  Just months ago, Chovanec notes, these borrowers were on the “do-not-lend list.”  Yet many localities, even after the lending taps were opened, are still cash-strapped.

So how bad is the situation?  Anne Stevenson-Yang of J Capital Research reports that the tax bureau of one of China’s largest cities “has no money.”  Its officials, incredibly, have been told to collect their own salaries from taxpayers directly.  The breakdown of government in that city is also evident across the country, where localities are now desperate for revenue.



Av :heart:


China’s Economy is Still Heading for a Hard Landing – Here’s a Better Bet
Written on 09 January 2013 by John Stepek

Early last year, the idea that China’s miracle economy might finally have sprung a leak started to gain some acceptance by even the biggest China bulls.

After all, it was pretty hard to keep arguing that growth could never fall below the magic 8% level when even the Chinese government said it come in at around 7%.

As Edward Chancellor points out in an excellent column for the FT’s funds supplement this morning, there is one predictor of financial crisis that is unmatched: “reckless credit expansion”.

Chancellor quotes from a paper by Claudio Borio at the Bank for International Settlements. Borio tries to highlight the importance of the credit cycle (in other words, how tight or loose lending is) to understanding macro-economics. He observed that “economic hard landings often followed periods of strong credit growth and house price inflation”.

This shouldn’t be a controversial topic, but it is. Maddeningly, the people in charge still argue that the financial crisis came out of nowhere. You can see why: it gets them off the hook. But it’s entirely wrong. “We have forgotten the basic law that every credit boom… contains the seeds of its own demise.”

Borio’s point is that the credit boom years are an aberration: “Reckless credit expansion spurs unsustainable growth and results in the misallocation of capital.” In other words, money gets thrown at projects and investments that can’t ever pay for themselves.

When the bust comes, the best thing to do is let the bad investments unwind and go bust. If you instead try to get back to the boom years by using ultra-loose monetary policy, all you do is “delay the resolution of economic imbalances and even generate new asset price bubbles”. That’s what Alan Greenspan did after the tech bubble burst, and it’s what Ben Bernanke is trying to do now.

By this measure, which country currently looks most vulnerable to a hard landing? China, of course. As Chancellor reminds us, China’s ratio of debt to GDP rose by 60 percentage points in the five years to 2012.

By itself, that probably doesn’t mean much to you. So to put it in perspective, that’s “a much larger increase than that experienced by either the US prior to 2008 or by Japan in the second half of the 1980s”.

In other words, China’s economy has ‘geared up’ more dramatically than either the US or the Japan did right before two of the most devastating economic collapses in living memory. And despite government attempts to cool the property bubble, credit has gone on expanding. “Last year, China’s non-financial credit expanded by a staggering 33%.”

As for ‘malinvestment’, Michael Pettis, a professor at Peking University, flags up an International Monetary Fund paper which investigates just how mad China has gone with its infrastructure investment.

In short, China has used its citizens’ savings to subsidise huge levels of investment in infrastructure. This can’t carry on. If it does, says Pettis, “overinvestment will contribute to further financial fragility leading, ultimately, to the point where credit cannot expand quickly enough and investment will collapse anyway”. But China’s growth meanwhile has become so dependent on this level of investment, that any slowdown or adjustment will hit growth hard.

So either way the country is in trouble.






Why China's Housing Bubble Will End Badly
By Charles Hugh Smith


China real estateImagine that your local city and county controlled all land rights, and the only ownership a private builder or developer could secure was a long-term lease. Now imagine that 40% of the city and county's revenues come from the lease fees paid by developers. Next, imagine a giant real estate bubble has priced most residents out of the market, and that the local governments are reaping huge gains as the development rights and leases they sell are skyrocketing.

Can you say conflict of interest?

That's the Chinese real estate dynamic in a nutshell. Local governments have every incentive to push lease prices higher, further fueling China's real estate bubble, and zero incentive to build low-cost housing for the average citizen.

Who Benefits

Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently described who benefits from what he termed China's "irrationally exuberant" property market: Local government and its officials, and state-owned enterprises (SEOs), which have exploited their ties to government-controlled banks to enter the speculative real estate market with a vengeance.

"With access to almost unlimited no-cost credit from the state-controlled banking system," he wrote, "these behemoths have abused their financial clout and plunged headlong into the real estate market, snapping up high-priced land and investing in high-end residential housing units that now sit empty across the country."

Once you understand this dynamic, it's not difficult to see why China's housing bubble will end badly. Local governments are so heavily dependent on development fees and taxes for their revenues that any fallback in new development will spell catastrophe for city and regional government budgets.

Who Pays for the Bailout

Who will lose when the bubble inevitably deflates?

Residents will suffer because government services will have to be slashed as revenues from development fees collapse.

The Chinese investors who overpaid for grossly inflated luxury condos will suffer massive losses, developers dependent on a fast-rising bubble market will go bust, and somebody will end up covering the losses as bankrupt developers renege on their loans.

Since most of the loans came from government-owned banks, then that "somebody" will be the Chinese taxpayer. Sound familiar?

"China's taxpayers will twice be made the victims by the housing bubble," Professor Pei noted. "In the bubble years, they're priced out of the market for affordable housing. When the bubble bursts, they'll pay for the cleanup. When Chinese state-owned banks write off their bad loans, they don't do so with money growing on trees. Instead, the Ministry of Finance will issue bonds to recapitalize the banks -- and fund the bailout with future tax receipts."

How Big a Bubble?

Recent reports estimate there are 64.5 million vacant "investment" flats in China. Analyst Andy Xie recently laid out the risks this giant speculative bubble poses to China's local governments and banks.

"Local governments in China depend on real-estate deals for revenue and could default if the market falls too far," he wrote. "Notice the bind China is in. It has to keep the bubble going to preserve local government finances. They've become a classic Minsky Ponzi unit."

If the Chinese central government keeps the bubble inflated with easy money, Xie concluded, the resulting crash and bailout will only be that much more painful.

Local Officials Benefit Personally from Bubble

While contributions from property developers tend to have outsized political influence in much of the world, local government officials in China are brazenly pocketing the proceeds from development. For example, the majority of homes in a newly launched subsidized housing project in Shaanxi Province have been handed to local government officials.

Add up these factors -- widespread corruption, a real estate bubble that's priced average citizens out of the market, local governments dependent on new development for their revenues and a government-run banking sector that will turn to taxpayers to fund the inevitable bailout -- and there's plenty of fuel for taxpayer resentment and anger once the bubble pops.

Sound familiar?

Based on the accounts of these analysts, Chinese taxpayers will soon have common ground with their American counterparts: They, too, will be stuck paying for the bailout of private developers and government-controlled banks (which in the U.S. are called Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).




A sada, još bolje vesti, balončići i u našoj mamici Rusiji  :heart:

(ovaj je onako jako zaheban, mislim za našu maticu ^_^)


Russia to Fall Victim to Oil Bubble Bust – Morgan Stanley
© RIA Novosti
Boris Babanov
12:22 26/06/2012
MOSCOW, June 26 (RIA Novosti)


The fall in world oil prices is the beginning of a major shift in the global economy and the end of the "commodity supercycle," spelling trouble for raw material producer countries like Russia, a senior US banker said late on Monday.

“In general, when prices reach the point that spending on oil equals six percent of gross domestic product, demand falls and growth starts to stall; the world economy hit that point just before the recent fall in commodity prices,” Ruchir Sharma, head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, wrote in an article published in The Financial Times.

Now the commodity bubble is expected to implode, world oil prices will fall, while world economic growth will accelerate, Sharma says. This process will last about twenty years, and then usher in a new decade of expensive oil.

“The mania for oil bore striking similarities to the dotcom mania of the late 1990s," Sharma says. "At the height of the dotcom bubble, tech stocks comprised 25 per cent of global markets. After the bust, commodity stocks – energy and materials – rose to replace tech stocks and, by the end of the last decade, accounted for 25 per cent of global markets too.”

The commodity mania gave rise to a new industry of investment funds that allow even ordinary people to trade in commodities. The total sum invested in commodity funds has more than doubled over the past five years to more than $400bn in 2011.

“The daily volume of trades in energy futures is now a staggering 25 times higher than daily global demand for energy. Speculators rule the markets, and many are suffering as prices fall. Their loss is a gain for consumers around the world.”

“The commodity bubble has had a larger impact than the dotcom boom. While rising stock prices generally boost the economy, high prices for staples such as oil impose costs on businesses and consumers, and act as a drag on the economy,” Sharma's report concludes.




E pa vidi ti to, dve zemlje koje je naveo James Rickards kao bezvredne imaju ovakve specifične balončiće, jao pa strašno, potresao sam se sad jako, pa neće valjda još istovremeno da eksplodiraju, to bi bilo onako depresivno, mislim represivno ^_^

Pa ajde dobro, neka bar puknu za leto, da može da se brćkamo malo. :s_w:

Ajmo, đuskanje. :heart:

Edited by JimmyM, 30 January 2013 - 07:30.

#3823 siogadjura

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Posted 30 January 2013 - 22:17

Zahvaljujem obozavaocima na mnogobrojnim mejlovima i telegramima podrske, te stoga iako nemam mnogo vremena odvojicu malo istoga ne bi li ih dodatno edukovao poucnim clancima.


Kazu ovde, opet se pominje planina ;):





Medicare: $24.8 trillionObligation per household: $212,500


The health insurance program for seniors is the nation's biggest financial challenge.

The first of 77 million Baby Boomers turn 65 this year and qualify for Medicare. Enrollment will grow from 48 million in 2010 to 64 million in 2020 and 81 million in 2030, according to Medicare actuaries. That 33-million increase in the next 20 years compares with 13 million in the last 20.

This demographic burst — combined with the addition of a prescription drug benefit in 2006 and rising health care costs generally — has created an unfunded liability of nearly $25 trillion over the lifetime of those now in the program as workers and retirees. That is the taxpayers' obligation, beyond what Medicare taxes will bring in or seniors will pay in premiums for Medicare Part B — also called supplemental coverage — that helps pay for doctor visits and other expenses outside the hospital.

That $25 trillion is likely an underestimate, Medicare's actuaries say, because it counts on 165 cost-saving changes in the health care reform law. Many of these are unlikely to occur — such as cutting physician payments 30% by 2012.

Even with savings, Medicare's financial hole grew $1.8 trillion last year, more than the federal deficit. One bit of good news: The prescription drug benefit is now projected to be underfunded by $5.3 trillion, less than the original projection in 2005 of $6.7 trillion. Reason: smaller drug price increase and increased use of cheaper generic drugs.

Republicans and Democrats have different approaches to saving Medicare's finances. House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan, R-Wis., has proposed giving seniors a fixed amount to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance. President Obama and other Democrats propose better management, smarter treatment choices and other strategies to bring U.S. health care costs in line with what other industrialized countries spend.

Spending on Medicare is set to increase from $523 billion last year to $676 billion in 2015 and $861 billion in 2020.

Social Security: $21.4 trillionObligation per household: $183,400

Social Security faces the same demographic challenges as Medicare: a rapidly aging population and increased longevity.

Social Security's long-term shortfall grows about $1.2 trillion annually — a sign of an imbalance between the number of young workers and older beneficiaries, according to the Social Security trustees' annual reports. The $21.4 trillion unfunded liability represents the difference between all taxes that will be paid and all benefits received over the lifetimes of everyone in the system now — workers and beneficiaries alike. This is the measure corporations and insurance companies use to assess financial adequacy of their retirement programs.

The number differs from the $6.5 trillion, 75-year shortfall that Congress uses to assess Social Security's health. Congress's 75-year figure is smaller because it counts taxes collected from future workers — those toiling from 2050 to 2085, for example — but doesn't count the benefits they will get in the 76th year and beyond.

In addition, Congress reduces its estimate of Social Security's shortfall by counting the $2.6 trillion in IOUs the government has issued to the program's trust fund. However, the government's audited books, issued by the Treasury Department, don't count that money as having any value to the federal government because it is a debt the government has issued to itself — like paying off a car loan with a credit card.

Social Security's cost will soar more quickly than Medicare because its early retirement age is 62 rather than 65. Social Security's cost will grow from $712 billion in 2010 to $911 billion in 2015 and $1.2 trillion in 2020, according to the program's actuaries.

President Obama's debt reduction commission recommended raising the early retirement age to 64 over 75 years, trimming benefits to affluent seniors and reducing annual cost-of-living increases. In the past, President George W. Bush and other Republicans have proposed converting part of Social Security to personal retirement accounts, similar to 401(k)s. President Obama and other Democrats have suggested applying the Social Security tax to salaries above the current limit of $106,800.

Federal debt: $9.4 trillionObligation per household: $79,900

The federal debt is growing so fast that each household owes $3,500 more today than at the start of the year when the debt clocked in at an average of $79,900 per household.

The federal government's $9.3 trillion in debt on Jan. 1 (and $9.7 trillion today) is what it owes the public from the Treasury Department's sales of short-term bills, medium-length notes and long-term bonds. It includes all debt owed to U.S. investors, money market funds, the central banks of China and Japan, private banks in Europe and others.

It does not include the $4.6 trillion in IOUs the federal government has promised its own programs such as Social Security and federal employee pensions. The effect on taxpayers is the same no matter where the debt lands — on the books of Social Security or Treasury Department.

The federal debt limit Congress and the White House are debating includes both — the debt held by the public plus the internal loans to federal programs, for a total of about $14.5 trillion.

Military retirement/disability benefits: $3.6 trillion

Obligation per household: $31,200

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to a 46% increase since 2004 in the cost of pension, medical care and disablity benefits for former service members.

Biggest jump: a 71% increase since 2004, to $1.3 trillion, in the cost of future pension checks to retired military personnel. The funding shortfall for the disability program rose to $1.5 trillion, up 54% since 2004, and to $900 billion for retiree health care, up 32%.

These numbers reflect the liability of those programs in today's dollars. Actual spending will be much higher over the years.

Federal employee retirement benefits: $2 trillionObligation per household: $17,000

The federal government makes its pension fund contributions with IOUs. Unlike private and state pensions, the federal government does not have a stash of stocks, bonds and other assets to pay future costs. Civil servant retirements will be financed by taxes or borrowing.

The unfunded liability for federal pensions is $1.6 trillion, plus another $400 billion for retiree health care. The federal government employs about 2 million people, excluding the military and postal service.

State, local government obligations: $5.2 trillionObligation per household: $44,800

States, cities and school districts are on the hook for at least $5 trillion, half of it debt. Most of the rest is about $900 billion in pension shortfalls and $1 trillion in promises made to pay medical costs for retired workers.

The unfunded liability for retiree health insurance varies widely — nothing for the state of Nebraska, $1.3 billion for the city of Buffalo — depending on what elected officials have promised employees.


A ovo je jos crnje :ajme: ,





Leap in U.S. debt hits taxpayers with 12% more red ink


Taxpayers are on the hook for an extra $55,000 a household to cover rising federal commitments made just in the past year for retirement benefits, the national debt and other government promises, a USA TODAY analysis shows.

The 12% rise in red ink in 2008 stems from an explosion of federal borrowing during the recession, plus an aging population driving up the costs of Medicare and Social Security.

That's the biggest leap in the long-term burden on taxpayers since a Medicare prescription drug benefit was added in 2003.

The latest increase raises federal obligations to a record $546,668 per household in 2008, according to the USA TODAY analysis. That's quadruple what the average U.S. household owes for all mortgages, car loans, credit cards and other debt combined.

"We have a huge implicit mortgage on every household in America — except, unlike a real mortgage, it's not backed up by a house," says David Walker, former U.S. comptroller general, the government's top auditor.

USA TODAY used federal data to compute all government liabilities, from Treasury bonds to Medicare to military pensions.

Bottom line: The government took on $6.8 trillion in new obligations in 2008, pushing the total owed to a record $63.8 trillion.

The numbers measure what's needed today — set aside in a lump sum, earning interest — to pay benefits that won't be covered by future taxes.

Congress can reduce or increase the burden by changing laws that determine taxes and benefits for programs such as Medicare and Social Security.

Rep. Jim Cooper, D-Tenn., says exploding debt has focused attention on the government's financial challenges. "More and more, people are worried about our fiscal future," he says.

Key federal obligations:

• Social Security. It will grow by 1 million to 2 million beneficiaries a year from 2008 through 2032, up from 500,000 a year in the 1990s, its actuaries say. Average benefit: $12,089 in 2008.

• Medicare. More than 1 million a year will enroll starting in 2011 when the first Baby Boomer turns 65. Average 2008 benefit: $11,018.

Retirement programs. Congress has not set aside money to pay military and civil servant pensions or health care for retirees. These unfunded obligations have increased an average of $300 billion a year since 2003 and now stand at $5.3 trillion.

#3824 zg76

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Posted 30 January 2013 - 23:27

Malo bolje da razumemo koliko je milijarda, evo grafickog prikaza (sta zna dete sta je bilion :lol+: ).


Neki kazu dug im je ko kuca, ali ovde to ne vazi ovde je pravi izraz dug kao planina (recimo Mt Helena :s_d: ).




#3825 heathen

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Posted 04 February 2013 - 14:06

Edited by heathen, 04 February 2013 - 14:55.