Jao što sam srećan, sad kad vidiš šta sam sve spremio za tebe, umrećeš od sreće, osećam
Alan Greenspan: WE CAN ALWAYS PRINT MORE MONEY
Lepo kaze glavni i odgovorni cova da ce da printaju lovu kolko god treba da bi pokrili dug. A dug je :
Tako je, slažeš se onda sa nama
"The United States can pay any debt it has because we can always print money to do that. So there is zero probability of default" said Greenspan on NBC's Meet the Press.
This is basically true
It's just what we do every day. And the market is fine with it.
E, inače, opet si promašio batice, glavni čovek je Bern Bernake, nisi u toku, zato i proživljavaš buru sa mnom, mislim kapiram da je očaj kod tebe, ne možeš da uspeš da ispadneš dasa, pa ti je krivo, razumem ja tebe, ono, prešao sam u kategoriju 5, razorni uragan, nije lako sa takvim kapacitetom, ali može to malo ozbiljnije, ovo je za Jimmyja dečja igra.
Michael Hudson On Why US Debt Problem Is Ficticious (& Why Peter Schiff Is Wrong)
Opet si bio blizu i opet doživeo debakl.
A dug je :
E, divan sajt još kad ga otvoriš ispod i vidiš da Evropa ima veći dug od Amerike, au, neprocenjivo
Čak je i sama Nemačka u većem dugu.
Znači, ti to hvališ Ameriku, stvarno nisam očekivao, čast mi je, bravo, tako se to radi.
Stampaju i Kinezi, ali tamo je potpuno druga paradigma
Au, pa ti stvarno sam sebe pržiš, ne treba ja uopšte da se javljam (ali hoću naravno, bez brige).
Wordpress bloger, fan made besplatne igračke i tako to, mislim prošlo ti batice- al zamalo
Kako volim kad vidim svoju nadmoć, prosto je i ja osetim, onako sva sija
Mislim, kapiram ja da si očajan, zato ću te opet besplatno naučiti kako se to radi.
Pokušaj da nalaziš fanfree blogiće bez podnaslova "INVESTIGATING NEW WORLD ORDER BIG PHARMA EUGENICS", mislim zbog tebe, jer je kod njih Rotšildče glavni krivac za NWO...
...a on inače hoće da uništi evro kao valutu i usput ludački kupuje dolare (tako čak i razara evro), pa ono, time realno pržiš sam sebe ko vruće krompiriće.
Možda (ali pazi, samo možda, još nije potvrđeno!) čak i više nego što bih to ja uradio, a to je jako teško postići, kao što znaš
Sad ću da plakim
A sad da Jimmy pređe na ozbiljne stvari, NWO i te fore ne prolaze kod njega, osim ukoliko nema profita i to isključivo po principu cash na ruke
DakleM, ubo si ga, al kao i uvek - zamalo, paradigma jeste drugačija, ali naravno, u donjem smislu.
Kina ono ima unutrašnji dug, pa zato štampa lovicu, jer joj se interni dug urušava kao Japanu i toga je svesna, a nema ko da ga servisira, jer je unutrašnji, jelte, nije spoljašni i zato je jedini preostali način da se nastavi valcer. Štampanje, gradnja gradova gde živi Kasper sa drugarima, dok ne dođe onaj zli patak i pojede ih, kao što je pojeo nekoliko azijskih zemljala devedesetih, onako lančano.
A sad će da ujka Jimmy da pokaže paradigmu i kako si ti nama sve to fino objasnio, mislim paradigmatično, podrazumeva se
Shankar Sharma & Devina Mehra: China's $22 trillion time-bomb
China's growth model is based on the oldest rapid economic growth hormone available: debt
Shankar Sharma & Devina Mehra / Mar 02, 2012, 00:08 IST
For years, a wispy, gossamer dream has been spun by economists working for Wall Street investment banks about how China has managed the impossible: high growth with a very low debt-to-GDP ratio. The dream has been so aggressively sold that almost everybody believes it, including editors of this newspaper who have written glowingly about China’s growth, how far ahead it is of India, how India should give up this race once and for all and so on.
Like all things churned out by Wall Street, this romantic story is also complete rubbish. Regardless of the level of education, we all behave the same way when we analyse countries: we land at the airport, see multi-lane highways, gleaming skyscrapers in the city centre, massive infrastructure development, teeming shopping malls, tall apartment blocks and golf courses. And immediately jump to the conclusion that this country has done it. It has made it. If you are an Indian, you say this country has left India behind by 100 or 200 years.
Just as behind nearly every rapid economic growth story, lies hidden, debt. Usually lots of it. Just like Ireland that went from being a really poor country in the 1980s to getting to the top of European Union’s per capital GDP league tables — all within 20 years or so.
China is no exception. The common wisdom is that China runs a very low debt-to-GDP ratio of around 30 per cent (this ratio was in the low 20s till 2007 but jumped sharply during the 2008 crisis), which gives it lots of firepower to keep reflating the economy and to keep recapitalising its banks. The reality is that this ratio is plain wrong. China’s growth model is based on the oldest rapid economic growth hormone available: debt.
China has debt at various levels and pockets. Let’s add to this central debt, the local government and provincial debt figures. This figure is around $1.9 trillion. Let’s further add the obligations of the Ministry of Railways. That’s $360 billion. And finally let’s also add 80 per cent of outstanding bank credit. This adds $6.3 trillion. We add bank loans to national debt because unlike most countries, China uses banks for nearly all of its directed, policy lending programmes. For example, the stimulus of 2008-09 was financed largely by banks. By pushing its lending via the banks’ balance sheets, China creates the impression of a country that has very low budget deficits and, of course, very low central debt. We take 80 per cent of bank debt into the national debt figures under the assumption that 20 per cent goes towards consumer and private sector credit.
Now let’s total up the few trillions we have unearthed. As of 2011, this figure amounted to a tad over $10 trillion! And the ratio of total debt to GDP becomes a more ominous 149 per cent. Mind you, there may be other debts that are obligations of the central government that we don’t know about since reliability of data in China is suspect, to say the least. It is eminently possible that debt is understated and GDP overstated.
But the story gets worse from hereon. China’s growth model is highly capital or, more accurately, debt intensive. We have calculated a ratio called DIG (debt intensity of GDP), that is, the amount of debt needed to generate one unit of GDP. This ratio started out being in the 0.9 to 1.2 range in the first half of the nineties. During the Asian crisis, this ratio worsened to around two as China again threw loads of debt to come out of the slowdown. The ratio subsided a bit to below one in the boom years from 2003 to 2007. But it jumped dramatically to over four in 2008 as China threw a huge amount of money at an unprecedented slowdown. The trouble is that given the overall low growth environment globally and the worsening trade situation for China, generating a unit of GDP growth now requires higher and higher doses of debt. And, in hindsight, we will look back and say this stimulus of 2008-09 was a colossal mistake.
So what does the DIG ratio lead us to? See the table.
As we can see, each crisis leads to a worsening of the DIG ratio and, concomitantly, a sharp worsening of the total debt-to-GDP ratio as China starts building bridges and roads to nowhere in order to reflate.
The bigger problem lies ahead. Given this inclined treadmill model, if China grows faster, the bigger the debt problem becomes. For the sake of calculation, let’s assume the DIG ratio goes to 1.7 over the next four years till 2016 and that China wishes to grow at eight per cent. The total debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of 2016 becomes 180 per cent, up from the 150 per cent of 2011! In absolute terms, China’s total debt will reach $22 trillion. Coupled with a worsening demographic picture, this high total debt-to-GDP ratio becomes a trap from which there is virtually no escape. To compound the problem, China’s private consumption expenditure ( PCE) to GDP has declined sharply to 33 per cent from 55 per cent 20 years ago. The ratio of net exports to GDP has fallen to 3.9 per cent in 2010, from 8.8 per cent in 2007. It’s only the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP that has jumped to over 50 per cent in 2011 from 25 per cent a few years ago. As is clear, if China has to maintain its pace of growth, it has to pile on more debt. If it slows down, its social powder keg starts getting incendiary.
We are not even counting the burgeoning, widespread non-performing loans problem that is looming large and will, in all probability, lead to China’s fourth systemic banking crisis in less than 25 years. If this is a growth model, then it is even worse than the Western growth model.
So, the bullets China has in order to emerge from this rock-and-a-hard-place situation are few, if any at all. China is indeed riding the tiger. In contrast, India’s is the Toyota Prius of growth models. India should simply avoid the trap of excessive public spending on infrastructure. That’s where almost every country in Asia, including Japan in the nineties to China and Dubai now, has run into problems. India’s growth model is infinitely more robust and time will prove this to a world bedazzled by China.
To su te paradigme
China’s Ticking Debt Bomb
China appeared to weather the global economic downturn better than most. But massive local government debt could bring growth to a screeching halt.
China’s remarkable economic rebound after the global economic crisis in 2008-2009 has been a source of envy and puzzlement for the rest of the world. Instead of recession, the Chinese economy has recorded double-digit growth, and is actually showing signs of overheating – a sharp contrast with the stagnation in most Western countries. How did the Chinese do it? Perhaps advocates of ‘Chinese exceptionalism’ are right after all: Beijing has found a secret formula of economic success that has eluded the West.
Part of the answer to this mystery was given in late June by the Chinese government. It turns out that Beijing has managed to keep its economy growing during the global slump by resorting to massive bank lending to local governments, which then went on an infrastructure spending binge that’s certain to haunt the country for years to come. If we remember the causes of the economic crisis that has ravaged the United States and Western Europe, the most important one is something euphemistically termed ‘credit boom’ – excessive lending and borrowing that fuelled housing bubbles and unsustainable consumption. China seems to have been afflicted with the same disease, with only one major variation: much of the debt incurred in China has gone into the infrastructure sector, not consumption. So much for Chinese exceptionalism.
Based on the figure released by the National Audit Office (NAO) at the end of June, local governments have accumulated debts totalling 10.7 trillion renminbi (RMB) or $1.65 trillion – about 27 percent of China’s GDP in 2010. Because the NAO’s figure was based on a sampling of 6,500 local government-backed financial vehicles (out of more than 10,000 such vehicles nationwide), the actual magnitude of local government indebtedness is much greater. The People’s Bank of China, the central bank, recently estimated that local government debt totalled 14 trillion RMB (most of which was owed to banks), almost 30 percent higher than the NAO figure.
Several interesting questions are raised by the revelation of local government debt in China. First and foremost, it has shown that public finance in China is in much worse shape than previously thought. On paper, China’s debt to GDP ratio is under 20 percent, making Beijing a paragon of fiscal virtue compared with profligate Western governments. However, if we factor in various government obligations that are typically counted as public debt, the picture doesn’t look pretty for China. Once local government debts, costs of re-capitalizing state-owned banks, bonds issued by state-owned banks, and railway bonds are included, China’s total debt amounts to 70 to 80 percent of GDP, roughly the level of public debt in the United States and the United Kingdom. Since most of China’s debt has been borrowed in the last decade, China is on an unsustainable trajectory at the current rate of debt accumulation, particularly when economic growth slows down, as it’s expected to do in the coming decade.
The second question to be asked here is whether local governments can service the debts and repay the loans. If they have made sound infrastructure investments that generate income streams, debt accumulation isn’t a problem. Unfortunately, that doesn’t appear to be the case for most infrastructure projects built by local governments. Typically, such projects are highly leveraged, with local governments putting in little equity capital and borrowing nearly all the costs. This makes debt-servicing a huge burden.
There are only two sources of income to service such debts. One is to sell land controlled by local governments (land is used as collateral for securing bank loans). The other is to use the cash flow generated by these projects (power plants, ports, and toll roads). With the frothy real estate teetering, local governments shouldn’t count on land sales to come to their rescue. The economic viability of their newly invested infrastructure projects is even more abysmal. One banking regulator revealed that only one third of these projects can produce enough cash flow to service their loans. This implies that local governments won’t be able to recoup the bulk of their infrastructure investments – or repay the banks.
So what about the economic consequences of this ticking debt bomb?
Because about half of the bank loans borrowed by local governments will come due in the next two years, we can expect a short-term repayment crisis. Chinese state-owned banks will have to roll over these loans, pretending that they are still performing. They may even have to lend local governments new money to pay the interests on these loans. The net effects of such accounting gimmicks would be reduced profitability for Chinese banks, admittedly not a cause for real concern. But accounting tricks can only temporarily delay the inevitable.
The longer term effects of massive non-performing loans owed to state banks by local governments are likely to manifest not in the form of a banking crisis, but in other more insidious – yet equally – harmful ways. Because the Chinese state owns trillions of RMB in assets (land, natural resources, state-owned monopolies, and $3 trillion in foreign exchange), Beijing should have enough resources to bail out local governments when these loans have to be repaid. But there’s no free lunch. Bailing out local governments with valuable financial resources in the coming decade – a decade in which China will experience the end of the demographic dividend, rising costs of healthcare and pensions, and slower economic growth – will mean China will have less capital to invest. For an investment-led economy, this implies even more sluggish growth.
It’s tempting to blame irresponsible and corrupt local government officials for wasting the country’s precious capital. That would be unfair. While there are no doubt unscrupulous local officials who see Beijing’s bank-funded stimulus plan as a golden opportunity to line their pockets, the behaviour of local governments is perfectly rational: they would be fools if they hadn’t jumped on the gravy train of freely available bank loans in the last two years. From their perspective, China’s system of public finance is grossly unfair to local governments. Beijing collects the bulk of taxes (60 percent of all taxes), but spends little on social services, which local governments must fund. Unlike their Western counterparts, local governments can’t issue bonds to borrow money. So if they want to develop local infrastructure (which Beijing doesn’t fund, either), the only source of financing is bank loans.
For all practical purposes, bank loans borrowed by government entities are actually free money – they don’t have to be repaid even when they go sour. Beijing has always come to the rescue, something local government officials are fully aware of. But we all know what happens when people get to spend free money.
Jao, jao, jao
China's debt nearing international warning levels: report
Continued borrowing to fund government projects is bringing China's debt to dangerous levels, says a think tank report. (File photo/Xinhua)
China's debt levels are nearing the international warning level, says the Development Research Center of the State Council, a thinktank under Taiwan's cabinet.
According to a report from the center published on Oct. 22, China's total liabilities had reached 23.76 trillion yuan (US$3.8 trillion) by the end of 2010, equaling as much as 59% of that year's GDP.
Wei Jianing, the center's vice minister of economic research, said repayment dates for loans arranged in 2009 are fast approaching. Local debt needs to be closely monitored given the tightening of real estate regulations and a reduction in government land premiums, he added.
China's National Audit Office also released a report stating that 42% of local government debt needs to be repaid by the end of 2012, with another 54% to be repaid by the end of 2013.
Wei said the government's ability to repay all of these debts in time is a concern as it continues to borrow despite falling fiscal incomes. There are inherent contradictions in the country's financial system given that the government controls the lending platforms and regulations, he said.
Local government debt, in particular, is said to be growing out of control, expanding from 1 trillion yuan (US$160 billion) in 2003 to 4 trillion yuan (US$639 billion) in 2006 and 10.7 trillion yuan (US$1.7 trillion) last year.
Experts say that the major risks of growing local government debt lie in the various local financial vehicles, through which 4.97 trillion yuan (US$795 billion) has been borrowed. Around 26%, or 1,734, of these financing vehicles are said to be registering losses.
A kad smo već kod Kinice, rast će još brže propadati nego što se očekivalo do sada
China's new leaders facing tough economic choices
Published October 21, 2012
BEIJING – China's economic model that delivered three decades of double-digit growth is running out of steam and the country's next leaders face tough choices to keep incomes rising. But they don't seem to have ambitious solutions. Even if they do, they will need to tackle entrenched interests with backing high in the Communist Party.
The cost of inaction could be high. The World Bank says without change, annual growth could sink to 5 percent by 2015 -- dangerously low by Chinese standards. Some private sector analysts give even gloomier warnings.
Nego paradigma izgleda i u spoljašnjem pravi problemče
Beijing Blasts Washington on Debt Crisis
“When countries across the world hold breath watching the debt negotiations between the Democrats and Republicans in Washington, they are once again ‘kidnapped’ by U.S. domestic politics,” complains Beijing’s official Xinhua News Agency in a blistering July 28 commentary entitled “Bring Some Sense of Global Responsibility to Brinkmanship-Obsessed Washington.” “Given the United States’ status as the world’s largest economy and the issuer of the dominant international reserve currency, such political brinkmanship in Washington is dangerously irresponsible, for it risks, among other consequences, strangling the still fragile economic recovery of not only the United States but also the world as a whole.”
The Federal government reached its $14.29 debt limit on May 16, and the Treasury Department has announced the U.S. will default unless the ceiling is raised by August 2. At the moment, it’s not clear whether President Obama, Senate Majority Leader Reid, and House Speaker Boehner—all representing polarized constituencies—will come to terms by Tuesday. Beijing officials, who are used to being in control, are freaking out as they watch a drama without a script.
Chinese officials know there’s virtually no chance of that. For one thing, all U.S. debt is denominated in dollars so the Federal Reserve can always print more of them to retire the Federal government’s obligations when they come due. As important, Washington is confronting the issue of debt before it absolutely has to. After all, the “crisis” would not have occurred if Congress had simply raised the debt limit and ignored the matter as it did so many times in the past. According to the Treasury, Congress has, in some fashion, raised the debt ceiling 78 times since 1960.
Beijing, of course, has no debt ceiling to raise, and so it has avoided a public airing of its problems. And China’s debt situation is at least as serious as America’s. Chinese leaders tell us their country’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 17% at the end of last year, but the figure is more like 89% according to Beijing-based Dragonomics. If the respected research firm is correct, then China’s ratio was just about the same as America’s, which was around 93% then. And a growing number of analysts disagree with the Dragonomics figure, putting China’s ratio as high as 160%.
The wide discrepancy is largely due to the counting of China’s so-called “hidden debts,” especially those incurred by local governments and the state banks. Yet there are other off-the-books obligations, including central government debt incurred for municipal and other local projects, Ministry of Finance guarantees related to partial bank recapitalizations, debt extended by multilateral institutions (such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) and by other governments, borrowings by China Development Bank and the other “policy banks,” and miscellaneous obligations such as grain subsidy payments. Moreover, some debt issued to pay for foreign exchange that has been added to the country’s bulging reserves may also be unrecorded.
Dobro, Jimmy je fleksibilac, nije smak sveta što Kina ide kod Japana u goste, čekamo mi našu Indiju, možda bude malo ozbiljnije, makar se nadam da će ta ekipa za druženje moći da ubode nešto, mislim da ne moram da i sa njima pravim palačinke.
Edited by JimmyM, 27 January 2013 - 00:03.