3824 replies to this topic

[JimmyM]

Jao što sam srećan, sad kad vidiš šta sam sve spremio za tebe, umrećeš od sreće, osećam

 

 

 

Alan Greenspan: WE CAN ALWAYS PRINT MORE MONEY
 

Lepo kaze glavni i odgovorni cova da ce da printaju lovu kolko god treba da bi pokrili dug. A dug je :

 

 

Tako je, slažeš se onda sa nama
 

 

"The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So there is zero probability of default" said Greenspan on NBC's Meet the Press.

This is basically true

 

  It's just what we do every day. And the market is fine with it.

 

 

 

E, inače, opet si promašio batice, glavni čovek je Bern Bernake, nisi u toku, zato i proživljavaš buru sa mnom, mislim kapiram da je očaj kod tebe, ne možeš da uspeš da ispadneš dasa, pa ti je krivo, razumem ja tebe, ono, prešao sam u kategoriju 5, razorni uragan, nije lako sa takvim kapacitetom, ali može to malo ozbiljnije, ovo je za Jimmyja dečja igra.

Nego:

 

Michael Hudson On Why US Debt Problem Is Ficticious (& Why Peter Schiff Is Wrong)

Opet si bio blizu i opet doživeo debakl.

 

 

A dug je :

E, divan sajt još kad ga otvoriš ispod i vidiš da Evropa ima veći dug od Amerike, au, neprocenjivo

 

http://www.usdebtclo...debt-clock.html

Čak je i sama Nemačka u većem dugu.
Znači, ti to hvališ Ameriku, stvarno nisam očekivao, čast mi je, bravo, tako se to radi.

 

 

Stampaju i Kinezi, ali tamo je potpuno druga paradigma

 

Au, pa ti stvarno sam sebe pržiš, ne treba ja uopšte da se javljam (ali hoću naravno, bez brige). 

Wordpress bloger, fan made besplatne igračke i tako to, mislim prošlo ti batice- al zamalo

Kako volim kad vidim svoju nadmoć, prosto je i ja osetim, onako sva sija

Mislim, kapiram ja da si očajan, zato ću te opet besplatno naučiti kako se to radi.

Pokušaj da nalaziš fanfree blogiće bez podnaslova "INVESTIGATING NEW WORLD ORDER BIG PHARMA EUGENICS", mislim zbog tebe, jer je kod njih Rotšildče glavni krivac za NWO...

...a on inače hoće da uništi evro kao valutu i usput ludački kupuje dolare (tako čak i razara evro), pa ono, time realno pržiš sam sebe ko vruće krompiriće.

Možda (ali pazi, samo možda, još nije potvrđeno!) čak i više nego što bih to ja uradio, a to je jako teško postići, kao što znaš

http://www.canadiant...n-euro-collapse

 

Sad ću da plakim

 

A sad da Jimmy pređe na ozbiljne stvari, NWO i te fore ne prolaze kod njega, osim ukoliko nema profita i to isključivo po principu cash na ruke

DakleM, ubo si ga, al kao i uvek - zamalo, paradigma jeste drugačija, ali naravno, u donjem smislu. 

 

Kina ono ima unutrašnji dug, pa zato štampa lovicu, jer joj se interni dug urušava kao Japanu i toga je svesna, a nema ko da ga servisira, jer je unutrašnji, jelte, nije spoljašni i zato je jedini preostali način da se nastavi valcer. Štampanje, gradnja gradova gde živi Kasper sa drugarima, dok ne dođe onaj zli patak i  pojede ih, kao što je pojeo nekoliko azijskih zemljala devedesetih, onako lančano.

A sad će da ujka Jimmy da pokaže paradigmu i kako si ti nama sve to fino objasnio, mislim paradigmatično, podrazumeva se

 

 

Shankar Sharma & Devina Mehra: China's $22 trillion time-bomb

China's growth model is based on the oldest rapid economic growth hormone available: debt
Shankar Sharma & Devina Mehra / Mar 02, 2012, 00:08 IST

For years, a wispy, gossamer dream has been spun by economists working for Wall Street investment banks about how China has managed the impossible: high growth with a very low debt-to-GDP ratio. The dream has been so aggressively sold that almost everybody believes it, including editors of this newspaper who have written glowingly about China’s growth, how far ahead it is of India, how India should give up this race once and for all and so on.

Like all things churned out by Wall Street, this romantic story is also complete rubbish. Regardless of the level of education, we all behave the same way when we analyse countries: we land at the airport, see multi-lane highways, gleaming skyscrapers in the city centre, massive infrastructure development, teeming shopping malls, tall apartment blocks and golf courses. And immediately jump to the conclusion that this country has done it. It has made it. If you are an Indian, you say this country has left India behind by 100 or 200 years.



Just as behind nearly every rapid economic growth story, lies hidden, debt. Usually lots of it. Just like Ireland that went from being a really poor country in the 1980s to getting to the top of European Union’s per capital GDP league tables — all within 20 years or so.

China is no exception. The common wisdom is that China runs a very low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 30 per cent (this ratio was in the low 20s till 2007 but jumped sharply during the 2008 crisis), which gives it lots of firepower to keep reflating the economy and to keep recapitalising its banks. The reality is that this ratio is plain wrong. China’s growth model is based on the oldest rapid economic growth hormone available: debt.

China has debt at various levels and pockets. Let’s add to this central debt, the local government and provincial debt figures. This figure is around $1.9 trillion. Let’s further add the obligations of the Ministry of Railways. That’s $360 billion. And finally let’s also add 80 per cent of outstanding bank credit. This adds $6.3 trillion. We add bank loans to national debt because unlike most countries, China uses banks for nearly all of its directed, policy lending programmes. For example, the stimulus of 2008-09 was financed largely by banks. By pushing its lending via the banks’ balance sheets, China creates the impression of a country that has very low budget deficits and, of course, very low central debt. We take 80 per cent of bank debt into the national debt figures under the assumption that 20 per cent goes towards consumer and private sector credit.

Now let’s total up the few trillions we have unearthed. As of 2011, this figure amounted to a tad over $10 trillion! And the ratio of total debt to GDP becomes a more ominous 149 per cent. Mind you, there may be other debts that are obligations of the central government that we don’t know about since reliability of data in China is suspect, to say the least. It is eminently possible that debt is understated and GDP overstated.

But the story gets worse from hereon. China’s growth model is highly capital or, more accurately, debt intensive. We have calculated a ratio called DIG (debt intensity of GDP), that is, the amount of debt needed to generate one unit of GDP. This ratio started out being in the 0.9 to 1.2 range in the first half of the nineties. During the Asian crisis, this ratio worsened to around two as China again threw loads of debt to come out of the slowdown. The ratio subsided a bit to below one in the boom years from 2003 to 2007. But it jumped dramatically to over four in 2008 as China threw a huge amount of money at an unprecedented slowdown. The trouble is that given the overall low growth environment globally and the worsening trade situation for China, generating a unit of GDP growth now requires higher and higher doses of debt. And, in hindsight, we will look back and say this stimulus of 2008-09 was a colossal mistake.

So what does the DIG ratio lead us to? See the table.

As we can see, each crisis leads to a worsening of the DIG ratio and, concomitantly, a sharp worsening of the total debt-to-GDP ratio as China starts building bridges and roads to nowhere in order to reflate.

The bigger problem lies ahead. Given this inclined treadmill model, if China grows faster, the bigger the debt problem becomes. For the sake of calculation, let’s assume the DIG ratio goes to 1.7 over the next four years till 2016 and that China wishes to grow at eight per cent. The total debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2016 becomes 180 per cent, up from the 150 per cent of 2011! In absolute terms, China’s total debt will reach $22 trillion. Coupled with a worsening demographic picture, this high total debt-to-GDP ratio becomes a trap from which there is virtually no escape. To compound the problem, China’s private consumption expenditure ( PCE) to GDP has declined sharply to 33 per cent from 55 per cent 20 years ago. The ratio of net exports to GDP has fallen to 3.9 per cent in 2010, from 8.8 per cent in 2007. It’s only the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP that has jumped to over 50 per cent in 2011 from 25 per cent a few years ago. As is clear, if China has to maintain its pace of growth, it has to pile on more debt. If it slows down, its social powder keg starts getting incendiary.

We are not even counting the burgeoning, widespread non-performing loans problem that is looming large and will, in all probability, lead to China’s fourth systemic banking crisis in less than 25 years. If this is a growth model, then it is even worse than the Western growth model.

So, the bullets China has in order to emerge from this rock-and-a-hard-place situation are few, if any at all. China is indeed riding the tiger. In contrast, India’s is the Toyota Prius of growth models. India should simply avoid the trap of excessive public spending on infrastructure. That’s where almost every country in Asia, including Japan in the nineties to China and Dubai now, has run into problems. India’s growth model is infinitely more robust and time will prove this to a world bedazzled by China.

 

http://www.business-...me-bomb/466379/

To su te paradigme

 

 

China’s Ticking Debt Bomb
China appeared to weather the global economic downturn better than most. But massive local government debt could bring growth to a screeching halt.


China’s remarkable economic rebound after the global economic crisis in 2008-2009 has been a source of envy and puzzlement for the rest of the world. Instead of recession, the Chinese economy has recorded double-digit growth, and is actually showing signs of overheating – a sharp contrast with the stagnation in most Western countries. How did the Chinese do it?  Perhaps advocates of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ are right after all: Beijing has found a secret formula of economic success that has eluded the West.

Part of the answer to this mystery was given in late June by the Chinese government. It turns out that Beijing has managed to keep its economy growing during the global slump by resorting to massive bank lending to local governments, which then went on an infrastructure spending binge that’s certain to haunt the country for years to come. If we remember the causes of the economic crisis that has ravaged the United States and Western Europe, the most important one is something euphemistically termed ‘credit boom’ – excessive lending and borrowing that fuelled housing bubbles and unsustainable consumption. China seems to have been afflicted with the same disease, with only one major variation: much of the debt incurred in China has gone into the infrastructure sector, not consumption. So much for Chinese exceptionalism.

Based on the figure released by the National Audit Office (NAO) at the end of June, local governments have accumulated debts totalling 10.7 trillion renminbi (RMB) or $1.65 trillion – about 27 percent of China’s GDP in 2010.  Because the NAO’s figure was based on a sampling of 6,500 local government-backed financial vehicles (out of more than 10,000 such vehicles nationwide), the actual magnitude of local government indebtedness is much greater. The People’s Bank of China, the central bank, recently estimated that local government debt totalled 14 trillion RMB (most of which was owed to banks), almost 30 percent higher than the NAO figure.

Several interesting questions are raised by the revelation of local government debt in China.  First and foremost, it has shown that public finance in China is in much worse shape than previously thought.  On paper, China’s debt to GDP ratio is under 20 percent, making Beijing a paragon of fiscal virtue compared with profligate Western governments.  However, if we factor in various government obligations that are typically counted as public debt, the picture doesn’t look pretty for China. Once local government debts, costs of re-capitalizing state-owned banks, bonds issued by state-owned banks, and railway bonds are included, China’s total debt amounts to 70 to 80 percent of GDP, roughly the level of public debt in the United States and the United Kingdom. Since most of China’s debt has been borrowed in the last decade, China is on an unsustainable trajectory at the current rate of debt accumulation, particularly when economic growth slows down, as it’s expected to do in the coming decade.

The second question to be asked here is whether local governments can service the debts and repay the loans.  If they have made sound infrastructure investments that generate income streams, debt accumulation isn’t a problem.  Unfortunately, that doesn’t appear to be the case for most infrastructure projects built by local governments.  Typically, such projects are highly leveraged, with local governments putting in little equity capital and borrowing nearly all the costs. This makes debt-servicing a huge burden.

There are only two sources of income to service such debts. One is to sell land controlled by local governments (land is used as collateral for securing bank loans). The other is to use the cash flow generated by these projects (power plants, ports, and toll roads).  With the frothy real estate teetering, local governments shouldn’t count on land sales to come to their rescue. The economic viability of their newly invested infrastructure projects is even more abysmal. One banking regulator revealed that only one third of these projects can produce enough cash flow to service their loans. This implies that local governments won’t be able to recoup the bulk of their infrastructure investments – or repay the banks.

So what about the economic consequences of this ticking debt bomb?

Because about half of the bank loans borrowed by local governments will come due in the next two years, we can expect a short-term repayment crisis. Chinese state-owned banks will have to roll over these loans, pretending that they are still performing. They may even have to lend local governments new money to pay the interests on these loans.  The net effects of such accounting gimmicks would be reduced profitability for Chinese banks, admittedly not a cause for real concern. But accounting tricks can only temporarily delay the inevitable.

The longer term effects of massive non-performing loans owed to state banks by local governments are likely to manifest not in the form of a banking crisis, but in other more insidious – yet equally – harmful ways.  Because the Chinese state owns trillions of RMB in assets (land, natural resources, state-owned monopolies, and $3 trillion in foreign exchange), Beijing should have enough resources to bail out local governments when these loans have to be repaid. But there’s no free lunch. Bailing out local governments with valuable financial resources in the coming decade – a decade in which China will experience the end of the demographic dividend, rising costs of healthcare and pensions, and slower economic growth – will mean China will have less capital to invest.  For an investment-led economy, this implies even more sluggish growth.

It’s tempting to blame irresponsible and corrupt local government officials for wasting the country’s precious capital. That would be unfair. While there are no doubt unscrupulous local officials who see Beijing’s bank-funded stimulus plan as a golden opportunity to line their pockets, the behaviour of local governments is perfectly rational: they would be fools if they hadn’t jumped on the gravy train of freely available bank loans in the last two years. From their perspective, China’s system of public finance is grossly unfair to local governments. Beijing collects the bulk of taxes (60 percent of all taxes), but spends little on social services, which local governments must fund. Unlike their Western counterparts, local governments can’t issue bonds to borrow money. So if they want to develop local infrastructure (which Beijing doesn’t fund, either), the only source of financing is bank loans.

For all practical purposes, bank loans borrowed by government entities are actually free money – they don’t have to be repaid even when they go sour. Beijing has always come to the rescue, something local government officials are fully aware of. But we all know what happens when people get to spend free money.

 

Jao, jao, jao
 

 

China's debt nearing international warning levels: report
2012-10-24
16:07 (GMT+8)
Continued borrowing to fund government projects is bringing China's debt to dangerous levels, says a think tank report. (File photo/Xinhua)

China's debt levels are nearing the international warning level, says the Development Research Center of the State Council, a thinktank under Taiwan's cabinet.

According to a report from the center published on Oct. 22, China's total liabilities had reached 23.76 trillion yuan (US$3.8 trillion) by the end of 2010, equaling as much as 59% of that year's GDP.

Wei Jianing, the center's vice minister of economic research, said repayment dates for loans arranged in 2009 are fast approaching. Local debt needs to be closely monitored given the tightening of real estate regulations and a reduction in government land premiums, he added.

China's National Audit Office also released a report stating that 42% of local government debt needs to be repaid by the end of 2012, with another 54% to be repaid by the end of 2013.

Wei said the government's ability to repay all of these debts in time is a concern as it continues to borrow despite falling fiscal incomes. There are inherent contradictions in the country's financial system given that the government controls the lending platforms and regulations, he said.

Local government debt, in particular, is said to be growing out of control, expanding from 1 trillion yuan (US$160 billion) in 2003 to 4 trillion yuan (US$639 billion) in 2006 and 10.7 trillion yuan (US$1.7 trillion) last year.

Experts say that the major risks of growing local government debt lie in the various local financial vehicles, through which 4.97 trillion yuan (US$795 billion) has been borrowed. Around 26%, or 1,734, of these financing vehicles are said to be registering losses.

 

http://www.wantchina...000101&cid=1102

A kad smo već kod Kinice, rast će još brže propadati nego što se očekivalo do sada

 

 

China's new leaders facing tough economic choices
Published October 21, 2012

BEIJING – China's economic model that delivered three decades of double-digit growth is running out of steam and the country's next leaders face tough choices to keep incomes rising. But they don't seem to have ambitious solutions. Even if they do, they will need to tackle entrenched interests with backing high in the Communist Party.

The cost of inaction could be high. The World Bank says without change, annual growth could sink to 5 percent by 2015 -- dangerously low by Chinese standards. Some private sector analysts give even gloomier warnings.

 

http://www.foxnews.c...test=latestnews

Nego paradigma izgleda i u spoljašnjem pravi problemče
 

Beijing Blasts Washington on Debt Crisis

“When countries across the world hold breath watching the debt negotiations between the Democrats and Republicans in Washington, they are once again ‘kidnapped’ by U.S. domestic politics,” complains Beijing’s official Xinhua News Agency in a blistering July 28 commentary entitled “Bring Some Sense of Global Responsibility to Brinkmanship-Obsessed Washington.” “Given the United States’ status as the world’s largest economy and the issuer of the dominant international reserve currency, such political brinkmanship in Washington is dangerously irresponsible, for it risks, among other consequences, strangling the still fragile economic recovery of not only the United States but also the world as a whole.”

The Federal government reached its $14.29 debt limit on May 16, and the Treasury Department has announced the U.S. will default unless the ceiling is raised by August 2.  At the moment, it’s not clear whether President Obama, Senate Majority Leader Reid, and House Speaker Boehner—all representing polarized constituencies—will come to terms by Tuesday.  Beijing officials, who are used to being in control, are freaking out as they watch a drama without a script.

Chinese officials know there’s virtually no chance of that.  For one thing, all U.S. debt is denominated in dollars so the Federal Reserve can always print more of them to retire the Federal government’s obligations when they come due.  As important, Washington is confronting the issue of debt before it absolutely has to.  After all, the “crisis” would not have occurred if Congress had simply raised the debt limit and ignored the matter as it did so many times in the past.  According to the Treasury, Congress has, in some fashion, raised the debt ceiling 78 times since 1960.

Beijing, of course, has no debt ceiling to raise, and so it has avoided a public airing of its problems.  And China’s debt situation is at least as serious as America’s.  Chinese leaders tell us their country’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 17% at the end of last year, but the figure is more like 89% according to Beijing-based Dragonomics.  If the respected research firm is correct, then China’s ratio was just about the same as America’s, which was around 93% then.  And a growing number of analysts disagree with the Dragonomics figure, putting China’s ratio as high as 160%.

The wide discrepancy is largely due to the counting of China’s so-called “hidden debts,” especially those incurred by local governments and the state banks.  Yet there are other off-the-books obligations, including central government debt incurred for municipal and other local projects, Ministry of Finance guarantees related to partial bank recapitalizations, debt extended by multilateral institutions (such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) and by other governments, borrowings by China Development Bank and the other “policy banks,” and miscellaneous obligations such as grain subsidy payments.  Moreover, some debt issued to pay for foreign exchange that has been added to the country’s bulging reserves may also be unrecorded.

 

http://www.forbes.co...on-debt-crisis/

Dobro, Jimmy je fleksibilac, nije smak sveta što Kina ide kod Japana u goste, čekamo mi našu Indiju, možda bude malo ozbiljnije, makar se nadam da će ta ekipa za druženje moći da ubode nešto, mislim da ne moram da i sa njima pravim palačinke.

 

...

Edited by JimmyM, 27 January 2013 - 00:03.

[JimmyM]

Soros juče razvalio u Švajcarskoj!

 

The US outlook is probably the best of the mayor economies today
 

http://money.cnn.com...mulus.cnnmoney/

 

(00:18)

 

[truba-dur]

Ček da razmislim... još razmišljam...još...još... mmm, ne, neće biti kraći!

Ok. Preživeo sam i čuvenog Deksa pa ću i ovo

 

 

E, a znaš šta će Jimmy sad da ti kaže, to šta je tebi bezveze ljude boli bubregče!
SrBski intelektualac, ono izvinjavam se!
 
Nego sad sam se setio, ae nam postavi bilo koju drugu listu, po tvom izboru, pa da je vidimo, može?
Eto odlučio sam da ću ti dati tu privilegiju da nađeš neku prilagodniju listu!

Inače, i mojoj babi je televizor u boji bio bezveze, šteta što je već 4 decenije pod zemljom, pa ne može da te podrži u ovoj patriJotskoj borbi za pravdu!
 
DakleM, to smo revizirali, zagrcnuo si se, a ne možeš da progutaš bez mene!

 

Te liste su mazanje očiju i najviše koriste onima koji ih prave,mada se slažem da su USA univerziteti najbolji.

 

 

Fazon ti je neuspešan

 

Dođe vernik ateisti i kaže: ti si sektaš!

 

Ono, nema drugi odgovor, a mora nešto da kaže da bi prividno ispalo da je nešto shvatio!

Samo tebi nije uspelo ni to

 

A sad batice da vidiš kako Jimmy raskrinkava, oduvek sam bio najbolji, pa tako i sad; bio bih jako happy kad bi ti sad citirao to tvoje pitanje gde si spomenuo migrante (ono ja sam ih prvi spomenuo posle tvoje poruke), pa da nam pokažeš sam kako usled mog nadmoćnog uragana moraš da bežiš u druge, izmišljene događaje!

 

Nego, tek to kida

 

Saberi se čoveče i počni smisleno da pričaš.

Pretpostavljam da je teško kad čovek izgubi BIG D.CK i postane Baja Patak ,.............,al nisi ti kriv na kraju svakog godine dotuku.

 

 

Au batice, odakle ti to, pa to nisu "vaši-naši-naci", već naši drugari iz svih krajića našeg divnog i šarenog sveta

 

Realno i ja bi bio ucveljen da mi pametne glavice odu nakon što mi isprazne državnu kasicu prasicu i svoj intelekt i kapitalče iskoriste negde druge, pretpostavljaš gde

Ne upadaj u truli forumaški koncept podcenjivanja sa etiketiranjem SrBov,vaši-naci OBRAZovani.

Koristi mozak umesto tastature.

I ne vidim odavde jesu li imigranti u proseku obrazovaniji od domorodaca.

 

Šetam se po Beverli Hilsu, dele nas dva (i po) naselja, pa se prošećkam sa ženčetom (ili provozam prostitukom) kad imam vremena!

Jao sad mi je sve jasno,pa ti si pubertetlija sa Banovog brda.

[Anduril]

Recycle Bin jos nije shvatio da postoji zapravo tema koja njega zanima:

 

http://forum.b92.net...past-ekonomije/

[siogadjura]

Malo bolje da razumemo koliko je milijarda, evo grafickog prikaza (sta zna dete sta je bilion ).

 

Neki kazu dug im je ko kuca, ali ovde to ne vazi ovde je pravi izraz dug kao planina (recimo Mt Helena ).

 

http://demonocracy.i...bt/us_debt.html

 

 

US Debt Ceiling Visualized in $100 Bills United States owes a lot of money. As of 2012, US debt is larger than the size of the economy. The debt ceiling is currently set at $16.394 Trillion and approaching rapidly.
To see current debt live visit US Debt Clock.

Tweet

   

 

One Hundred Dollars $100 - Most counterfeited money denomination in the world.
Keeps the world moving.

 

Ten Thousand Dollars $10,000 - Enough for a great vacation or to buy a used car.
Approximately one year of work for the average human on earth.

 

One Million Dollars $1,000,000 - Not as big of a pile as you thought, huh?
Still this is 92 years of work for the average human on earth.

 

One Hundred Million Dollars $100,000,000 - Plenty to go around for everyone.
Fits nicely on an ISO / Military standard sized pallet.


The couch is worth $46.7 million. Made out of crispy $100 bills.

 

 

$100 Million Dollars = 1 year of work for 3500 average Americans It takes 3500 Americans 1 year of work to make $100 Million dollars. The 155 million Americans who worked with earnings in 2005 on average made $28,567 / year.

In front of the 3500 people is the $100 Million pallet that they all have to work for 1 year to earn.
Look carefully to see a stack of $1 Million and the 35 average Americans required to earn that $1 Million in 1 year.

 

 

 

 

 

One Billion Dollars $1,000,000,000 - You will need some help when robbing the bank.
Interesting fact: $1 million dollars weights 10kg exactly.
You are looking at 10 tons of money on those pallets.

 

One Trillion Dollars $1,000,000,000,000
The 2011 US federal deficit was $1.412 Trillion - 41% more than you see here.

If you spent $1 million a day since Jesus was born, you would have not spent $1 trillion by now...
but ~$700 billion- same amount the banks got during bailout.

 

One Trillion Dollars

Comparison of $1,000,000,000,000 dollars to a standard sized American Football field.
Say hello to the Boeing 747-400 transcontinental airliner that's hiding in the back. This was until recently the biggest passenger plane in the world.

You can see the White House with both wings to the right.

"My reading of history convinces me that most bad government results from too much government." - Thomas Jefferson

 

US Debt Ceiling - $16.394 Trillion in 2013

The US debt ceiling limit D-Day is estimated for September 14, 2012. US Debt has now surpassed the size of US economy in 2011-- rated @ $15,064 Trillion.

Statue of Liberty seems rather worried as United States national debt is soon to pass 20% of the entire world's combined economy (GDP / Gross Domestic Product).

“I predict future happiness for Americans if they can prevent the government from wasting the labors of the people under the pretense of taking care of them.” - Thomas Jefferson

 

122.1 Trillion Dollars

$122,100,000,000,000. - US unfunded liabilities by Dec 31, 2012.
Abovet you can see the pillar of cold hard $100 bills that dwarfs the
WTC & Empire State Building - both at one point world's tallest buildings.
If you look carefully you can see the Statue of Liberty.

The 122.1 Trillion dollar super-skyscraper wall is the amount of money the U.S. Government
knows it does not have to fully fund the Medicare, Medicare Prescription Drug Program,
Social Security, Military and civil servant pensions. It is the money USA knows it will not
have to pay all its bills.
If you live in USA this is also your personal credit card bill; you are responsible along with
everyone else to pay this back. The citizens of USA created the U.S. Government to serve
them, this is what the U.S. Government has done while serving The People.

The unfunded liability is calculated on current tax and funding inputs, and future demographic
shifts in US Population.

Note: On the above 122.1T image the size of the bases of the money stacks are $10 billion, and 400 stories @ $4 trillion

"It is incumbent on every generation to pay its own debts as it goes. A principle which if acted on would save one-half the wars of the world." - Thomas Jefferson

[JimmyM]

Saberi se čoveče i počni smisleno da pričaš.

Pretpostavljam da je teško kad čovek izgubi BIG D.CK i postane Baja Patak ,.............,al nisi ti kriv na kraju svakog godine dotuku.

 

Čekaj, kad Jimmy pita nešto, ti stojiš i slušaš, dakleM, je l' si mi citirao ono svoje pitanje gde si ga postavio?
Ja ga još čekam.
Nisi ga valjda izmislio?

E, ne, pomešao si me sa tobom, ne znam za takve stvari, hebiga.

Potražiću tvoj savet kad me stignu, da mi objasniš kako se ti boriš sa tim.

Inače, sinonim za di*ck je patka, znaš već.
Mislim, vatromet.
 

 

I ne vidim odavde jesu li imigranti u proseku obrazovaniji od domorodaca.

Pf, pa onda ne znaš da čitaš

Kapiram te, mozagče preskače stresne situacije.
 

Ne upadaj u truli forumaški koncept podcenjivanja sa etiketiranjem SrBov,vaši-naci OBRAZovani.

 

Hm, ček da vidim...ti si upao, ja te valjam.
Mislim, ono respektivno.
 

Koristi mozak umesto tastature.

 

Aham ti hoćeš da vidiš mozak po prvi put?
Pf, prvo cash, prolaze samo $$$ i švajcarci.
 

Jao sad mi je sve jasno,pa ti si pubertetlija sa Banovog brda.

 

Aham, znači pokvario ti se bajs
A bio onaj srBendski pretpostavljam

Truba-dur kupuje samo kvalitetno, čovek od stila
 

Recycle Bin jos nije shvatio da postoji zapravo tema koja njega zanima:

Ne vredi batice, ostajem ovde.
Ali trudi se ti i dalje, možda i uspeš.
Za jedno 100 godina.
 

Malo bolje da razumemo koliko je milijarda, evo grafickog prikaza (sta zna dete sta je bilion).

E, baš sam bezobrazan, pa pozdravi dete i prenesi mu saučešće što ima nesposobnog taticu, koji ne može da mu obezbedi parice, pa dete mora da ih gleda na slici i tv-u.

Ko i papica njegov.

Nego:
 

Neki kazu dug im je ko kuca, ali ovde to ne vazi ovde je pravi izraz dug kao planina.

 

Pf, nikakav dug.

Kinin u ovom trenutku oduvao američki ko što sam ja tebe oduvao tebe

 

Why China's Debt Problems Are Worse Than America's

In the aftermath of Washington’s debt-ceiling debacle, Vice President Joe Biden was in Beijing on Friday, desperately trying to reassure the Chinese government that the American economy is not in a downward spiral.

“And very sincerely, I want to make clear that you have nothing to worry about,” the vice president said.

Whether or not he succeeded in soothing his hosts’ anxiety remains to be seen. Yet in trying to placate Beijing, the vice president was making a major miscalculation. China may own $1.2 trillion in U.S. Treasury obligations, but from the get-go, Biden should have eschewed playing defense and gone on the offensive. He should have asked the Chinese to reassure him about their debt problems and, more urgently, their impending economic slide.

Despite all the apocalyptic pronouncements about America’s budget problems, the reality is that the U.S. has a higher credit rating than China and, unlike Beijing, has never repudiated its sovereign debt. More important, the People’s Republic has been understating its debt for years to avoid global attention and criticism.

Indeed, China claims its debt-to-GDP ratio—the standard measure of sustainability—was a healthy 17 percent at the end of last year. Yet Beijing-based Dragonomics, a well-respected consultancy, put China’s ratio at 89 percent—about the same as America’s. Worse still, a growing number of analysts think the Chinese ratio was really 160 percent. At that astronomical level, China looks worse than Greece.

The wide discrepancy in estimates is due to the so-called hidden debts. The largest of these off-the-books obligations have been incurred by local governments and state banks. Yet there are other components, including central-government debt incurred for municipal and local projects, Ministry of Finance guarantees related to partial bank recapitalizations, and miscellaneous obligations such as grain-subsidy payments. No one actually thinks Beijing will default on its outstanding external debt, but these hidden obligations matter; to work down the crushing debt load, the country’s technocrats are adopting strategies that will cripple growth for a decade, maybe longer.

It didn’t have to happen this way. When the global downturn hit in 2008, China decided to spend its way out of the crisis. The country adopted a stimulus program that in 2009 pumped, according to my calculations, about $1.1 trillion into its then–$4.3 trillion economy. Beijing created robust growth—9.1 percent in 2009 and 10.3 percent last year—but in the process, the country’s hidden debts ballooned, as the country’s leaders forced state banks to lend to unviable projects.

These include ghost cities such as Ordos in Inner Mongolia, where the government has built sundry new homes and office buildings, which remain empty. Last year, the state grid reported there were 64.5 million flats—enough housing for 200 million people—that used no electricity for six consecutive months. Despite the obvious oversupply, the government—in conjunction with private developers—is constructing 40 million to 50 million more units. And the Chinese government recently announced it will be building 20 new cities a year over the next two decades.



    Until now, just about everyone seemed to be looking to the Chinese to become the new engine of world economic growth. We will surely be disappointed.

All this building is technically creating gross domestic product, but it is extraordinarily wasteful. In a free-market economy, this grossly imbalanced situation would lead to both a property crisis and a banking crisis. Weak developers and financial institutions would go bankrupt, their assets would end up in the hands of more productive market participants, and the economy would recover quickly.

But Chinese leaders are not allowing this creative destruction to occur. To rescue financial institutions, for instance, central authorities are forcing down interest rates paid to depositors so that banks can earn their way out of difficulties. Yet in doing so, they are condemning their economy to years of stagnation.

By keeping deposit rates artificially low, the government depresses the income of households. Consumption accounts for just 34 percent of the economy in China—the lowest rate in the world—compared with about 70 percent in America. For the country’s economy to achieve sustainability, its consumers will have to spend more.

That’s unlikely to happen, however, as Beijing is essentially adopting the same fundamentally flawed tactic that Tokyo employed in the early 1990s to work its way out of its infamous housing bubble. Japan’s economy has never fully regained its dynamism, and China’s won’t either, unless Beijing radically changes course.

Politically, that doesn’t seem feasible. The Communist Party has begun its historic transition from fourth- to fifth-generation leaders, and the result has been paralysis. At the moment, current officials seem to be just buying time until they leave office—and then hand intractable problems to someone else. No one in Beijing is willing to take the steps necessary to put the economy on a sound basis.

Washington, of course, is no stranger to gridlock and head-in-the-sand economics. Yet until now, just about everyone seemed to be looking to the Chinese to become the new engine of world economic growth. We will surely be disappointed. China has just begun another long descent. Biden should have spoken up.

 

http://www.thedailyb...-america-s.html

Znači opet nam potvrđuješ da je Amerika najbolja.
Kažem čast mi je.

Nego kako ono kažeš, a da, paradigmatično
 

 

Government Report Reveals China Debt Bomb
By Gao Zitan
Epoch Times Staff Created: October 25, 2012






Debt-crippled Western nations who have hopes that China will rescue them should think again: a new report from a Chinese regime think tank reveals that China has debt problems of its own.

The State Council Development Research Center’s (DRC) Oct. 22 report, “Research on China’s Financial Risks,” shows the combined central and local government debt at 23.76 trillion yuan ($3.8 trillion), or 59 percent of 2010 GDP. While this number is lower than most Western governments, it is the distribution that is most troubling.

Local governments’ short term debt is the most critical, with the highest potential for a financial blow up. In fact, the debt is so high that 78 cities and 99 counties would need to allocate 100 percent of their budget to service it.

A $640 billion central government stimulus plan enabled local governments to borrow heavily in 2009, in the wake of the global 2008 financial crisis. In order to borrow from banks, local governments set up special financial entities that carried out local infrastructure projects, mostly highways and airports.


According to the DRC report, 42 percent of these local debts mature at the end of 2012 and 53 percent by the end of 2013. The report examined 1734 of the special entities and found that more than 26 percent of them are losing money.

Since many local governments are experiencing difficulties in paying the interest on their loans, the probability is low that they will retire the debt on time. Many of the projects aren’t generating enough cash to service the debts, so some local governments have taken on new loans to retire old ones, compounding the problem.

It is very likely that the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) will be forced to introduce a new policy, extending the deadline for entities that cannot pay back the debt, according to the National Audit Office.

There is no sign that investment activity is leveling off, however. On the contrary, it is increasing. Because officials’ performance is measured by how much they boost the GDP, the incentive is high for them to overspend in order to create a track record of political achievement, leaving the debt for the next generation.

Wu Jinglian, a well-known Chinese financial scholar and State Council expert, points out that the current investment plan presented by local governments has reached 17 trillion RMB ($2.72 trillion). Addressing the 2012 International Financial Forum, he warned that the Chinese regime’s current economic growth stimulus plans are not sustainable, and will create dire consequences if deployed, as this paper reported in a Sept. 19 article.

Speaking in a closed door forum in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, in October 2011, economic scholar Larry Lang predicted that the local debt would cause an economic tsunami, as The Epoch Times earlier reported.

He warned: “Every province in China is Greece. All levels of government will go bankrupt in all aspects.”

 

http://www.theepocht...omb-307579.html

A tako si bio blizu da ispadneš pametan, doduše danas dalje nego juče, ali opet bitan je trud, trudiš se, a to je najbitnije.

E, a kad smo kod te teme, dug je toliko nebitan da je Soroš juče predložio da se dug još poveća i da se uvede novi stimulus paket za infrastrukturu, nove oblakodere, aerodrome i tako te In stvari.
A ono, pre par nedelja Warren isto predložio.
E sad, the best part - koga da slušaju ljudi - bilionere ili krpigaće, velika nedoumica.

Znaš, nemamo kineske probleme. E kad bi i Kinezi imali kom da utrpaju tako dolarčiće kao mi.

Nego da nastavimo, malo u stilu planinica naših divnih i velikih.
 

 

China’s “little” debt problem
5 September, 2012, 12:52. Posted by Zarathustra

Over-investment has knocked down returns on investments, and it becomes apparent when growth has slowed only to 7.6%. The consequence of that is that there is a little debt problem in China. The volume of debt is getting bigger, while the ability to service the debt is diminishing.

The latest major surge in investment happened after the 2008/09 financial crisis, and it was fuelled by credit. The government announced RMB4 trillion stimulus plan, and asked banks to lend as much as possible, that was how that happened. Later, the shadow banking system grew very rapidly, particularly after PBOC tighten policy to fight inflation. For a long time, we believe that there are more debts in the economy than anyone could have known. The trouble is that massive amount of debts which were used to finance a lot of the projects are not generating enough return on over-investment, as it has becoming rather apparent now. In order to sustain that, however, one of the ways is, ironically, to lend even more money to these enterprises.

The chart below clearly shows the very dramatic increase in credit after the 2008/09 financial crisis, and associated with it is the remarkable increase of the growth rate of money supply. With over-investment crushing returns already happening, there is little doubt to our mind that a lot of debts are going to be bad.



It is quite true that official data do not seem to show much increase in non-performing loans, and banks’ results have shown very little deteriorations of asset quality for the moment. However, as this is China, we need to look outside of data being reported officially, and sometimes into the obscure corner of shadow banking. The picture is certainly not great at all.

We have spent a great deal of time last year looking at shadow banking mess, particularly all those loan sharks, pawnshops, etc. As the economy slows, we have noted that quite a number of business owners were running away from creditors. And for the reasons that we still understand very little, the formal banking system ends up funding many investments indirectly through the shadow banking system, so there is little doubt that some of the mess will sooner or later appear in formal banking system.

We have also noted rather recently at the practise of credit guarantees. In one case, for instance, a Beijing-based credit guarantee company went bust as it was engaging in some sort of fraudulent behaviours which are not uncommon within the credit guarantee industry. In another, companies were offering guarantees for other companies’ loans, and ended up guaranteeing loans for each other. As one of the companies went bust, it dragged down some 600 companies which were within the chain. Some industries such as solar and steel are notably under pressure, plagued by mutual guarantee schemes of one form or another.

Meanwhile, it is becoming clear that local governments, as one of the drivers of post-crisis investment and credit, are now unable to service their debts. As it turns out, banks are not only not cutting loans or urging repayment, they simply roll over their debts. Recently, it is reported that big four banks actually increased lending to local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) in the first half instead of cutting them, even though the central government once looked keen to clean up the debts. Meanwhile, we see continued increase of debts owed by the Ministry of Railways as the rapid expansion of the past few years, particular in the high-speed rail area, is proved to be generating very little return, if at all.

And then there is the trust industry, explosive growth of wealth management products which may end up funding crap, etc. Meanwhile, the government starts getting worried about so-called “triangular debt” where companies simply owe money each other, mostly in forms of account receivables.

The chart below from Bank of America Merrill Lynch, shows that the debt situation in China in the recent years turns out to be not very much different from Japan in the late stage of its bubble, with the exception of household debt.



It is now clear that corporate profits are almost collapsing, and with overcapacity in the economy, it is unclear if profitability can improve dramatically in a very near-term, especially as external demand is clearly collapsing on the on-going Euro crisis, while domestic demand was merely sustained by investments, which is now becoming unsustainable because of low return and huge volume of debt. There is little doubt in our mind that some of the debts will inevitably turn bad, and banks will see their asset quality deteriorates. There are ways to delay that, of course, but it is inevitable.

Before going on, we need to make one thing clear. There is a huge volume of debt in China, and there might well be some debts that we probably will have no knowledge of until they blow up, so to speak. There is clearly a need for corporations to deleverage with such high debt and low return on their investments, and quite a portion of the debt will end up going bad. However, we are not sure if this would turn into some sort of a full-blown banking crisis where you see banks going bankrupt, or nation-wide bank-run or anything like that. In fact, while one economist at China’s State Council clearly thinks that some banks will fail, we are actually not as pessimistic as that.

Or, to be more precise, China can, at least theoretically, avoid that somewhat apocalyptic scenario if the government wishes to.

But that is not going to be an easy task due to various constraints, and it is also unclear if the government will actually like to idea of bailing out everyone and keep the credit tap open for the sake for maintaining growth and delay bad loans from surfacing.

 

http://www.alsosprac...bt-problem.html

Au, Japanče čekaj komšu, da pečete patku.
Onako reš pečeno, da krcka.

 

Nego:

 

 

Zero Hedge: China Has World’s Largest Credit Bubble

 

"It is therefore critical for the new leadership to pursue reforms that not only support the private sector, but also consumption more broadly, in order to utilize this capacity"

 

China has the largest credit bubble in the world as corporate debt as a percentage of GDP reached as high as 151%, Zero Hedge said in a recent report.

 

Hong Kong has the world’s second largest credit bubble with a 141% corporate debt /GDP, followed by Singapore, Malaysia and UK which has a corporate/debt percentage of 135%, 116% and 115% respectively, according to the news site’s findings based on statistics from central banks, Gao Hua Securities, as well as Goldman Sachs.

 

 

While government and consumer debt can be whatever China wants it to be, corporate debt, in keeping with Western-style reporting requirements, is far more difficult to obfuscate and falsify in recent years, the report said.

 

Zero Hedge also quoted Goldman Sachs as saying that the rapid rise of corporate leverage is concerning.

Corporate leverage in China rose to 130% of GDP in 2011, one of the highest corporate leverage ratios in the world, from 96% in 2008.

 

This high leverage is the result of substantial investment in the manufacturing sector since 2008, leading to over-capacity in many sectors such as solar energy, steel and ship building, the report cited Goldman Sachs.

 

“It is therefore critical for the new leadership to pursue reforms that not only support the private sector, but also consumption more broadly, in order to utilize this capacity,” said Goldman Sachs.

 

 

 

 

http://english.caiji.../112262841.html

Inače, sad malo novosti, divne su razbijaju

 

 

 

Fitch Warns On China Debt

1/09/2013 @ 9:48AM

China‘s credit-laden growth model is unsustainable, a Fitch Ratings Agency in Asia Pacific said Wednesday.
The Global Debt Bomb Daniel Fisher Daniel Fisher Forbes Staff
China 4Q GDP Seen At 7.9%, Bears Turn Bullish Kenneth Rapoza Kenneth Rapoza Contributor

“The debt issue is tightening constraints on the old investment-driven growth model,” Andrew Colquhoun, head of the agency’s Asia-Pacific Sovereigns section, said in the China Daily today.

The total amount of credit in China’s economy is currently about 190 percent of GDP, up from 124 percent at the end of 2008, Fitch said. China’s sovereign credit rating remains AA- but with a negative outlook. Fitch kept its stable outlook of A+ for the country’s foreign debt holdings. Rapidly expanding credit may risk balance sheets, it said.

“I think that China banks are definitely a cause for concern,” Allan Conway, a fund manager at Schroders in London said in a phone interview this week. “But having said that, I don’t think those problems come home to roost this year.”

Proponents of a China hard landing say that the big four government banks have a growing number of non-performing loans owed by cities and states across the country. Expanding credit to investment projects that struggle to show a profit in the medium term is a cause for concern for China investors.

China’s Big Four

The national banks was a favorite of short-sellers at this time last year due to the thesis of non-performing loans and tightening real estate policies designed to pop a looming housing market bubble.

 

 

http://www.forbes.co...-on-china-debt/

 

Edited by JimmyM, 27 January 2013 - 15:19.

[siogadjura]

Daklem, koga zanima deficit, a sve nas zanima , evo malo egzaktnih figuresa:

 

http://www.davemanue...ited-states.php

 

 

A History of Surpluses and Deficits in the United States
On this page you will find a history of surpluses and deficits in the United States, running all the way back until 1789.

Directly underneath you will find an up-to-date table that contains all of the budget surpluses and deficits in the United States from 1940 until present day, both in nominal dollars and inflation adjusted dollars. A projection for 2013 is included as well:

Deficits/Surpluses From 1940 Until 2013 (*fiscal years)

1* - Presidential control
2* - Senate control
3* - House control

D = Democrat R = Republican


Year    Nominal Dollars    Inflation Adjusted    1*    2*    3*
1940    $2.9 Billion Deficit    $47.54 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1941    $4.9 Billion Deficit    $76.56 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1942    $20.5 Billion Deficit    $288.73 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1943    $54.6 Billion Deficit    $728 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1944    $47.6 Billion Deficit    $618.18 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1945    $47.6 Billion Deficit    $610.26 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1946    $15.9 Billion Deficit    $187.06 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1947    $4 Billion Surplus    $41.24 Billion Surplus    D    R    R
1948    $11.8 Billion Surplus    $112.38 Billion Surplus    D    R    R
1949    $0.6 Billion Surplus    $5.77 Billion Surplus    D    D    D
1950    $3.1 Billion Deficit    $29.52 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1951    $6.1 Billion Surplus    $53.98 Billion Surplus    D    D    D
1952    $1.5 Billion Deficit    $12.93 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1953    $6.5 Billion Deficit    $56.03 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1954    $1.2 Billion Deficit    $10.26 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1955    $3 Billion Deficit    $25.64 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1956    $3.9 Billion Surplus    $32.77 Billion Surplus    R    D    D
1957    $3.4 Billion Surplus    $27.64 Billion Surplus    R    D    D
1958    $2.8 Billion Deficit    $22.22 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1959    $12.8 Billion Deficit    $100.79 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1960    $0.3 Billion Surplus    $2.33 Billion Surplus    R    D    D
1961    $3.3 Billion Deficit    $25.38 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1962    $7.1 Billion Deficit    $53.79 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1963    $4.8 Billion Deficit    $36.09 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1964    $5.9 Billion Deficit    $43.7 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1965    $1.4 Billion Deficit    $10.22 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1966    $3.7 Billion Deficit    $26.24 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1967    $8.6 Billion Deficit    $58.9 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1968    $25.2 Billion Deficit    $165.79 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1969    $3.2 Billion Surplus    $20 Billion Surplus    R    D    D
1970    $2.8 Billion Deficit    $16.57 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1971    $23 Billion Deficit    $129.94 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1972    $23.4 Billion Deficit    $128.57 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1973    $14.9 Billion Deficit    $76.8 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1974    $6.1 Billion Deficit    $28.37 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1975    $53.2 Billion Deficit    $226.38 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1976    $73.7 Billion Deficit    $297.18 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1977    $53.7 Billion Deficit    $203.41 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1978    $59.2 Billion Deficit    $208.45 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1979    $40.7 Billion Deficit    $128.39 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1980    $73.8 Billion Deficit    $205.57 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1981    $79 Billion Deficit    $199.49 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1982    $128 Billion Deficit    $304.04 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1983    $207.8 Billion Deficit    $478.8 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1984    $185.4 Billion Deficit    $409.27 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1985    $212.3 Billion Deficit    $452.67 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1986    $221.2 Billion Deficit    $462.76 Billion Deficit    R    R    D
1987    $149.7 Billion Deficit    $302.42 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1988    $155.2 Billion Deficit    $300.78 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1989    $152.5 Billion Deficit    $281.89 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1990    $221.2 Billion Deficit    $388.07 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1991    $269.3 Billion Deficit    $453.37 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1992    $290.4 Billion Deficit    $474.51 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
1993    $255.1 Billion Deficit    $404.92 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1994    $203.2 Billion Deficit    $314.55 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
1995    $164 Billion Deficit    $246.62 Billion Deficit    D    R    R
1996    $107.5 Billion Deficit    $157.16 Billion Deficit    D    R    R
1997    $22 Billion Deficit    $31.43 Billion Deficit    D    R    R
1998    $69.2 Billion Surplus    $97.33 Billion Surplus    D    R    R
1999    $125.6 Billion Surplus    $172.76 Billion Surplus    D    R    R
2000    $236.4 Billion Surplus    $314.78 Billion Surplus    D    R    R
2001    $127.3 Billion Surplus    $164.9 Billion Surplus    R    D    R
2002    $157.8 Billion Deficit    $201.02 Billion Deficit    R    D    R
2003    $377.6 Billion Deficit    $470.82 Billion Deficit    R    R    R
2004    $413 Billion Deficit    $501.21 Billion Deficit    R    R    R
2005    $318 Billion Deficit    $373.24 Billion Deficit    R    R    R
2006    $248 Billion Deficit    $282.14 Billion Deficit    R    R    R
2007    $161 Billion Deficit    $178.1 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
2008    $459 Billion Deficit    $488.82 Billion Deficit    R    D    D
2009    $1413 Billion Deficit    $1509.62 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
2010    $1294 Billion Deficit    $1360.67 Billion Deficit    D    D    D
2011    $1299 Billion Deficit    $1324.16 Billion Deficit    D    D    R
2012    $1100 Billion Deficit    $1100 Billion Deficit    D    D    R
2013    $900 Billion Deficit    $884.96 Billion Deficit    D    D    R


Source: Whitehouse.gov - Historical Tables (Table 1.1)






1789 to 1900 (Nominal Dollars)

1789 to 1849: Cumulative Surplus of $70 million dollars

1850 to 1900: Cumulative Deficit of $991 million dollars


1901 to 1939 (Nominal Dollars)

Year - Nominal Dollars - Surplus/Deficit


Major Events from 1940 to 2012

Great Depression - 1929 to 1938
WWII - 1939 to 1945
Korean War - 1950 to 1953
Vietnam War - 1955 to 1975 (US combat units deployed in 1965)
Oil Embargo - 1973
Soviet Union Collapses - 1991
Gulf War - 1990-1991
9/11 - September 11th, 2001
Iraq War - 2003 to 2011
Global Financial Meltdown - 2007 to ?



In the last 69 years, the U.S. government has managed to post 12 surpluses, with the most recent coming in 2001.

The largest uninterrupted stretch of surpluses came between 1920 and 1930. This eventually came to an end after the government spent billions of dollars combating the Great Depression.

The largest uninterrupted stretch of deficits came between 1970 and 1997.

It's hard to imagine that the United States will post a surplus anytime soon - will we give the 28 year stretch between 1970 and 1997 a run for its money?

 

I zakljucak je:

USA nece skoro doci u suficit, ebiga ali tako je...

[siogadjura]

Takodje, ova situacija sa deficitom je nevidjena jos od 2. svetskog rata:

 

http://www.reuters.c...E8941F720121006

 

 

U.S. deficit ends fourth fiscal year above $1 trillion: CBO By David Lawder

WASHINGTON | Fri Oct 5, 2012 8:14pm EDT

(Reuters) - The federal budget deficit for the just-ended 2012 fiscal year shrank by $207 billion from the prior year, but still marked its fourth straight year above $1 trillion, Congress' budget referee estimated on Friday.

The deficit equaled about 7 percent of U.S. economic output, down from 8.7 percent in 2011, 9 percent in 2010 and 10.1 percent in 2009, but it was still greater than in any other year since 1947, the non-partisan Congressional Budget Office said.

Economists generally consider any deficit that exceeds 3 percent of U.S. gross domestic product to be unsustainable in the long term.

CBO said a $75 billion surplus September surplus helped to hold the full-year fiscal 2012 deficit to $1.09 trillion, compared with a $1.297 trillion deficit in fiscal 2012.

The September surplus was just the second month in the black for the U.S. government since September 2008, when the country was in the throes of a financial crisis. The September data was buoyed by strong quarterly corporate income tax payments and $7 billion from the sale of shares in bailed-out insurer American International Group.

The U.S. Treasury is expected to release official final figures for the year ended September 30 next week.

Republicans, including presidential nominee Mitt Romney, have long been hammering President Barack Obama for overseeing four straight years of trillion-dollar deficits during his time in office. Democrats have countered that these were necessary to avoid another depression and help dig out of a deep recession they inherited.

Whether the U.S. deficit will mark a fifth year above $1 trillion in fiscal 2013 depends on how Congress handles the year-end "fiscal cliff" of expiring tax cuts and automatic spending cuts.

If that massive fiscal tightening happens as scheduled, the deficit could be as low as $641 billion next year, according to a CBO estimate in August. But if Congress keeps current tax rates in place and finds a way to avoid the spending cuts, CBO estimates the deficit at about where it is now -- $1.04 trillion.

In September's rare surplus, the CBO estimated that receipts grew $23 billion compared with a year earlier, while outlays shrank by $115 billion.

Most of the spending decline was the result of calendar shifts associated with benefit payments, but adjusting for this, there were some notable changes.

Net payments to government-controlled housing finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fell by $7 billion in September because they did not need any capital injections. Outlays for unemployment benefits fell by $6 billion while military spending fell by $5 billion.

For the full fiscal year, total receipts grew 6.4 percent to $2.45 trillion, while outlays fell 1.6 percent to $3.54 trillion, CBO estimated.

Individual income tax receipts rose 3.4 percent while corporate income tax collections rose 33.7 percent. Most categories of spending fell, except for Social Security benefits, which rose 5.9 percent, to $762 billion, and Medicare, which rose 3.2 percent to $469 billion after adjusting for offsetting receipts.

[JimmyM]

Daklem, koga zanima deficit, a sve nas zanima, evo malo egzaktnih figuresa:

 

DakleM se piše sa velikim M pošto je nepravilna rečca.

Kapiram da sam faca, pa pokušavaš da me kopiraš, ali ti čak ni to ne ide.

Treba diplomica.

Ne možeš svako da bude ko Jimmy.

 

USA nece skoro doci u suficit, ebiga ali tako je...

 

 

E, opet si promašio, odakle tebi da USA uopšte hoće u suficit?

 

DakleM, 50 godina je već u deficitu, nikakva novost, mislim ono, da joj to ne odgovara, dolar ne bi bio reserve currency, kapiram ja da hoćeš da te ušivam, ali ovako brutalno je već nehumano. 

 

Promašio si foru.

 

Hebiga, sada nisi bio čak ni blizu

 

Nego:

 

 

Takodje, ova situacija sa deficitom je nevidjena jos od 2. svetskog rata:

 

 

Batice, udaram te ko malog majmunčeta realno.

 

Nego pošto si "propustio" prethodnu stranicu da ponovimo

 

 

 

Buffett: U.S. debt on its own ‘not a problem’ Billionaire says deficit a lower percent of GDP than after World War II

 

 

Warren Buffett says the federal deficit is less of a problem than it’s made out to be.

 

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) — Billionaire Warren Buffett believes the federal deficit should be stabilized in relation to U.S. economic growth, but that the nation’s $16.4 trillion in red ink is not trouble in and of itself.

 

“It is not a good thing to have it going up in relation to GDP, that should be stabilized, but the debt itself is not a problem,” the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway said in an interview broadcast Sunday on the CBS “Sunday Morning” news show.“What is right about America just totally dwarfs what’s wrong with Washington. 535 people are not going to mess up 315 million over time. I know it.

 

The nation’s debt is “a lower percent of GDP [gross domestic product] than it was when we came out of World War II. You’ve got to think about it in relation to GDP,” added Buffett, a vocal advocate for increased taxes on the nation’s wealthiest, a stance he alluded to in the broadcast.

 

 

 

 

http://www.marketwat...blem-2013-01-20

 

 

 

E, kad bi svi mogli ovako da uživaju.

A sad gratis info, najbogatiji ljudi savetuju još veći dugić i još veći deficit, dakleM, ne smanjivanje, već povećanje!

Kapiraš koliko je onda realno problemče kad ih žiga levo žumance za njim

 

E sad, da Jimmy pređe na drugu, kako ono rekosmo, a da, paradigmu, pa da posetimo najveće balonče na svetu onako paradigmatično jelte

 

DakleM

 

 

 

China's End Game - The Dark Side Of A Great Deleveraging

 

1. The Central Bank: Aggressions and Frustrations

 

Just how far has China's economy deteriorated? For the answer, look no further than the current discomposure at the People's Bank of China. On July 5th, the PBOC cut interest rates for the second time in less than a month. Starting in December 2011, the FBOC cut the reserve ratio in increments of 50 bps in February and May to its current level at 20%.

 

On top of the rate reductions, the PBOC injected 225 billion Yuan ($34.5 billion USD) - its biggest injection in the past six months - into the money supply through repurchase agreements last Tuesday and Friday. There was already a combined injection of 291 billion Yuan that took place in June.

 

2. The Systematic Short Circuit of Debt Financing

 

Why is the PBOC so worried about liquidity? However high its aims, the PBOC is engaging in short-term fixes that will only act as a monetary band aid for the troubled economy. The central bank's aggressive liquidity maneuvers will at best sustain the over-leveraged economy and avoid the systematic short circuit of debt financing, for now.

 

The main drivers of China's debt financing, China's state-owned banks, are starving for cash. According to Citigroup estimates, seven of the biggest Chinese banks raised 323.8 billion Yuan ($51.4 billion) of new funds in 2011. Several banks are expected to raise another $17.7 billion in the next few months, with China's fifth-biggest lender, the Bank of Communications, raising $9 billion.

 

This unprecedented lending binge encouraged by the central government, increasingly rigorous capital requirements, and continuation of excessive dividend payouts have left Chinese banks - though they are the most profitable banks in the world - in a precarious situation. GaveKal's data shows that in 2010, China's five biggest banks - the Big Four and the Bank of Communications - paid more than 144 billion Yuan in dividends while raising more than 199 billion Yuan on the capital markets. The ballooning balance sheet driven by the loan frenzy and strict capital requirements exacerbated the need for cash. This March, China's Big Four - Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China - have a combined 14% increase in total assets, to 51.3 trillion Yuan, which is roughly the size of the German, French, and British economies combined.

 

Meanwhile, under a new set of rules, the country's biggest banks will need to increase their reserves to 11.5% of assets by the end of 2013. Their core tier 1 capital ratio will need to be at least 9.5%. These requirements are more stringent than the rules applied to American and European banks, so it is not surprising that Chinese banks are in dire need of cash.

 

 

 

3. Over-leveraged Economy, Unsustainable Bubbles

 

Ray Dalio wrote in his Principles that the credit-fueled Chinese economy is so over-leveraged that a great de-leveraging will be the only way out. No amount of monetary band aids can change that reality.

According to data from Fitch, the ratio of total financing/GDP in China rose from 124% at end‐2007 to 174% at end‐2010, and rose by another 5 bps to 179% in 2011. In Fitch, the growth of broad credit will slightly decelerate but will still outpace GDP.

 

Clearly, China is not suffering from a liquidity problem but a diminishing ROI. According to Fitch, in 2012, each Yuan in new financing will yield 0.39 Yuan in new GDP versus 0.73 Yuan pre-crisis. Returns would have to rise above 0.5 Yuan for domestic credit/GDP to stabilize at 179%, the rate back in 2011.

 

The dilemma is that businesses will need more and more credit to achieve the same results, so they will become more leveraged, less able to service the debt, and more prone to bankruptcy. There will be a turning point when the increasing number of bankruptcies will initiate an accelerating downward spiral for underling asset prices and drive up the non-performing loan ratio at banks. Then, the over-extended banking system will implode and an economic crisis will follow suit.

 

The chain reaction is set in motion - the question is when we will reach that turning point. The PBOC has only made the problem worse with its inability or unwillingness to tackle the root causes of China's economic problems - unsustainable economic bubbles and collapsing demand.

 

 

 

 

Developments in the construction industry in China can help illustrate the severity of the country's economic bubbles. According to Générale Générale, in 2010, China spent more than $1,000 billion on construction (including residential and non-residential real estate and infrastructure), representing approximately 20% of its nominal GDP, almost twice the world average.

 

 China's construction binge pushed its investment/GDP ratio to 48.5%, a record unprecedented in recent history in China or any other country. It's sufficient to say that China is a construction-led economy.

 

 

 

In 2010, China's cement consumption surpassed 1,800 mt, around 55% of global consumption and about 25 times of that of the US. With an average consumption of 1,400 kg per capita, China stands well above the average for the rest of the world, at 300kg. History shows that such high consumption is difficult to sustain in the long term and ultimately leads to a construction crisis.

 

In 2010, China built around 1.8 billion sq m of new residential floor space, the equivalent of the total residential floor space in Spain. This construction has already provided accommodation for 60 million people, though the urban population has merely increased by 20 million. If China were to maintain its current rate construction over the next five years, the 9 billion sq m of new housing area built would accommodate 300 million more people by 2015. The residential floor space in China will then be able to accommodate an urbanization rate of 65-70%, whereas according to the IMF, China will not reach that level of urbanization until 2030. Soon, China will have more and more cities like Ordos, a modern Chinese Ghost Town featured on Time Magazine.

 

 

For signs of its own impending construction bubble, China can look to pre-crisis Spain. Spain had a very high consumption per capita for years before its economy collapsed during the financial crisis. Spanish annual cement consumption topped off at nearly 1,300 kg per capita in 2007. Four years later, Spanish consumption stands at barely 500 kg per capita, down 60% from its peak. If China's cement consumption per capita continues at its current rate, sooner or later China's construction bubble will reach its end game.

 

 

Economic bubbles are unsustainable - it works like a Ponzi scheme. In the beginning, the excess liquidity unleashed by the central banks will drive asset prices higher and higher. More and more people will buy into the game, assuming the price will continue going up. Leverage will not be a problem, but when the de-leveraging starts, everyone will run for the exit. That's when any Ponzi scheme collapses. China's investment-fueled growth, with its construction binge, is just like a Ponzi scheme.

 

4. Myth: China's Transition toward a Consumption-led Economy

 

China can't rely on the excessive investment to propel its growth much longer. So what about seeking the growth from the other side of the economy: foreign and domestic demand? As for demand from foreigners, China's export growth is clearly slowing down. It would be difficult to increase the rate of export growth with trade partners drowning in debt crises. It may be equally as dangerous, as those trade partners may not hesitate to engage in a trade war, if necessary, to protect their economies.

 

China can sincerely hope that the EU and the US will soon bounce back from the economic abyss to return as its best customers, but that will not happen in the near future. As Ray Dalio said, this economic crisis is a great deleveraging, and it will take more than a decade to unwind. According to a report by Wealth Wealth Wealth Wealth, the great deleveraging will likely play out through 2020. The debt-to-income ratios must go down in the EU and the US. For China, export-led growth will no longer be as easy as it was before.

 

 

 

The Ponzi scheme of investment growth and the export growth are both collapsing; where else can China look to seek growth? The answer may be domestic demand, but it's not very convincing. China's domestic demand has a big job to do to fill the shoes of collapsing investment and export, due to several structural factors.

 

First - contrary to common belief - China's trade surplus is not caused by Chinese consumers' high saving rate, but rather their deteriorating disposable incomes, which lag far behind GDP growth and inflation. According to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), workers' wages/GDP ratio has gone down for 22 consecutive years since 1983.

 

It goes without saying that the consumption/GDP ratio is shrinking at the same time. Aggregate saving rate increased from 36% in 1996 to 51% in 2007, but it's not because Chinese consumers were tightening their purse strings. According to a report by the Development Research Center of the State Council, the growth is driven mainly by the government and corporations, not the household.

 

For the past 11 years, the household saving rate has only increased 3% from 19% to 22%. (India's household saving rate of 24% is higher than China's.) All the while, government and corporations' saving rate has increased from 17% to 22%, accounting for 80% of the increase in the aggregate saving rate.

 

For the past decade, the government's fiscal income has been growing faster than GDP or household income. In 2009, the fiscal income was 687.71 billion Yuan, and achieved an annual growth of 11.7%. At the time, GDP growth was 8.7%, urban household disposable income growth 8.8%, and agricultural household disposable income growth 8.2%. It seems that the state and the corporations have taken too much out of national income, weakening consumers rather than empowering them.

 

 

Second, state enterprises and corporations heavily dominate the income distribution. The deteriorating income inequity makes it harder for GDP growth to trickle down to the average consumer. In 2010, net profits from two central enterprises (China Mobile and Petrol China) outstrip net profits from the top 500 private enterprise combined. State enterprises contribute to only 30% of GDP and provide 20% of national employment, while private enterprises contribute to 70% of the GDP and provide 80% of the national employment. Monopoly enterprises also account for 55% of national wages. The widening income gap may direct more national income toward corruption, rent-seeking, capital flight, and speculation. The consumption side of economy will be continually weakened.

 

Right now, the biggest problem for China is that state enterprises and corporations have too much monopoly power over wealth creation and income distribution. Much of the GDP growth and the economic progress of special interest groups are made at the expense of consumers trapped in worsening relative poverty. If China's problems aren't solved, the faster the Chinese GDP growth, the less Chinese consumers will be able to support the expansion that is beyond their country's capacity, and the more export momentum China will need to sustain its growth. It is a vicious circle of global imbalance; even the revaluation of the Yuan will not be able to ratify it.

 

5. The End Game

 

Unsustainable economic bubbles and collapsing demand are the root causes plaguing China's economy. The PBOC's current maneuvers are not the solution; they at best can sustain the over-leveraged economy and avoid the systematic short-circuit of debt financing, for now. Apart from that, there will not be much liquidity invested in job creation since there is not enough demand to go around, and ROI will deteriorate.

If these structural deficiencies aren't properly addressed by the central government, things will only get worse. More frivolous interest rate cuts, reserve ratio cuts, and other similar gimmicks are sure to occur but to no avail. The chain reaction will be accelerated, and China will face its end game:the dark side of a great deleveraging.

 

 

 

 

http://seekingalpha....at-deleveraging

 

Au, pa u poređenju sa našom Kinicom, balonče našeg divnog Japana je mali bebac

 

Nego kad smo kod planinica, preferiram Mont Everest

Vidi se da se nalazi u Aziji

 

 

 

Global markets nervous about China’s mounting debt By John Chan In an effort to address growing international concerns over the huge debts accumulated by China’s local governments, the national audit office last week published its first-ever audit of their finances.

In late 2008, in response to the global financial crisis, Beijing resorted to a 4 trillion yuan ($US620 billion) stimulus package. Local governments were able to set up investment companies and aggressively borrow from state banks at low interest to build infrastructure and real estate projects.

As a result, according to a recent Credit Suisse study, Chinese banks issued credit totalling $2.7 trillion in 2009 and 2010. As Beijing has tightened credit, the lending slowed sharply in the first five months of 2011, but still reached $556 billion.

 

The national audit office said the total debt incurred by local governments by the end of 2010 was 10.7 trillion yuan or $1.65 trillion. About half ($767 billion) was held by local government-backed investment companies. Provincial, municipal and county governments had set up 6,576 financing vehicles, of which 358 had obtained further loans to cover expiring ones and 148 had defaulted.

An American political scientist, Northwestern University’s Victor Shih, has dismissed the national audit office’s finding because it only counted loans explicitly guaranteed by local governments, not those backed by state land and other state assets as collateral. He estimated that China’s actual debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio could be well over 150 percent, far higher than the official 27 percent.

 

Credit Suisse analyst Victor Chen warned last month: “China’s credit-to-gross domestic product ratio has risen to alarming levels in the past two years due to massive off-balance-sheet financing, and raised a red flag for future asset quality problems in banks.” Wang Tao, the chief China economist at UBS, predicted earlier last month that local government investment companies could produce non-performing loans worth as much as $460 billion in the next few years.

 

Fuelling the concerns are signs that the over-heated property market is heading for a major downturn. A sharp drop in property prices would seriously impact on local governments, which depend on land sales as a major revenue source.

 

Real estate prices had soared partly because industrial companies, seeking to offset lower profits, also channelled funds into property speculation. Prices reached such an absurd level that last year’s total land values in Beijing alone exceeded the GDP of the US, which is 2.5 times greater than China’s.

 

Subsequent measures to tighten bank lending led Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the outlook for China’s property sector to “negative” in mid-June. S&P analyst Bei Fu told the Financial Times: “In the near term, what worries us most is the liquidity position of developers, who are facing very tight lending control. In this situation developers really need to rely on their own sales but this is a highly uncertain prospect given government attempts to suppress the market and the fact sales volumes have already started to come down.”

 

Moody’s also cut its outlook for Chinese property developers from stable to negative in April. Moody’s predicted that the sales volume in big cities this year could see a 25-30 percent fall, even as most developers planned to boost sales by 20-40 percent. S&P warned that the resulting oversupply could generate a “price war” among developers.

 

Nicolas Lardy, an American expert on the Chinese economy, who earlier dismissed the notion of a property bubble, changed his mind last month, predicting that China was heading for a “major, major economic correction.”

At the root of the crisis is China’s role as a global cheap labour platform. Low wages for workers mean that domestic consumption accounts for a very small share of GDP. Capital investment provides close to 50 percent of GDP. The enormous and rising output must be exported, especially to Europe and the US.

 

Even before the global financial crisis, overcapacities plagued many industries. While an estimated 110 million members of the Chinese middle classes constitute the world’s largest car market, for instance, they account for only 8 percent of the country’s population and their total purchasing power is only 6 percent of the American consumer market.

 

Standard Chartered economist Stephen Green recently estimated that half the Chinese GDP is now linked to the real estate market, including the construction, steel, concrete, power and home appliance industries. Because of the slowing property market, manufacturing barely grew in June. Credit Suisse now predicts next year’s GDP growth will be just 8.5 percent, down from 9-10 percent this year.

 

There is deep fear in Beijing’s ruling elite that the worsening financial turmoil in Europe will unleash economic instability in China, given that Europe is China’s largest export market, and Beijing holds euro-denominated assets worth 600 billion euros. Seeking to assure European political and business leaders of China’s economic strength, Premier Wen Jiabao toured Hungary, Britain and Germany last week. In a Financial Times article, Wen wrote: “There is concern as to whether China can rein in inflation and sustain its rapid development. My answer is an emphatic yes.”

 

Talking to a group of Chinese students in the UK, however, Wen admitted that social unrest was a major threat: “My experience is that if inflation goes with corruption, they could undermine a regime’s stability and a society’s harmony.” Wen previously admitted that it would be hard to keep inflation under 4 percent. The consumer price index reached 5.5 percent in May—the highest in 34 months—with food prices up by over 11 percent in a year.

 

Wen, who was a central government official in 1989, knows that the initial student protest opened the door for a mass movement of the working class angered by hyperinflation and rampant official corruption. He was part of the Stalinist regime that crushed the movement with tanks and troops in Tiananmen Square and police state repression in other cities.

 

Many in global financial circles remain anxious about the recent protests of migrant workers, who clashed with riot police in Zengcheng, and signs of a new wave of strikes among factory workers. Moody’s Investor Service stated last month: “We do not see negative credit implications from the recent unrest because it has remained localised.” Then it added: “What we do see are clouds gathering on the economic horizon at a time when social unrest is apparently rising.”

 

All the signs are that the Chinese regime is sitting on a social time bomb, which could be triggered either by slowing economic growth or a new global financial meltdown. While the exact forms of the eruption cannot be predicted, it will certainly involve the country’s multi-million working class that has grown immensely since 1989.

 

 

 

 

http://www.wsws.org/...7/chin-j04.html

 

Au

 

Kažem, čekamo Indiju, da vidimo da li će tu makar biti nešto konkretno. Od Kine pored ovolikog balončeta još i smanjivanje radne snage, penzioneri, pa ja sam iznenadŽen, potresao sam se sada jako, neću moći da pajkim, mislim ovo će biti bubble burst veka...Hm kakvog veka milenijuma, ovde će prštati na sve strane, biće ludilo, osećam

 

Obožavam žurke

 

Moramo da otpevamo Kininu novu nacionalnu himnu, pokidala je

 

 

Ojhaaaaa idemo, pršti, pršti bela staza evo Deda Mraza, jupi

 

A sad vesti

 

 

Austria's Far-Right Call for In/Out Referedum on Eurozone

 

Bulgaria in EU | January 24, 2013, Thursday

Leader of Freedom Party of Austria (FPOE) Heinz-Christian Strache gestures during a party convention in Graz, Styria 18 June 2011. Photo by EPA/GNES

 

Austrian people should be given the opportunity to have their say on Europe and the eurozone in an in/out referendum, the leader of the country's far-right party has said.

 

Saying he was inspired by British Prime Minister David Cameron's promise of a referendum on whether to leave the European Union, FPÖ head Heinz-Christian Strache told the daily Österreich this was just the kind of direct democracy Austria needed as well.

 

"If the EU develops into a centralised super-state then the final consequence for Austria would be an EU exit. I would rather have an alliance with Switzerland," Strache said, as cited by EurActiv.

 

"It would make sense to have a referendum on a euro exit," he said.

 

Strache, whose opposition party has consistently scored more than 20% in opinion polls in the run-up to parliamentary elections due by September, has long been a eurosceptic.

 

He has opposed bailouts of struggling countries in the currency bloc, and proposed splitting the eurozone into two camps: economically stronger northern European countries and weaker ones on the periphery.

 

Strache's statement comes just a day after UK Prime Minister David Cameron said he wanted to renegotiate the UK's relationship with the EU and then give people the "simple choice" between staying in under those new terms, or leaving the EU.

 

If his Conservative Party wins again in an election due in 2015, Cameron said, the new arrangement would be put to voters in an in-or-out referendum by the end of 2017.

 

The news was welcomed by eurosceptics who have long campaigned for a vote.

 

Germany and France however were quick to warn Cameron that Britain cannot pick and choose EU membership terms.

 

The response from most European capitals, including Austria and Denmark, was that we don't want Britain to leave, but when you join a club, you have to abide by the rules.

 

 

http://www.novinite....s.php?id=147169

 

R.I.P. EU

 

Moraće da se glasa ponovo, ovaj poll ostavlja svetu loš utisak o Srbima, ispada da nemaju pojma o ekonomiji

Doduše i nemaju, ali to ne trebaju drugi da znaju!

Mora da se kamuflira srBska inteligencija

Mislim, da me ne blamirate pred drugima

Edited by JimmyM, 28 January 2013 - 00:27.

[Kinik]

...

 

Ima li ovde Moderacije?

 

...

[bojant]

Daklem, koga zanima deficit, a sve nas zanima , evo malo egzaktnih figuresa:

 

http://www.davemanue...ited-states.php

 

 

 

I zakljucak je:

USA nece skoro doci u suficit, ebiga ali tako je...

Cemu sluzi uopste drzavni suficit?

uz to, pre cetiri godine je deficit bio trilion ipo, sada ide ispod triliona, znaci pada brzo. ukoliko je cilj pravljenje suficita, moguce ga je ostvariti kroz 6-7 godina manjim prilagodjavanjem, ali cilj je pozaposljavati ljude, razviti infrastrukturu... takoda ekonomija moze da raste

 

...

 

Ima li ovde Moderacije?

 

...

ocigledno da nema

Dzimijevo nepostovanje sagovornika (bez obzira koliko njegovi postovi bili tacni i postovi sagovornika nebulozni) i nacin komunikacije je strasan i morao bi se dovesti u red

[Ibiza]

Cemu sluzi uopste drzavni suficit?

uz to, pre cetiri godine je deficit bio trilion ipo, sada ide ispod triliona, znaci pada brzo. ukoliko je cilj pravljenje suficita, moguce ga je ostvariti kroz 6-7 godina manjim prilagodjavanjem, ali cilj je pozaposljavati ljude, razviti infrastrukturu... takoda ekonomija moze da raste

 

ocigledno da nema

Dzimijevo nepostovanje sagovornika (bez obzira koliko njegovi postovi bili tacni i postovi sagovornika nebulozni) i nacin komunikacije je strasan i morao bi se dovesti u red

Tesko jer je batica zesce iskompleksiran.

[alexnikolic]

@JimmyM - poslednje upozorenje pred zesci ban! Pises dobre tekstove, izostavi kvalifikacije na racun sagovornika. Sukobljavaj misljenje, ne ljude. 

[brusli]

Cemu sluzi uopste drzavni suficit?

uz to, pre cetiri godine je deficit bio trilion ipo, sada ide ispod triliona, znaci pada brzo. ukoliko je cilj pravljenje suficita, moguce ga je ostvariti kroz 6-7 godina manjim prilagodjavanjem, ali cilj je pozaposljavati ljude, razviti infrastrukturu... takoda ekonomija moze da raste

Zar ovo nije liberalni kapitalizam gde drzava treba da ostavi trziste na miru da se "samoregulise", sta ima ona da zaposljava i pravi deficit ?

[bojant]

Zar ovo nije liberalni kapitalizam gde drzava treba da ostavi trziste na miru da se "samoregulise", sta ima ona da zaposljava i pravi deficit ?

i ako ga ostavis na miru

cemu sluzi drzavni suficit i ekstraktovanje resursa iz ekonomije bez vracanja u istu